

MANUAL
OF
SOCIAL ETHICS

REVEREND JAMES KAVANAGH
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A proper understanding and practical application of the Church's social, that is moral, teaching is a matter of prime importance to-day, and has been repeatedly urged by His Holiness Pope Pius XII and his predecessors.

The Dublin Institute of Catholic Sociology established by His Grace Most Rev. Dr. McQuaid, Archbishop of Dublin and Primate of Ireland, has proved an invaluable medium for promoting this vital work amongst the laity and in the short time since its inception many hundreds of men and women have benefited from its courses. It numbers manual workers, clerks, employers, tradesmen, civil servants and many others amongst its students.

In this testing ground, Father Kavanagh—who studied economics at Oxford and is now Director of the Institute—planned a text-book that would serve the needs of his students and bring together essential material which had hitherto been available only in a number of separate books.

But he has done much more than make a synthesis of existing material. To the writing of this book he has brought the easy familiar manner and down-to-earth viewpoint which have made him so popular with his students. Readers will feel at once that they have here a practical and reliable guide to the solution of the many problems which confront lay men and women in their spheres of work and social relations generally.

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BY

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INTRODUCTION

THIS book has been compiled primarily to meet the needs of the many adults attending the course of the Dublin Institute of Catholic Sociology. Perhaps it may be of assistance to others who are interested in the Social Question.

In this Manual, some of the main problems of Social Ethics are treated. The object has been to be as brief as possible without, it is hoped, sacrificing clarity.

I have not written this book for the expert, but for the average adult. I have taken a good deal of care to see that the opinions expressed are not without serious foundation, and generally I have tried to focus attention on certain "key" passages of the Encyclicals.

The interest of so many in these Social Questions is the response undoubtedly to the pleas of successive popes. Pope Pius XI in the Encyclical *Divini Redemptoris* says: "Catholic Action is in effect a social apostolate also, inasmuch as its object is to spread the Kingdom of Jesus Christ not only among individuals, but also in families and in society. It must, therefore, make it a chief aim to train its members with special care and to prepare them to fight the battles of the Lord. This task of formation, now more urgent and indispensable than ever, which must always precede direct action in the field, will assuredly be served by study-circles, social weeks, lecture-courses, and the various other activities undertaken with a view to making known the Christian solution of the social problem."

In the same Encyclical he declares that "if the manner of acting of some Catholics in the social-economic field has left much to be desired, this has often come about

because they have not known and pondered sufficiently the teachings of the Sovereign Pontiffs on these questions."

I have devoted the first chapter to a consideration of the Natural Law, a subject which is of the utmost importance. It is not an easy subject, but I believe it is essential to begin the study of Social Ethics with a statement of fundamental principles. The function of the Church as the defender of Natural Law is then explained—and it is hoped that this approach to the subject will have a message for the many outside the Church, to whom Pope Pius XI in the Encyclical *Divini Redemptoris* extended a warm invitation to join in the battle against the powers of darkness.

I wish to express my very sincere thanks to His Grace, Most Rev. John Charles McQuaid, Archbishop of Dublin and Primate of Ireland, for his insistent encouragement in the writing of this Manual. His founding of the Dublin Institute of Catholic Sociology is but another indication of His Grace's "up-to-date" solicitude for the members of his flock.

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CHAPTER I

THE NATURAL LAW

At the outset it is necessary to stress that this subject—the Natural Law—is fundamental in Social Ethics. Listen to the voice of Pope Pius XII in his Encyclical, *Summi Pontificatus* (1939) in which he discusses the causes of international chaos—"Both in private life and in the State itself, and moreover in the natural relations of race with race, of country with country, the *one universal standard of morality* is set aside—by which we mean the natural law, now buried away under a mass of destructive criticism and neglect. This natural law reposes as upon its foundation, on the notion of God, the Almighty Creator and Father of us all, the supreme and perfect lawgiver, the wise and just rewarder of human conduct. When the willing acceptance of that eternal will is withdrawn, such wilfulness undermines every principle of just action. The voice of nature, which instructs the uninstructed and even those to whom civilization has never penetrated, over the difference between right and wrong, becomes fainter and fainter till it dies away. Nothing is left to remind us that we shall one day have to give an account of what we have done, well or ill, before a Judge from Whom there is no appeal."

The Holy Father emphasises that Natural Law is based upon the existence of God. Where belief in God is weak or abandoned, then there cannot be respect for the Natural Law.

Eternal Law of God.

Natural Law is part of the Eternal Law of God. God created the whole universe for His own eternal glory. He created it according to a plan, and that plan is the Eternal Law of God. This law embraces everything in the whole universe. Every creature acts according to

this Eternal Law—irrational creatures by physical necessity, but rational creatures, because they are free, cannot be compelled—they act in accordance with their free nature.

Man's Freedom.

It may be asked why did God make men free. The glory given to God by a creature who freely obeys God's law is greater than that given by irrational nature. "The heavens show forth the glory of God," it is true, but it is small in comparison to the praise of free beings. Some, of course, abuse their freedom, and even use their powers to mock Almighty God, yet He allows these things to happen because He respects the freedom of man, and because through that freedom many will offer Him great praise and glory.

Inanimate creatures, as we have observed, attain the end of their existence by physical necessity. In the rather trite words of the song "Mollie Bawn" we hear that "the stars above are brightly shining because they have nothing else to do." The various elements act according to their natures—fire burns, water dampens, acids corrode and so on through physical necessity; the acorn grows into the oak, the chestnut into the chestnut tree, through physical necessity; the bees build their cells, animals mate and procreate through instinct or physical necessity. They are drawn to attain the end or purpose of their existence, and they have no choice in the matter.

Man, however, is unique. With justice is he termed the Lord of Creation. Through his reason and will he exceeds the rest of creation more than the sun exceeds the moon, for he is in a special category of his own. He more truly reflects the Creator in his being than all else because of his rationality. With truth we say that "man is made in the image of God."

Natural Law.

Because man is rational and free, the Eternal Law of God will affect man differently from the way irrational creation is affected. A special term is given to that part of the Eternal Law which embraces man, *viz.*, the Natural Law. In the words of St. Thomas: "Natural Law is the participation of the rational creature in the Eternal Law of God." Man discovers this Natural Law through the use of his reason. It is true, as we shall see later, that God has helped man in the work of discovery—the Ten Commandments are in many ways a clarification of the Natural Law, yet man should be able through the proper use of his reason to arrive at certain basic principles according to which his being must operate, and these principles will be valid for man no matter where he may find himself—in Europe, Africa, America or Asia. Listen to Cicero in his *De Republica* :

"There is a true law, a true reason, agreeable to nature known to all men, constant and eternal, which calls men to duty, which commands and forbids. . . It is not lawful to amend this law, nor to take anything from it, nor can the Senate or the people alter this. . . It is not one in Rome and another in Athens, one thing now and another afterwards, but binds all races of men, and all times; it is eternal and immutable . . . for it is God Who is the discoverer and maker of this."

St. Paul in the "Epistle to the Romans" expresses the same idea: "For when the Gentiles, who have not the law, do by nature those things that are of the law, these having not the law are a law to themselves; who shew the work of the law written in their hearts, their conscience bearing witness to them, and their thoughts between themselves accusing or also defending one another" (*Rom.* ii. 14, 15).

Men, then even without revelation, have a standard of morality—the Natural Law. They can judge if a certain

action is right or wrong according to whether it respects or violates man's nature. This Natural Law is the bulwark of man's freedom against every onslaught of totalitarianism, because it decrees that every man-made law must be in accordance with Natural Law if it is to be valid. The whole Christian tradition of Law was built on this foundation, and international relations were enshrined in the Law of Nations, which itself was founded on Natural Law.

Wrong Ideas about Law.

It is not to our purpose here to discuss the history of the concept of Natural Law, but suffice it to say that one of the chief influences making for a departure from the old idea was *The Leviathan* of Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679): He developed a theory of State autocracy divorced from Christian philosophy. With him law is the command of the sovereign—it does not matter what the content of the law is; if it is decreed, it is by that fact alone a law to be obeyed: "it is a word by him that by right has command over others." That Hobbesian idea gradually prevailed in English jurisprudence, and we find later that John Austin (1790-1859), who is regarded as one of the great English Jurists, treats of the notions of sovereignty, law and right as altogether divorced from morality and ethics.

We are not surprised then to hear the Labour Attorney-General, Sir Hartley Shawcross, declaring in a speech that "Parliament is sovereign; it can make any laws, it could ordain that all blue-eyed babies should be destroyed at birth."

This perversion of the true idea of law is but carried to its logical conclusion by the totalitarian dictators. If law is simply the dictate of the one who is sovereign, then why complain if the one who governs decrees certain laws which oppress and crush the human spirit?

Once the Natural Law is overthrown, then the citadel has been surrendered. Accepting the Natural Law, we have a rule to judge all man-made laws—if these laws violate man's nature, then they are bad laws, in fact, they are not laws at all.

It is interesting to note that the American Declaration of Independence, which was drawn up before the idea of law as the decree of the sovereign prevailed, has many references to the Natural Law. "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness." This emphasis on man's inalienable rights is in accordance with a proper reverence for Natural Law—man has got certain rights, not by the concession of the State, but by the very fact that he is the possessor of human nature. The State, as we shall see later, is there to protect and safeguard these natural rights—it offends against the Natural Law if it claims to be the originator of these rights.

Social Ethics based on Natural Law.

It cannot be too strongly emphasised that a correct understanding of Natural Law is essential for a sound grasp of Social Ethics. Some, perhaps, may object that this is a rather abstract question which has no reference to everyday life. "Let us be practical. Let us do things. All this theorizing will get us nowhere"—such is the opinion of some. The writer remembers the words of an honest, well-meaning individual, who had listened to a series of lectures on Marx and Lenin. A good deal of preparation had been necessary for these lectures, but at the end this "practical person" declared that all this theorizing and philosophizing about Marx and Lenin were "getting us nowhere," that Marx and Lenin were dead anyway and why not leave them in their tombs,

that there were present-day Communists to be dealt with, and so on. It was a rather deflating experience, but nevertheless, a little reflection will show that this "practical person" was completely wrong. You cannot understand a system like Communism until you have examined the ideas and philosophy behind it, and you cannot combat it unless you understand it. Ideas come before practice. Ideas are dynamic. If your thinking is false, your actions will be wrong.

That is why the Catholic Church has insisted always on the faithful being taught correct Dogma. Many outside the Church say "Why this insistence on belief? Cannot we all get together and work in common co-operation to build a new and better world?" This well-meaning desire is nevertheless based on illusion. Wrong belief leads to wrong practice. To give a simple example—the practice of one who holds that marriage is a Sacrament instituted by the Son of God is almost certain to be different from the practice of one who believes that marriage is but a man-made arrangement. As Hilaire Belloc says: "Difference in doctrine is at the root of all political and social differences; therefore is the 'struggle for and against true doctrine the most vital of struggles.'" Pope Leo XIII in his Encyclical, *Aeterni Patris*, of 1879, in a few words points to the cause of practical troubles: "If anyone looks carefully at the bitterness of our times, and if, further, he considers earnestly the cause of those things which are done in public and in private, he will discover with certainty the fruitful root of the evils which we greatly fear. The cause he will find to consist in this—evil teaching about things human and divine has come forth from the schools of philosophy and has crept into all the orders of the State."

If a people appreciates the meaning and purpose of Natural Law, then encroachments on the natural rights which are based on that Law will be resisted. Forgetful-

ness and neglect of, and worse still, false teaching about Natural Law make it easy for autocrats and despots (be they benevolent or otherwise) to prevail. The citadel is surrendered because the guards have been drugged.

Natural Law, as we shall see, teaches us certain things about man's rights as an individual, as a member of a family, and as a member of the State. Never was it more necessary to have correct ideas on these matters. Let Etienne Gilson, the great French philosopher, conclude this section for us: "The chaotic condition of contemporary philosophy with the ensuing moral, social, political and pedagogical chaos, is not due to any lack of philosophical insight among modern thinkers; it simply follows from the fact that we have lost our way because we have lost the knowledge of some fundamental principles which, since they are true, are the only ones on which . . . any philosophical knowledge worthy of the name can possibly be established."

Restricted and Wrong Uses of the Term "Natural Law."

It is necessary for us to appreciate the fact that the term "Natural Law" is often used in senses which are radically different from the one which we have been speaking about, and which has been the traditional viewpoint. If the reader were to refer to the *Encyclopædia Britannica* for information on Natural Law he would find that there the term is considered as belonging exclusively to the field of science—a Natural Law being accepted as a statement of the uniformity of behaviour of many things in nature. This restricted use of the term "Natural Law" has made for a good deal of confusion.

Then, again, everybody is well aware of the fact that many dictators profess to act in accordance with the law of nature. Martin Bormann, head of the Nazi Party organization, declared: "We National Socialists

set before ourselves the aim of living as far as possible by the light of nature; that is to say, the law of life. The more closely we recognise and obey the laws of nature and of life, the more we observe them, by so much the more do we express the will of the Almighty."

Many, too, attempt to condone their wrongdoing by an appeal to "what is natural." They say it is "natural" to hate one's enemies, to thirst for revenge and so on.

What are we to say to all this? Regarding the use of the term "Natural Law" in science let it be said at once that that expression is perfectly justified. Verified propositions of science (for example, two atoms of hydrogen combine with one atom of oxygen to form a molecule of water) may be described as natural laws, but to limit the term to science is fantastic and contrary to all tradition.

As regards the appeal of Bormann to Natural Law and the invocation of "what is natural" by wrongdoers as a condonation of their actions, we must remember that such appeals are nearly always insincere. The wrongdoer is anxious to cloak his actions in the garb of righteousness.

Reason and Natural Law.

But it may be objected that there still remains a serious question. Man, you have said, discovers the Natural Law by the light of Reason, but you have not told us whose Reason—men after all vary considerably in intellectual endowment: what may appear eminently clear to an Aristotle may be quite opaque to an ordinary individual. The answer is that the reason by which is discovered the dictates of the Natural Law is the Right Reason of mankind. But it may be objected—you are arguing in a vicious circle: how can we know Reason is Right without some knowledge of Natural Law? The problem is not unanswerable. It is akin to the problem inherent in logic—we arrive at conclusions

in argument by deduction from premises, but we cannot prove by syllogism every statement: otherwise we could have no basis for argument at all. We see that there are certain self-evident propositions which are immediately comprehended as soon as we grasp the meaning of the terms used. Such propositions are the Law of Contradiction, *e.g.*, a thing cannot both be A and not be A at the same time. Others are: "the whole is greater than the part"; "two and two are equal to four." Such statements are not reducible to syllogistic form: they are self-evident, *i.e.*, the mind immediately apprehends them. On these foundations the structure of logical thought is built.

So, too, in the domain of Natural Law. There are certain fundamental propositions which are grasped by Reason immediately, for example, good is to be done, and evil is to be avoided. St. Thomas in the *Summa Theologica* says: "The precepts of the natural law are to the practical reason what the first principles of demonstrations are to the speculative reason, because both are self-evident principles" (1a 11ae, q.94, a.2.). In the same article we read: "Now as *being* is the first thing that falls under the apprehension absolutely, so *good* is the first thing that falls under the apprehension of the practical reason, which is directed to action (since every agent acts for an end, which has the nature of good). Consequently, the first principle in the practical reason is one founded on the nature of good, *viz.*, that *good is that which all things seek after*. Hence this is the first precept of law, that good is to be done and promoted, and evil is to be avoided. All other precepts of the natural law are based upon this: so that all the things which the practical reason naturally apprehends as man's good belong to the precepts of the natural law under the form of things to be done or avoided."

The good for man is that which is according to his

nature, and as man is a rational animal, his actions to be good must conform to reason. "In human affairs a thing is said to be just from being right, according to the rule of reason" (*Ibid.* 1a 11ae, q.95, a.2).

In the *Summa Contra Gentiles*, Book III, Chap. 129, St. Thomas illustrates how this principle operates. "It is natural to man that he be a social animal—which is seen from the fact that a man on his own cannot provide those things which are necessary for human life. Those things therefore without which human society cannot be preserved are natural to man. Such principles are: each must conserve what is his own and each must abstain from inflicting injury on others." He continues by pointing out that inordinate taking of food is harmful to man and therefore is not in accordance with right reason. So also man's lower nature must not be allowed to obstruct his higher nature—drunkenness and sexual abuse impede the operations of reason, so are naturally wrong.

Of course, it is clear that the further we advance from first principles, the more difficult it may be to arrive at certain conclusions. That is why it is usual to distinguish three kinds of principles of the Natural Law:

1. PRIMARY PRINCIPLES. These are general truths known naturally, *e.g.*, good is to be done and evil avoided.

2. SECONDARY PRINCIPLES. Those truths which are easily derived from the primary, *e.g.*, children must honour their parents. A quotation from St. Thomas (1a, 11ae, q.100, a.1) is applicable to the above: "As every judgment of speculative reason proceeds from the natural knowledge of first principles, so every judgment of practical reason proceeds from principles known naturally . . . from which principles one may proceed in various ways to judge of various matters. For some matters connected with human actions are so evident, that after very little consideration one is able at once to approve or disapprove of them by means of these general first principles."

3. TERTIARY PRINCIPLES. Those truths which may be deduced only from the primary and secondary principles with a certain amount of difficulty. St. Thomas continues in the passage already quoted: "Some matters cannot be the subject of judgment without much consideration of the various circumstances, which all are not competent to do carefully, but only those who are wise." Jacques Maritain in *The Rights of Man and Natural Law* says: "Natural Law is not a written law. Men know it with greater or less difficulty, and in different degrees, running the risk of error here as elsewhere."

Natural Law and Revelation.

While then it is true that Natural Law essentially is not dependent on Revelation, yet because of the present condition of mankind, it seems clear that Revelation is morally necessary if the masses of men are to comprehend with certainty and clarity the various principles and conclusions of the Natural Law. Such is the teaching of the theologians of the Church. Reason is not thereby dethroned—rather is reason strengthened and illuminated. Without this help many men might continue to grope in perplexity for the right course to be followed—with it a light is shone on the passage-ways and the route becomes clear. The Ten Commandments, for example, are eminently in accordance with reason—they are not just restrictive commands, but they are in a very real sense guides for correct living, so that man in following them develops his personality and lives a happy life. Some may short-sightedly imagine that the Commandments restrict their freedom, while in fact they make the exercise of freedom a joyous and healthy pursuit. One might compare the Commandments to the tracks on which a train runs—it might seem a restriction that the train should be confined to the tracks, yet it is obvious that only by keeping to them can the train

function properly. So, too, with men and the Commandments—by adhering to them men live according to their proper nature.

With the coming of Christ and His founding of the Church man's knowledge of Natural Law has been deepened. In addition, men are aware of the fact that man's end is supernatural—the Beatific Vision of God. Man's dignity as a creature with reason and will is now stupendously increased, because now he understands he is meant to share in the life of God Himself—" *consortes divinæ naturæ* " (sharers of the divine nature) as St. Peter expresses it. Nature and grace now intermingle in joyous communion. The Church is the dispenser of that life of grace; she, too, is the guardian of man's morals. That is her commission, received from the Son of God. "Going therefore teach ye all nations. . ." "I am the Vine, you are the branches."

Many, of course, refuse to accept the Church's claim, and therein lie the seeds of conflict and tragedy. Yet the Church steadily pursues her course, appealing to all men of goodwill by the beauty and integrity of her teaching, and to-day she stands forth pre-eminently in the world as the defender of reason and the champion of Natural Law, so that men outside her fold cannot ignore her. Men have been burrowing through tunnels devoid of light, but now many see that these burrowings are undermining the foundations of civilization. The Church stands for Sanity against Unreason. "Grace does not destroy nature, but perfects it"—that is her teaching. While emphasising the life of grace, she remembers that man is a rational creature and his life must ever be based on that foundation which is the Natural Law. Her guidance of the world through the Holy Spirit points the sure way for men. To give but one illustration—never has she compromised on Divorce or Birth Prevention; she says such practices are not natural; her judgment

is based on reason enlightened by grace. Many who on natural grounds—some even men of goodwill—have argued otherwise, are now coming to see that the Church is right: through Divorce and Birth Prevention society itself is undermined. The Church with her long experience of men can take the long view of problems; others are easily prejudiced by the short view of things. The solution of the world's problems demands a complete philosophy of life—the Church claims to have that—she sees life and sees it whole; others take but a piecemeal view, over emphasising this aspect or that of man's make-up—the Materialist regards man as a bodily mechanism; the Communist, man as a belly to be filled; the Idealist, man as a spirit; while the Church proclaims man as a body and soul made in the image of God.

Let us now go on to examine the various aspects of man's life, using reason as our guide and the Church the champion of reason as our companion.

CHAPTER II

THE DIGNITY OF MAN

The concept of the Dignity of Man is fundamental in sociology. If we err in our estimation of what man is worth, we shall also err in our treatment of man. Obviously, the person who, for example, looks upon man as just a superior combination of atoms will tend to act differently to the one who regards man as possessing a soul which is spiritual and immortal. A good deal of the confusion and distress in the modern world is due to the fact that so many are ignorant of the dignity of man. Bertrand Russell in his recent work, *Authority and the Individual*, says that "emphasis upon the value of the individual is even more necessary now than at any former time." With that opinion we agree, even though it may be doubted if Mr. Russell's opinion of man as one "whose ancestors came down from the trees and lost the advantage of prehensile toes, but gained the advantage of arms and hands" can make for any great emphasis on the value of the individual.

The Psalmist strikes for us the true note: "What is man that thou art mindful of him. . . Thou hast made him a little less than the angels" (Psalm 8).

Christian philosophy sees in Creation an order or gradation of being. At the lowest end of the scale is inanimate creation—stones and rocks and minerals, and next comes vegetative life—plants and trees and flowers; then comes animal life—horses and cats and dogs, etc.; then follows man, combining vegetative and sensitive life with his intellectual life—he is a sort of microcosm, a small world in himself; next in the scale come the angels—pure spirits, independent of matter, standing between men and God. Man, then, is literally next to

the angels in the order of Creation. In his nature he links the world of the spirit to the world of matter. Through him irrational creation can sing its hymn of praise to the Creator; we are not surprised then to learn that after the fall of man even this irrational world looked forward to man's redemption. St. Paul tells us:

"For the expectation of the creature waiteth for the revelation of the sons of God. For the creature was made subject to vanity: not willingly, but by reason of him that made it subject, in hope. Because the creature also itself shall be delivered from the servitude of corruption, into the liberty of the glory of the children of God. For we know that every creature groaneth and travaileth in pain, even till now. And not only it, but ourselves also, who have the first fruits of the spirit: even we ourselves groan within ourselves, waiting for the adoption of the sons of God, the redemption of our body" (*Rom. viii. 19-23*).

The teaching of Christ, of course, places the dignity of man beyond any possible doubt. We learn that man's soul is worth more than all the goods of the world, "For what doth it profit a man if he gain the whole world and suffer the loss of his own soul. Or what exchange can a man give for his soul?" (*Matthew xvi. 26*). Man is so wonderful that God Himself sent His own Son to die on the Cross to save him. So privileged is he that the Blessed Trinity yearns to reside in his soul and to make of his body a temple of the Holy Ghost. For the Christian there can be no questioning of the immense worth and dignity of man.

We say then that man is composed of a body and soul, and made in the image of God's likeness, and that man's soul is like to God in being a spirit and immortal. That truth about man is, as we have seen, strengthened and confirmed by Christian Revelation, but even on the ground of natural philosophy we are able to understand

how unique a creature is man. For man has intellect and free will. The great philosopher Aristotle three centuries before Christ was able to oppose the totalitarianism of his one-time master Plato because he was aware of the dignity of man. Plato subordinated individuals to the State—as many have tried to do since—but Aristotle declared that happiness resides in individuals, and that the State was made for man and not man for the State. Man being a unique personality with intellect and will could not be subordinated to the State. That attitude of Aristotle is philosophically correct, but we can learn from the example of Aristotle how Revelation can strengthen and clarify our thinking, for Aristotle was prepared to admit that some men were fit only to be slaves, and were not to be considered fully as men, because they were not able to attend to the life of the intellect—Christianity declares that all men fundamentally are equal, because each has been redeemed by the blood of Christ, and each is called to the eternal vision of God.

The first great truth then of Sociology is that man is a creature of great dignity, and therefore he must always be treated in a manner becoming to his intrinsic worth. Because of his human nature he has certain inalienable rights (*i.e.*, rights which cannot be taken from him) and so of these we shall treat in the next chapter.

CHAPTER III

MAN'S NATURAL RIGHTS

Legal Positivism.

A rather prevalent modern theory holds that all man's rights derive from civil law and ultimately from the State. On this view man has no rights "of his own"—they are donated to him by the State. This theory is called "legal positivism." In essence this means that the authority of a law flows from the omnipotent will of the State. If the sovereign or the body which exercises sovereignty proclaims a law, then by that fact alone it is to be regarded as a good law.

Reason, on this viewpoint, ceases to be the final arbiter of law. This is a far cry from the Thomistic definition of law as "a certain ordinance of reason promulgated by the one who has charge of the community for the common good."

John Austin popularized this legal positivism in the 19th century. Many have followed him. To quote Professor McKenzie in his *Manual of Ethics* published in the University Tutorial Series writes: "A man's rights are nothing more than those things which for the general good it is convenient that he be allowed to possess. . . . By himself, a man has no right to anything whatever." G. D. H. Cole in his book, *The Economic System*, says: "To sum up—all property rights, all recognised rights of association, all enforcement of contracts, depend on the law; and under the British constitutional system, the law can be changed to any extent by Act of Parliament."

Totalitarian thinkers but carried these ideas to their logical conclusion. If will and not reason is the determinant of law then tyrants may do as they please.

The Soviet State Prosecutor can declare: "There is no law but the Soviet law and by that law you must die"; Mussolini could say: "For Fascism the State is an absolute, before which individuals and groups are relative." With Hitler the welfare of the race predominated over individual liberties. Many have held their hands high in horror at these ideas, but the very people who do so are often protagonists of the view that the State is the source of law. Wrong ideas bring wrong practice.

Man's Rights Based on Natural Law.

The result is that many to-day are returning to the conception of Natural Law on which man's rights are based. In a brochure on Natural Law, edited by Vidler and Whitehouse (S.C.M. Press, page 34), we read that in totalitarianism "law is simply the expression of the will of the leading party or class or of an individual tyrant. This arbitrary decisionism can be met and overcome only by the claim that there is a Natural Law, which flows from the Eternal Law of God, and that it is the function of positive law to determine in detail, according to particular social and historical circumstances, the fundamental principles of the Natural Law. In performing this function positive law at the same time performs a political function, since every community which wants to stabilize its political life needs to base order and security on the basic principles of Natural Law."

It is no harm to point out that in 1938 the Sacred Congregation of Seminaries and Universities condemned the proposition: "Each man exists by and for the State; everything he possesses by right derives solely from a State concession."

We say then that man's rights follow from his dignity as a personality with intellect and will, and are guaranteed by Natural Law.

The Chief Natural Rights.

The chief Natural Rights of man are outlined by Pope Pius XI in his Encyclical Letter, *Divini Redemptoris*—the right to life, to bodily integrity, to obtain the necessary means of existence; the right to tend towards his ultimate goal in the path marked out for him by God; the right of association and the right to possess and use property.

CHAPTER IV

THE RIGHT TO LIFE

The Right to Life means that the direct killing of an innocent person is forbidden by the Natural Law. This is the meaning of the Fifth Commandment: "Thou shalt not kill." The State is empowered by the Natural Law to put certain criminals to death if such capital punishment is considered in the circumstances to be necessary for the preservation of the common good. Likewise, a person acting in self-defence against an unjust aggressor may kill if that is the only way to preserve his own life.

But an innocent person cannot be deprived of life. The authoritarian State often tries to interfere with this natural right. A State which is geared for war, for example, will tend to look upon the old, the unfit and the insane as a useless burden on the State. In our own day some States have carried this thinking into practice. But the Natural Law says that these people are innocent; they have not forfeited their right to life; rather should these unfortunates be the recipients of the special care and assistance of the State which exists for the common good.

Euthanasia.

Euthanasia is advocated by some people to-day. It is a Greek word meaning "easy or painless death." The protagonists of such a view argue that it is terrible to see a patient suffering from an incurable disease, and that the application of a killing drug would be an easy solution for onlookers and patient. This viewpoint is typical of the short-sightedness of much modern thinking. As in the case for divorce, some point to Mr. X, who is very unhappily married. Why not grant him a divorce?

It would be a blessing to relieve him of his painful marriage! But the effects on society are ignored in such thinking, and the moral law so strongly upheld by the Church is seen in the long run to make for the good of man and society. So, too, with euthanasia. The place of suffering in the Christian dispensation is ignored by materialists. Suffering can only be understood in the light of the hereafter. The Cross of Christ can transmute the dross of suffering into pure gold. Again, even on the material plane, who can really say that any person's condition is incurable? It is by no means rare for "hopeless cases" to recover. God is the author of life, and it is blasphemous for ordinary mortals to assume the Creator's powers in the taking of innocent life.

Bernard Shaw advocated euthanasia instead of the ordinary means of capital punishment. Why have a person waiting for weeks before the date of the execution? Why not chloroform him some night during his sleep? That is all very well for the first person to be so treated. But once the "easy death" technique is publicised, a criminal, I suggest, would never sleep again!

Suicide.

But perhaps it may be said that a person suffering from incurable disease may himself authorize euthanasia. The answer to that is that no person is morally justified in committing suicide. Suicide is a very serious crime, so much so that the Catholic Church does not allow Christian burial to one guilty of it. Suicide is wrong because:

1. The suicide arrogates to himself the dominion of God who is the author and giver of life.
2. The suicide offends against one of the primary behests of the Natural Law, namely, that we should love and preserve our own lives.
3. The suicide inflicts a grave injury on society.

The Unborn Child.

The unborn baby is also safeguarded by this natural right to life. There can be no question whatever of the direct killing of an unborn child. Craniotomy (*i.e.*, the crushing of the head) or any other form of direct killing is morally wrong. Being a human being and innocent, the foetus has the right to life. The Catholic Church here again has strenuously upheld this principle of the Natural Law. In the medical profession it is becoming increasingly realized that adherence to the Natural Law in these matters is not only good ethics but the best medicine. The so-called choice of the mother's life or the child's is exceedingly rare nowadays. Listen to the words of Professor John Cunningham, one of the greatest obstetricians of this century, in his *Text Book of Obstetrics*.¹ In his chapter on operations to facilitate the delivery of a dead foetus, he says: "they are performed only to facilitate the delivery of a dead foetus. No obstetrician, worthy of the name, would perform such an operation on a living foetus. In cases of obstructed delivery from any cause, it is always possible to effect the safe delivery of the foetus by some operative method, without undue risk to the mother. This is especially true at the present time, when operative procedures have been brought to such a high stage of perfection, and when there is recourse to potent anti-bacterial agents." It is no harm to point out that one of the incidents of the popular novel, *The Cardinal*, deals very dramatically but very inaccurately with this question.

Abortion.

Abortion is the direct expulsion of a non-viable foetus (*i.e.*, a foetus which because of its undeveloped state cannot live outside the womb). This is forbidden by the

¹ Heinemann (1951).

Natural Law. The Catholic Church again as defender of the Natural Law punishes with excommunication those who procure abortion, the mother included. Some countries distinguish between criminal abortion and therapeutic (*i.e.*, for the purpose of curing the ill-health of the mother) abortion. Each, however, is morally reprehensible if the direct killing of the foetus is involved.

We shall conclude this chapter with a long excerpt from the Holy Father's address to the "Family Front Congress," November, 1951.

"Innocent human life, in whatsoever condition it is found, is withdrawn, from the very first moment of its existence, from any direct deliberate attack. This is a fundamental right of the human person, which is of general value in the Christian conception of life; hence as valid for the life still hidden within the womb of the mother, as for the life already born and developing outside of her; as much opposed to direct abortion, as to the direct killing of the child before, during or after its birth. Whatsoever foundation there may be for the distinction between various phases of the development of life that is born or still unborn, in profane and ecclesiastical law, and as regards certain civil and penal consequences, all these cases involve a grave and unlawful attack upon the inviolability of human life.

"This principle holds good both for the life of the child as well as for that of the mother. Never and in no case has the Church taught that the life of the child must be preferred to that of the mother. It is erroneous to put the question with this alternative; either the life of the child or that of the mother. No, neither the life of the mother nor that of the child can be subjected to an act of direct suppression. In the one case as in the other, there can be but one obligation: to make every effort to save the lives of both, of the mother and of the

child (cfr. Pius XI, Encyclical *Casti Connubii*, 31 Dec., 1930, *Acta Ap. Sedis*, vol. xxii, pp. 562-3).

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“ But—it is objected—the life of the mother, especially the mother of a large family, is of incomparably greater value than that of a child not yet born. The application of the theory of the equalisation of values to the case which occupies Us has already been accepted in juridical discussions. The reply to this harrowing objection is not difficult. The inviolability of the life of an innocent human being does not depend on its greater or lesser value. It is already more than ten years since the Church formally condemned the killing of life considered to be ‘without value’; and whosoever knows the sad events that preceded and provoked that condemnation, whosoever is able to weigh up the dire consequences that would result if one were to try to measure the inviolability of innocent life according to its value, knows well how to appreciate the motives that determined that disposition.

“ Besides, who can judge with certainty which of the two lives is in fact the more precious? Who can know what path that child will follow and what heights of achievement and perfection he may reach? Two greatnesses are being compared here, one of them being an unknown quantity.

“ In this regard We wish to cite an example which may perhaps be already known to some of you but which notwithstanding that fact loses none of its suggestiveness. It goes back to the year 1905. At that time there was a young lady of noble birth and of still nobler sentiments, but who was frail and of delicate constitution. As a young girl she had been ill with a slight apical pleurisy, which seemed cured. When, however, having contracted a happy marriage, she felt a new life springing in her womb, she soon became aware of a peculiar physical indisposition,

which alarmed the two able doctors who were attending her with every care and solicitude. The old apical trouble, the cicatrised lesion had become active again; in their opinion there was no time to lose; if the gentle lady was to be saved, a therapeutic abortion would have to be provoked without the least delay. The husband also realised the gravity of the case and signified his consent to the distressful act. But when the mid-wife in attendance duly made known the decision of the doctors and besought her to defer to their opinion, she replied with firm voice: ‘I thank you for your merciful advice; but I cannot suppress the life of my child! I cannot, I cannot! I feel it already throbbing in my womb; it has the right to live; it comes from God and should know God so as to love and enjoy Him.’ Her husband also entreated, supplicated and implored her; she remained inflexible and quietly awaited the event. A baby girl was regularly born; but, immediately after, the health of the mother began to get worse. The pulmonary lesion spread; the deterioration became progressive. Two months later she was at the limit of her forces; she once again saw her little child who was growing healthily under the care of a robust nurse; her lips broke into a sweet smile and she passed away peacefully. Many years went by. In a religious Institute a young Sister might be particularly noticed, totally dedicated to the care and education of abandoned children, bending over sick little ones, with eyes full of maternal love, as if to give them life. It was she, the daughter of the sacrifice, who now with her generous heart was doing so much good among abandoned children. The heroism of her fearless mother had not been in vain! (Cfr. Andrea Majocchi, *Tra bistori e forbici*, 1940, pp. 21 ff.). But We ask: Is it possible that Christian sensibility, even also purely human sensibility, has been dulled to the point that it cannot any longer appreciate the sublime

holocaust of the mother and the visible action of divine Providence, which brought forth such a splendid fruit from that holocaust?

“On purpose We have always used the expression ‘direct attempt on the life of an innocent person,’ ‘direct killing.’ Because if, for example, the saving of the life of the future mother, independently of her pregnant state, should urgently require a surgical act or other therapeutic treatment which would have as an accessory consequence, in no way desired or intended but inevitable, the death of the foetus, such an act could no longer be called a direct attempt on an innocent life. Under these conditions the operation can be licit, like other similar medical interventions, granted always that a good of high worth is concerned, such as life, and that it is not possible to postpone the operation until after the birth of the child, or to have recourse to other efficacious remedies.”

CHAPTER V

THE RIGHT TO BODILY INTEGRITY

Integrity essentially is a Latin word meaning wholeness. The Right to Bodily Integrity means that no mutilation of our body or members is allowed except for the good of the whole body. In Pope Pius XI's Encyclical on *Christian Marriage* we read: “Christian doctrine establishes, and the light of reason makes it most clear, that individuals have no power over the members of their bodies than that which pertains to their natural ends; and they are not free to destroy or mutilate their members or in any way render themselves unfit for their natural functions, except when no other provision can be made for the good of the whole body.” It is only lawful then to allow mutilation of oneself when such action is necessary to preserve health and life.

Sterilization and Eugenics.

At the present day claims are made on behalf of the State to sterilize physical and mental defectives. Sterilization is a surgical operation which prevents propagation. The teaching of the Encyclical on *Christian Marriage* on this matter is very clear. “That pernicious practice must be condemned which closely touches upon the natural right of man to enter matrimony but affects also in a real way the welfare of the offspring. For there are some, who over-solicitous for the cause of eugenics, not only give salutary counsel for more certainly procuring the strength and health of the future child, which indeed is not contrary to right reason, but put eugenics before aims of a higher order, and by public authority wish to prevent from marrying all those who, even though

naturally fit for marriage, they consider according to the norms and conjectures of their investigations, would through hereditary transmission, bring forth defective offspring. And more, they wish to legislate to deprive these of that natural faculty by medical action, despite their unwillingness; and this they do not propose as an infliction of grave punishment under the authority of the State for a crime committed, nor to prevent future crimes by guilty persons, but *against every right and good they wish the civil authority to arrogate to itself a power over a faculty which they never had and can never legitimately possess.*

“Those who act in this way are at fault in losing sight of the fact that the family is more sacred than the State and that men are begotten not for the earth and for time, but for Heaven and eternity. Although often these individuals are to be dissuaded from entering into marriage, certainly it is wrong to brand men with the stigma of crime because they contract marriage, on the ground that despite the fact that they are in every respect capable of matrimony, they will give birth only to defective children, even though they use all care and diligence

“Public magistrates have no direct power over the bodies of their subjects; therefore, where no crime has taken place and there is no cause present for grave punishment, they can never directly harm or tamper with the integrity of the body, either for the reasons of eugenics or for any other reason.”

The Sterilization Law of Nazi Germany specified the following as coming within the meaning of the law—congenital feeble-mindedness, schizophrenia, manic depressive insanity, inherited epilepsy, Huntington's chorea, inherited blindness, inherited deafness, severe inherited physical malformation, severe alcoholism.

Bernard Shaw in his *Man and Superman* proclaims that there is only one hope for the world—eugenics.

The man of the future must be bred, not taught. In his book, *George Bernard Shaw*, G. K. Chesterton says: “This notion of producing superior human beings by the methods of the stud-farm had often been urged, though its difficulties had never been cleared up. I mean its practical difficulties; its moral difficulties or rather impossibilities, for any animal fit to be called a man need scarcely be discussed. But even as a scheme it had never been made clear. The first and most obvious objection to it of course is this: that if you are to breed men as pigs, you require some overseer who is as much more subtle than a man as a man is more subtle than a pig. Such an individual is not easy to find.” The propounders of eugenics and sterilization are really guilty of a colossal superiority complex—they think they know what the perfect man should be. Any specialist in this field knows that in the domain of heredity nothing very definite can be said. Haldane in his *Heredity and Politics* says: “We do not, in my opinion, know enough to accord rights to any individual, or to deprive him or her of any rights, on the basis of ancestry only.” We shudder to think of what the world would be like if the selection of those to be born should be left to the “men of genius” like Bernard Shaw.

The Church wisely leaves the future of the race to the Creator. It is said that on the basis of modern ideas about sterilization Milton and Beethoven—to mention but two—would never have seen the light of day. Let us repeat the teaching of the Encyclical *Christian Marriage*: “Public magistrates have no direct power over the bodies of their subjects; therefore where no crime has taken place and there is no cause present for grave punishment, they can never directly harm or tamper with the integrity of the body, either for the reasons of eugenics or for any other reason.”

CHAPTER VI

THE FAMILY

Men do not live in isolation. They are social by nature. One of the most dreaded punishments is solitary confinement. Men like to associate with each other, and such association is essential for their proper development. Some associations man will form freely and voluntarily, such as a club or dramatic society. But there are three associations which are absolutely necessary for man, *viz.*, the Family, the State and the Church. The Church and State are said to be *perfect societies*, that is, they contain within themselves all the normal means necessary for the development of their members. The Family is said to be an *imperfect society*, that is, the Family in isolation could not cater for the complete development of man.

Under the Right of Association, we must then treat first of this necessary association: the Family. And on this most vital subject we cannot but illuminate our discussion with the teaching of the Church.

Marriage: An Institution of the Natural Law.

The Family is based on the Natural Law and so is ordained by God. That the family has its basis in Natural Law is seen from the primary end of marriage, which is the procreation and the rearing of children. The marriage union has to fulfil a social end, the rearing of the offspring. The marriage contract, therefore, contains conditions that are not left to the will of the contracting parties but have been decreed by Natural Law. Anyone who enters a marriage contract binds himself by the conditions essential to the social ends of marriage. These

conditions are unity and indissolubility. By *unity* is meant one husband and one wife; by *indissolubility* is meant the permanence of the marriage union as long as both parties are living. *Because these conditions are there in the marriage contract independently of the wills of the contracting parties we say that marriage is an institution of the Natural Law and therefore ordained or established by God, and hence in itself the marriage contract is something sacred, even before the elevation of the contract to the dignity of a Sacrament by Our Blessed Lord.*

Unity and Indissolubility of Marriage.

That marriage is an indissoluble union may be proved by natural reason. The Encyclical on *Christian Marriage* states: "First of all, both husband and wife possess a positive guarantee of the endurance of this stability which that generous yielding of their persons and the intimate fellowship of their hearts by their nature strongly require, since true love never falls away." A mere transitory union can never satisfy the claims of true love. Love embraces and informs the whole existence of the lovers. On the same grounds, polygamy, which means one man possessing several wives, is repugnant to the notion of real love; it is degrading to the personality of woman, and frustrates the union of mind and heart which is the basis of marriage.

The Holy Father continues his argument on natural grounds for the indissolubility of marriage: "A strong bulwark is set up in defence of a loyal chastity against incitements to infidelity, should any be encountered either from within or without; any anxious fear lest in adversity or old age the other spouse would prove unfaithful is precluded and in its place there reigns a calm sense of security. Moreover, the dignity of both man and wife is maintained and mutual aid is most satisfactorily assured, while through the indis-

soluble bond, always enduring, the spouses are warned continuously that not for the sake of perishable things nor that they may serve their passions, but that they may procure one for the other high and lasting good have they entered into the nuptial partnership, to be dissolved only by death." Indissolubility then makes for the sustained happiness of husband and wife, in spite of occasional ups-and-downs. Each helps and sustains the other through the many trials and difficulties of life. Marriage is not akin to the mating of animals; it is the union of human beings possessing spiritual and immortal souls.

The Pope so far has been treating the question as regards the man and wife alone. Now he goes on to discuss the social aspects of indissolubility. "In the training and education of children, which must extend over a period of many years, it plays a great part, since the grave and long enduring burdens of this office are best borne by the united efforts of the parents." Parents are primarily responsible for the rearing and education of their children. Nobody else can adequately take their place. But it may be asked, what of a childless marriage? Even in such cases nature demands the indissolubility of marriage for the sake of its social end which transcends the individual marriage and concerns society in general. And as we have seen already, true love demands indissolubility. The Pope therefore concludes: "Where this order of things (*i.e.*, indissolubility) obtains, the happiness and well-being of the nation is safely guarded; what the families and individuals are, so also is the State, for a body is determined by its parts. Wherefore, both for the private good of husband, wife and children, as likewise for the public good of human society, they indeed deserve well who strenuously defend the inviolable stability of matrimony."

As we have seen the primary end of marriage is the

procreation and rearing of children; the secondary ends are the mutual aid the parties render to each other and a safeguard against lust. Only in monogamy (*i.e.*, one woman with one husband) is the dignity and position of women safeguarded and assured. The teaching of Christ, of course, makes all this perfectly clear. As the Council of Trent declares: "Christ Our Lord very clearly taught that in this bond two persons only are to be united and joined together when He said: 'Therefore they are no longer two but one flesh.'" In a period of the Old Testament polygamy was allowed, as Christ tells us, "because of the hardness of their hearts," *i.e.*, God tolerated this evil but did not approve of it. Christ restored the complete unity of matrimony which the Creator had laid down in the beginning when he wished it to be not otherwise than between one man and one woman. He also asserted the indissolubility of marriage: "What God hath joined together let no man put asunder."

Christian Marriage.

Family life and marriage then have been instituted by God. It is something sacred as coming from the Creator Himself. But Christ has elevated the marriage contract into the dignity of a sacrament for all baptized Christians. Just as the rite of Ordination confers sanctifying and sacramental grace on the new priest, so also the marriage contract brings sanctifying and sacramental grace to the souls of the parties. This gives Christian marriage an immeasurable dignity. Because it is a sacrament Christ's Church has the sole right to regulate and control Christian marriage. The civil power can legislate with certain limitations regarding the civil effects of marriage, but it cannot interfere with the essential institution itself (even in the case of non-Christian marriage, because the institution is from God). Hence divorce legislation is

intrinsically unlawful. Pope Pius XI quotes the words of Pius VII in this regard: "Therefore although the sacramental element may be absent from a marriage as is the case among unbelievers, still in such a marriage, inasmuch as it is a true marriage, there must remain, and indeed there does remain that perpetual bond which by divine right is so bound up with matrimony from its first institution that it is not subject to any civil power."

The Church of Christ is the guardian and interpreter of divine law, nobody else. "What God has joined together, let *no man* put asunder." The Church declares that the valid marriage of two baptized people which has been consummated cannot be dissolved, not even by the Church itself. It is in this sense that we use the expression: "There is no divorce in the Catholic Church." The Church may dissolve natural marriages of unbelievers if one of the parties is to be converted and cannot live peaceably with the other party, and for grave reasons, too, she may dissolve valid marriages of baptized people which have not been consummated. *The bond of indissolubility is forged irrevocably by the consummation of the valid marriage of two baptized persons.*

It is worth remembering that the Catholic Church regards the marriage of two baptized non-Catholics as a sacramental marriage.

Decrees of Nullity.

Some people profess to be puzzled by the Church's granting of Decrees of Nullity. These decrees simply state that there was no marriage between the parties in the first instance; they are not bills of divorce. The Church says there never was a marriage because certain essentials were lacking. For example, a man, already married, goes through a marriage ceremony; on investigation the Church states that this ceremony does not constitute a marriage contract because the man

was already married. Similarly, a girl under fourteen or a boy under sixteen who goes through the form of marriage is not married because of defect of age. A person forced by the point of the gun to marry is not really married and the Church will say so. The Church in these instances is protecting each party to the marriage, and is also safeguarding the contract and the Sacrament.

The Graces of the Sacrament.

Because the marriage contract is a Sacrament for baptized Christians, husband and wife get very special graces. The words of the Holy Father in *Christian Marriage* should be meditated upon carefully. By marriage "the faithful open up for themselves a treasure of sacramental grace from which they draw supernatural power for the fulfilling of their rights and duties faithfully, holily, perseveringly even unto death. Hence this Sacrament not only increases sanctifying grace, the permanent principle of the supernatural life, in those who place no obstacle in its way, but also adds particular gifts, dispositions, seeds of grace, by elevating and perfecting the natural powers." The Pope here stresses the necessity of a good preparation for marriage—one obvious condition being the state of grace. He goes on: "By these gifts the parties are assisted not only in understanding, but in knowing intimately, in adhering to firmly, in willing effectively, and in successfully putting into practice those things which pertain to the marriage state, its aims and duties; *giving them in fine, right to the actual assistance of grace whensoever they need it for fulfilling the duties of their state.*" This should be a great source of confidence to those who are married or who are about to enter the married state.

But the Holy Father points out: "Nevertheless, since it is a law of divine Providence in the supernatural order that men do not reap the full fruit of the Sacraments which

they receive after acquiring the use of reason unless they co-operate with grace, the grace of matrimony will remain for the most part an unused talent hidden in the field unless the parties exercise these supernatural powers and cultivate and develop the seeds of grace they have received. *If, however, doing all that lies within their power, they co-operate diligently, they will be able with ease to bear the burdens of their state and to fulfil their duties.* By such a Sacrament they will be strengthened, sanctified, and in a manner consecrated."

Duties and Rights within the Family.

Between husband and wife there must be conjugal fidelity, mutual help and love. By conjugal fidelity is meant strict regard for the marriage contract, so that what belongs to one of the parties by reason of this contract may not be denied to him or her, or permitted to any third person. This conjugal faith must be rooted in the love of husband and wife for each other, so that together they face the problems and difficulties of life, rendering to each other strength and help. St. Paul said: "Husbands, love your wives as Christ also loved the Church" (*Ephesians*, v. 25). Pope Pius XI says: "The love of which we are speaking is not that based on the passing lust of the moment, nor does it consist in pleasing words only, but in the deep attachment of the heart which is expressed in action, since love is proved by deeds."

Parents and Children.

Parents have a grave obligation towards their children. They must love their children and tenderly care for their spiritual and physical upbringing. *Christian Marriage* warns us: "Both husband and wife receiving these children with joy and gratitude from the hand of God will regard them as a talent committed to their charge

by God, not only to be employed for their own advantage or for that of an earthly commonwealth, but to be restored to God with interest on the day of reckoning."

We shall see more in the chapter on Education about this matter, but suffice it to say here that parents who without sufficient cause send their children off to a boarding school at a tender age are not fulfilling their duties as parents. Nothing can take the place of the love of father and mother. Parents, too, who show preference openly for some of their children cause a good deal of pain and misery to the others. Homes are known where one of the children is looked upon as unwanted and is treated as an outcast. Parents who act in this manner are guilty of grave dereliction of duty.

Even Catholic parents nowadays must ponder seriously the great blessing of offspring; because so much pagan materialistic thought is rampant. No material comfort can take the place of a child. A child even on the natural plane is a source of innumerable joys and blessings to the parents, but when we remember that parents have brought this child into the world to be a living member of Christ's mystical body and a sharer in the eternal joys of heaven, then indeed, the dignity of child-bearing is enormous. God's Providence will never forsake those parents who trust in Him. But many unfortunately suffer from a lack of confidence and trust in God, and that is the main source of much of their difficulties.

Father, the Head of the Family.

St. Paul in the "Epistle to the Ephesians" (v. 22, 23) says: "Let women be subject to their husbands as to the Lord, because the husband is the head of the wife, as Christ is the head of the Church." That the husband is the final authority in the family is clear on natural grounds; every community must have a head, and the father being the breadwinner and the primary provider

of the family is that natural authority. The Encyclical on Christian Marriage of Leo XIII teaches: "The man is the ruler of the family and the head of the woman; but because she is flesh of his flesh and bone of his bone, let her be subject and obedient to the man, not as a servant but as a companion, so that nothing be lacking of honour or of dignity in the obedience which she pays." And Pope Pius XI in his Encyclical is also careful to point out: "This subjection, however, does not deny or take away the liberty which fully belongs to the woman both in view of her dignity as a human person, and in view of her most noble office as wife and mother and companion; nor does it bid her obey her husband's every request if not in harmony with right reason or with the dignity due to a wife; nor, in fine, does it imply that the wife should be put on a level with those persons who in law are called minors, to whom it is not customary to allow free exercise of their rights on account of their lack of mature judgment, or of their ignorance of human affairs. But it forbids that exaggerated liberty which cares not for the good of the family; it forbids that in this body which is the family the heart be separated from the head to the great detriment of the whole body and the proximate danger of ruin. For if the man is the head, the woman is the heart, and as *he occupies the chief place in ruling*, so she may and ought to claim for herself the chief place in love."

He continues: "This subjection of wife to husband in its degree and manner may vary according to the different conditions of persons, place and time. In fact, if the husband neglect his duty, it falls to the wife to take his place in directing the family."

There is no doubt then that the ultimate power of decision normally rests with the father. It is necessary to stress this because the Irish Supreme Court in its ruling on the Tilson case used certain sentences which could appear to give a wrong impression.

Birth-Prevention.

It is now necessary to look at another of the evils which are besetting family life. We have already touched upon the evils of divorce, sterilization and abortion. A few words must be said on birth-prevention. Pope Pius XI on Christian Marriage declares: "Any use whatsoever of matrimony exercised in such a way that the act is deliberately frustrated in its natural power to generate life is an offence against the law of God and of nature, and those who indulge in such are branded with the guilt of a grave sin." Modern paganism looks upon offspring as the disagreeable burden of matrimony. Some attribute to economic motives what is in reality their unbridled lust; it is a fact that in the higher income groups there are less children than in the lower groups. The Holy Father, as father of all, especially the poor, is not unmindful of the difficulties of parents: "We are deeply touched by the sufferings of those parents who, in extreme want, experience great difficulty in rearing their children. However, they should take care lest the calamitous state of their external affairs should be the occasion for a much more calamitous error. *No difficulty can arise that justifies the putting aside of the law of God which forbids all acts intrinsically evil. There are no possible circumstances in which husband and wife cannot, strengthened by the grace of God, fulfil faithfully their duties and preserve in wedlock their chastity unspotted.*"

Aids to the Family.

The Pope, however, is insistent that the man and wife in straitened circumstances must have their necessities relieved as far as possible to enable them to observe the duties of their state without undue difficulty. "And so in the first place every effort must be made to bring about that which Our predecessor, Leo XIII of happy memory, has already insisted upon, namely, that in the

State such economic and social methods should be adopted as will enable every head of a family to earn as much as, according to his station in life, is necessary for himself, his wife and for the rearing of his children. If, however, for this purpose, private resources do not suffice, it is the duty of the public authority to supply for the insufficient forces of individual effort. . . . If families, particularly those in which there are many children, have not suitable dwellings; if the husband cannot find employment and means of livelihood; if the necessities of life cannot be purchased except at exorbitant prices; if even the mother of the family, to the great harm of the home, is compelled to go forth and seek a living by her own labour; if she, too, in the ordinary or even extraordinary labours of childbirth is deprived of proper food, medicine and the assistance of a skilled physician, it is patent to all to what an extent married people may lose heart, and how home life and the observance of God's commands are rendered difficult for them. . . . *Wherefore those who have the care of the State and of the public good, cannot neglect the needs of married people and their families, without bringing great harm upon the State and on the common welfare. Hence, in making the laws and in disposing of public funds, they must do their utmost to relieve the needs of the poor, considering such a task as one of the most important of their administrative duties.*"

But we must always bear in mind that the family is prior to the State and holds natural rights which the State is bound to recognise. The State's function is to supplement, not supplant, the family. State paternalism can injure the family just as much as State neglect. We must be on our guard then against so-called welfare "reformers": they would afflict us with State nurseries, communal kitchens, etc., things which may be necessary in very exceptional circumstances, but as a normal rule

of policy must be reprehended. Youth clubs, too, have their dangers as tending to keep children from the home, but wisely used they may help to strengthen and support an otherwise weak family life. Leo XIII reminds us in *Rerum Novarum*: "Speaking strictly the child takes its place in civil society not of its own right but in its quality as a member of the family in which it is born." And Pius XI in *Christian Education* declares: "the function of the Civil Authority residing in the State is twofold: to protect and to foster but by no means to absorb the family and the individual, or to substitute itself for them."

The Irish Constitution in Article 41 has the following noteworthy paragraphs:

- (1) 1° The State recognise the Family as the natural primary and fundamental unit group of Society, and as a moral institution possessing inalienable and imprescriptible rights, antecedent and superior to all positive law.
2° The State, therefore, guarantees to protect the Family in its constitution and authority, as the necessary basis of social order and as indispensable to the welfare of the Nation and the State.
- (2) 1° In particular, the State recognises that by her life within the home, woman gives to the State a support without which the common good cannot be achieved.
2° The State shall, therefore, endeavour to ensure that mothers shall not be obliged by economic necessity to engage in labour to the neglect of their duties in the home.
- (3) 1° The State pledges itself to guard with special care the institution of Marriage, on which the Family is founded, and to protect it against attack.
2° No law shall be enacted providing for the grant of a dissolution of marriage.

3° No person whose marriage has been dissolved under the civil law of any other State, but is a subsisting valid marriage under the law for the time being in force within the jurisdiction of the Government and Parliament established by the Constitution, shall be capable of contracting a valid marriage within that jurisdiction during the lifetime of the other party to the marriage so dissolved.

CHAPTER VII

THE STATE

After the family, the next natural and necessary form of association for man is the State. "Man," according to the famous dictum of Aristotle, "is a political animal." The State is the natural home of the fully grown man. Leo XIII in his Encyclical *Immortale Dei* summarizes the teaching of the great Christian philosophers: "Man's natural instinct moves him to live in civil society, for he cannot, if dwelling apart, provide himself with the necessary requirements of life, nor procure the means of developing his mental and moral faculties." As we have seen, the Family is said to be an imperfect society because man's need for protection and proper development could not be satisfied by the Family in isolation; these needs are met by the State which is said to be a perfect society. As Thomas Aquinas says: "Because of its ability to provide all things necessary for the temporal happiness and well-being of man, the State is designated as a perfect community. Among all natural societies it holds the highest rank as being the most perfect, subordinate to none other in its own sphere" (1-11, q.90, a.2).

The State then exists for the temporal well-being of man. It is not an artificial institution which men are free to join or not. It is a natural and necessary institution. That is the accepted Christian view, and with it Aristotle and the great pre-Christian philosophers agree. In the last few centuries some have advocated what are called "contract" theories of the State, especially the English philosophers Thomas Hobbes and John Locke, and the French philosopher Jean Jacques Rousseau. For these thinkers, the State is an artificial institution: men decided themselves to form it—they

need not necessarily have formed it. It is not to our purpose here to enter into a detailed criticism of these views, except to point out that "contract" theories in general make for the suppression of individual and family rights in the State. With Hobbes all rights are at the arbitrary will of the supreme power; with Rousseau the majority is always right and there are no rights for dissenting minorities. The Christian view of the State is radically different. Leo XIII expresses it succinctly: "Diverse families, *without abandoning the rights and duties of the domestic society* unite under the inspiration of nature in order to constitute themselves as members of another greater family, the civic society" (*Acta Sanctae Sedis*, XXIV, 250). The rise of the State then out of a mere aggregation of independent families is a natural development of human social nature.

Government in the State.

That there must be a ruling authority in the State is obvious. No society can function without some sort of committee in charge of things. Leo XIII in *Immortale Dei* says: "As no society can hold together unless some one be over all, directing all to strive earnestly for the common good, every civilized community must have a ruling authority, and this authority, no less than society itself, has its source in nature, and has consequently God for its author. Hence it follows that all public power must proceed from God; for God alone is the true and supreme Lord of the world. . . 'There is no power but from God' (*Rom.* xiii, 1)."

In other words, even though in a democracy the people choose their rulers, authority in the State comes from nature, and hence from God, the author of nature. "All power is from the people" is a false maxim; the wielders of power may be chosen by the people, but the authority itself comes from God.

The Functions of Government.

Now we come to a most important question—a question which was perhaps never so vital as to-day. The answer to the problem of the precise functions of Government will depend very largely on a philosophical attitude. At the outset let us consider two extreme points of view.

First Extreme.

The first view is that of "Laissez Faire" or Individualism. "Laissez Faire" is a French expression meaning "Leave things alone." On this principle that Government is best which governs least. This viewpoint prevailed for a good deal of the nineteenth century, particularly in England. It was felt that Government interference would make matters worse rather than better: "Do not hamper progress by regulations; free trade and free contract are the desirable policies." This viewpoint was mainly due to the influence of the economists. At that time economists ruled the thoughts of most people. They taught that wages could not be raised either by any action of the Government or by any combination on the part of the workers themselves. They held that the capital in existence was a result of saving in the past; that capital was divided between plant, labour and raw materials; and if labour temporarily got more than its share, then plant and raw materials would suffer and fewer people would be employed. This "Wages Fund" theory thus declared that if someone got more, somebody else must get less. Along with this went fears about the effect of the growth of population. The work of Malthus was used to bolster up "Laissez Faire"—it was generally believed that if wages were increased more marriages took place, more children were born and there was a greater struggle for existence, because more people existed to join in the scramble for a share of the "Wages Fund." It made people afraid

to do anything in the way of philanthropy lest they should only make things worse.

The general climate of thought then was against State interference in any way. As regards tampering with factories and the hours of work the economists had more precise objections. Headed by Senior, they proved to their own and many factory owners' satisfaction that the profits of the manufacturer arose from the labour of the last two hours of the day. The restriction of hours of work would accordingly on this view make for the destruction of industry.

Even those who were considered the workers' champions bitterly opposed State interference. John Bright, for example, could hardly control himself in pouring vituperation on all who would try to interfere with the "freedom of industry." He was perhaps the bitterest opponent of Lord Shaftesbury who fought strenuously for factory legislation. Cobden, too, for long was a rabid opponent of factory legislation, though he later changed his views on the subject. Bright and Cobden felt they were defending the workers' best interests—less hours would mean less wages; the exclusion of women and children from certain types of work would mean a considerable lowering of the family income.

We may expect then to find that in the history of State interference there is a rather slow evolution. There was so much opposition to be broken down that in the early years we notice that legislation dealt with cases of flagrant and horrible injustice. It is intriguing to reflect now when there is so much opposition to State regulation on the ground of the intrinsic worth of the human personality that the inspiration of early governmental legislation in industry was from precisely the same source—not the economists, but men like Shaftesbury, intensely conscious of the greatness of the individual, led the movement for reform. Their standpoint was that

certain conditions—very long hours of work, filthy surroundings, employment of females and young children in occupations altogether inimical to their proper development, and the almost total lack of interest in their educational and religious upbringing—all these things and many more were abominations which had to be got rid of, whatever the laws of economics might say, because these conditions were fundamentally and radically opposed to the dignity of human nature.

There were, it is true, a few others who went against the current economic opinions. Men like Robert Owen demonstrated early in the 19th century that shorter hours and better conditions so far from lowering production rather stimulated it. But these were as voices crying in the wilderness. It was comparatively late in the century when the efforts of men like Shaftesbury had wrung certain factory laws from an unwilling Parliament, and their operation gradually showed that they aided rather than retarded the development of industry.

"Laissez Faire" had a long innings, but now that the pendulum has swung too far to the opposite side, *i.e.*, far too much State interference, it is important to remember that Government interference was first introduced very grudgingly. A very brief look at some of the legislation of the last century is extremely interesting.

In 1802 Peel passed an act to protect little apprentices—it only referred to cotton mill apprentices. It limited their labour to twelve hours daily and forbade night work. The masters greeted it with a storm of protest. The act was not of much use because there was no effective means provided for its enforcement. In 1819 Peel tried again—the Act once more applied to cotton mills. It fixed the hours of children's labour at twelve but no male or female over sixteen came under its terms. This too became a dead letter.

The Hammonds remind us in *The Rise of Modern Industry* that when the Parliamentary Reform Bill of 1832 was passed "children were left entirely unprotected except in cotton mills, and in these mills children of nine could be made to work twelve hours a day . . . of effective inspection there was none." Under Shaftesbury's influence the Act of 1833 created four inspectors, and the facts which they brought to light were largely responsible for pushing later Parliaments further along the path of industrial legislation which most M.P.'s disliked and feared. The Act in itself was not very generous—it limited the hours of children under thirteen to eight hours per day and under eighteen to twelve hours per day.

In 1842 the Coal Mines Act was passed. This abolished women's underground labour in the mines and fixed a minimum age of ten for boy miners. Inspectors of mines were also appointed.

In 1847 the Ten Hours Act was passed for textile workers, but due to a legal quibble this was rendered ineffective by the employers' use of a system of relays. The clear Ten Hours Act was not secured till 1874.

From 1850 on, the opposition of manufacturers lessened as they saw the good results of factory legislation. Production was better and workers were more efficient. In 1867 the system of regulation was made generally applicable to all factories employing more than fifty workers, and at the same time "workshops"—workplaces with less than fifty employees—were placed under the supervision of the local authorities. This dual system continued until 1878 when the Factory and Workshops Acts were consolidated under a single system of State inspection.

In 1891 came a big innovation. In the Factories and Workshops Act of that year the task of making regulations was handed over to administrators of the

Civil Service. Government by order and delegation was ushered in.

Second Extreme.

This survey of the growth of Government influence in industrial life is of great importance. It shows us that at first Governments were very loath to interfere at all, and that gradually the policy of "Laissez Faire" was broken down. The State had neglected its duty as promoter of the common good, but once the movement began to go in the opposite direction its speed gathered momentum, so that in the twentieth century the prevailing view of the functions of the Government was that the more the Government interfered, the better. "That Government is best which governs most." This is the other extreme and is the basis of all forms of Totalitarianism.

This viewpoint forgets the importance of the individual and over-emphasises his dependence on society. The State is made into a super-entity before which the individual pales into insignificance. Nazism, Communism, Fascism, and Socialism all err by their excessive glorification of the power of the State.

Typical of this philosophy of the State are the words of Mussolini: "Fascism conceives of the State as an absolute, in comparison with which all individuals or groups are relative, only to be conceived of in their relation to the State." Hitler and Stalin both subscribe to the same opinion. For them, man is made for the State, not the State for man.

Socialism, in all its forms, while not professing so blatantly such a totalitarian philosophy, in practice is influenced greatly by it. It emphasises the claims of society over those of the individual. Gradually it whittles away the initiative and responsibility of the individual. Socialists forget that it is absurd to speak of the State

as happy or prosperous, rather should we speak of the citizens who make up the State as happy or prosperous. Long ago, Aristotle criticised the totalitarian views of Plato by the saying: "Happiness resides in individuals." Socialists neglect that principle.

And so to-day we have the "Welfare State" upon us. Where is it leading us? More and more State control, more and more Welfare planning, that is to-day's remedy for all ills. An extract from a recent book *Return from Utopia*, by Richard Law, is very pertinent. "It is worth while pausing for a moment to consider what life would be like in Utopia if ever it could be realized. Our wants would be provided for us, certainly; but they would be created for us, too. We should be fully occupied but our occupations would be chosen for us. There would be no truth except the truth which is proclaimed by the State; no value except in what is valuable to the State; no loyalty except the loyalty that is due to the State. In such a life there would be neither hunger, poverty, nor remediable disease. There would be little discomfort and no danger.

"But in such a life there would be no choice. There would be no virtue except obedience and no vice except individuality. The creatures condemned to such a life would be cattle, not human beings. . .

"When you rob man of his freedom you take away from him all possibility of development. When you take away from him his freedom to choose between good and evil you have delivered him into slavery. The chains are no less real because they have been forged in kindness or because after a time they can scarcely be felt.

The idea that virtue is a function of society, as distinct from the members of society, is not only a fallacy; it is positively derogatory to the dignity of man, because it justifies the belief that the State has an existence of its own apart from, and on a plane superior to, the life of

its citizens. It justifies any tyranny so long as the State is the tyrant. It leads us to confuse means with ends, and makes us forget that the State exists to serve man, not to master him."

The Golden Mean.

The correct principle of the power and functions of the State avoids the extremes of Individualism ("Laissez Faire") and Totalitarianism. The State's function is to promote the common good; it exists for man and not man for the State. Yet man has certain duties towards the State and it has rights over him, rights however which cannot conflict with man's inalienable fundamental rights, which are superior and antecedent to the claims of the State. Pope Pius XI in the Encyclical on *Christian Education* declares: "The purpose of the existence of the State is to promote the common temporal welfare . . . which consists in that peace and security in which families and individual citizens have the free exercise of their rights and at the same time enjoy the greatest spiritual and material prosperity possible in this life."

In *Quadragesimo Anno* he indicates how this common welfare can best be promoted. "It is indeed true, as history clearly proves, that owing to changed circumstances much that was formerly done by small groups can nowadays only be done by large associations. None the less, just as it is wrong to withdraw from the individual and commit to a group what private enterprise and industry can accomplish, so too it is an injustice, a grave evil and a disturbance of right order, for a larger and higher association to arrogate to itself functions which can be performed efficiently by smaller and lower societies. This is a fundamental principle of social philosophy, unshaken and unchangeable. Of its very nature the true aim of all social activity should be to help members of the social body, but never to destroy or absorb them."

The Holy Father continues: "The State therefore should leave to smaller groups the settlement of business of minor importance, which otherwise would greatly distract it; it will thus carry out with greater freedom, power and success the tasks belonging to it alone, because it alone can effectively accomplish these: *directing, watching, stimulating, restraining*, as circumstances suggest and necessity demands. Let those in power, therefore, be convinced that the more faithfully this principle of subsidiary function be followed, and a graded hierarchical order exist between various associations, the greater will be both social authority and social efficiency, and the happier and more prosperous the condition of the commonwealth."

The general principles, then, are clear. The State is guardian and promoter of the common good, and normally that common good is best achieved by leaving individuals and lesser associations to function as freely as possible; however, the State may have to step in to foster and protect the community.

The State then is justified in doing for members of the community what these cannot do for themselves. So, for example, the State organizes the army and the police. The State, too, rightly inaugurates employment schemes during a period of depression; it also may embark on capital investment programmes which are too big for private resources and which do not bring a quick return on investment, for example, afforestation. But where is its power to stop? Should the State run public utilities and services like the water supply, gas and electricity and transport? A few words on the subject of Nationalization are here called for.

Nationalization.

Pope Pius XI in *Quadragesimo Anno* states that "it is rightly contended that certain forms of property must

be reserved to the State, since they carry with them a power too great to be left to private individuals without injury to the community at large." The good of the community is the criterion. Pope Pius XII said in his address to the Italian Workers' Association in March, 1945, that nationalization of industry can be accepted by Catholics only in cases where it is seen to be really necessary for the general welfare, and he also added that nationalization imposes the duty of compensation which will be appropriate, *i.e.*, just and equitable to all concerned. In a letter to M. Charles Flory of France in July, 1946, the Pope wrote: "Instead of diminishing the mechanical character of life and work in common, nationalization, even when morally licit, is more likely to increase it." It is clear then that the Church regards nationalization as a last resort. The State has the duty regarding private enterprises of "guiding, supervising, stimulating and restraining" (*Quadragesimo Anno*) them in the interests of the common good, but not to nationalize them except in certain exceptional cases. In these matters a good deal will depend on the different circumstances prevailing in different countries. No hard and fast rule will apply, but the bias of the Church's teaching is against a facile appeal to nationalization. Pius XII in an address to the Cardinals in February, 1946, re-echoes the words of Pius XI: "What individual men can do for themselves and by their own forces should not be taken from them and assigned to the community."

Social Services.

The same principles help us in dealing with the question of the State and the Social Services. The State is entitled to initiate Social Security plans if private initiative is lacking. It would be preferable if industry, agriculture and the other services inaugurated their own schemes through the collaboration of trade unions and other

associations. The State should try to stimulate and extend such schemes if already in force. But if the prospects are not very bright in this regard, the State as guardian of the common good may introduce its own scheme with due safeguards for the rights of the family and the individual. *Quadragesimo Anno* declares: "It is true, indeed, that a just freedom of action should be left to individual citizens and families; but this principle is only valid, as long as the common good is secure, and no injustice is entailed. The duty of rulers, however, is to protect the community and its various elements; and in protecting private rights, they must have special regard for the weak and the needy." Immediately after this sentence follows a quotation from *Rerum Novarum*: "For the richer classes have many ways of shielding themselves, and stand less in need of help from the State; whereas the poorer classes have no resources of their own to fall back upon, and must chiefly depend upon the assistance of the State. And for this reason, wage-earners, since they mostly belong to that class, should be specially cared for and protected by the Government."

The State then exists, let it be repeated, for the common good, and that common good is best achieved when families and individuals are enabled to fulfil their proper destinies. The State must take account of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Supplementation. The State does not exist to do for individuals and families and other associations what they can do reasonably well themselves; the State should not supplant them when they can partly do things but should supplement their efforts; finally, the State is there to do for them what they cannot at all do for themselves.

The Socialist and Welfare planner acts from a different philosophy. Sydney Webb, the Fabian Socialist and the inspiration of much of modern Socialism expresses his creed as follows: "The perfect and fitting development

of each individual is not necessarily the utmost and highest cultivation of his own personality, but the filling in the best possible way of his humble function in the great social machine" (*Fabian Essays in Socialism*, 1931 Edition, page 54). Against that pernicious philosophy we must be on our guard. Our Irish Constitution in Article 45 gives what are called "Directive Principles of Social Policy," and in that, I suggest, we have the correct viewpoint of the function of the State. With that Article we may conclude:

1. The State shall strive to promote the welfare of the whole people by securing and protecting as effectively as it may a social order in which justice and charity shall inform all the institutions of the national life.

2. The State shall, in particular, direct its policy towards securing:

- (i) That the citizens (all of whom, men and women equally, have the right to an adequate means of livelihood) *may through their occupations find the means of making reasonable provision for their domestic needs.*
- (ii) That the ownership and control of the material resources of the community may be so distributed amongst private individuals and the various classes as best to subserve the common good.
- (iii) That, especially, the operation of free competition shall not be allowed so to develop as to result in the concentration of the ownership or control of essential commodities in a few individuals to the common detriment.
- (iv) That in what pertains to the control of credit the constant and predominant aim shall be the welfare of the people as a whole.

- (v) That there may be established on the land in economic security as many families as in the circumstances shall be practicable.
3. 1° *The State shall favour and where necessary supplement private initiative in industry and commerce.*
- 2° The State shall endeavour to secure that private enterprise shall be so conducted as to ensure reasonable efficiency in the production and distribution of goods and as to protect the public against unjust exploitation.
4. 1° The State pledges itself to safeguard with especial care the economic interests of the weaker sections of the community, and, where necessary, to contribute to the support of the infirm, the widow, the orphan and the aged.
- 2° The State shall endeavour to ensure that the strength and health of workers, men and women, and the tender age of children shall not be abused, and that citizens shall not be forced by economic necessity to enter avocations unsuited to their sex, age or strength.

There, briefly, are indicated the State's functions of "directing, watching, stimulating and restraining." As *Quadragesimo Anno* declares: "Of its very nature the true aim of all social activity should be to help members of the social body, but never to destroy or absorb them."

CHAPTER VIII

LESSER ASSOCIATIONS IN THE STATE

The State and family are necessary societies as we have seen, but man's desire for associating with his fellows is not exhausted by his membership of the family and State. Men are sociable and like to form various societies. It may be a football club or a debating society, a dramatic group or a cycling club. There are many forms of these associations (G. K. Chesterton has a story about *The Club of Queer Trades*), but they all try to satisfy this natural desire of men to express their personalities in diverse ways.

Pope Leo XIII reminds us of the Old Testament teaching in this regard: "It is better that two should be together than one, for they have the advantage of their society. If one fall, he shall be supported by the other. Woe to him that is alone, for when he falleth he hath none to lift him up" (*Eccles* iv. 9, 10), and again "A brother that is helped by his brother is like a strong city" (*Prov.* xviii. 19). The Pope continues: "It is this natural impulse which binds men together in civil society; and it is likewise this which leads men to join together in associations which are, it is true, lesser and not independent societies, but nevertheless, real societies" (*Rerum Novarum*).

A Society.

A Society may be defined as a group of persons organised for some common purpose. The purpose must involve a certain stability—a group who organise themselves to lift a car out of a drain, for example, is not a society; the purpose of the organisation must not be ephemeral in its nature. The following are examples of societies:

Trade Unions ;
 Employers' Associations ;
 Professional Associations, *e.g.*, the Irish Medical Association ;
 Cultural Associations, *e.g.*, Local Dramatic, Literary and Musical Societies ;
 Recreational Societies, *e.g.*, G.A.A., Football Association, Rugby Union ;
 Religious Societies, *e.g.*, Confraternities, Sodalties ;
 Political Societies ;
 Rate-Payers' Association.

The list may be added to in detail. The above are all examples of Voluntary or Conventional (*i.e.*, formed by free consent) Societies.

Leo XIII states in *Rerum Novarum*: "Private Societies, then, although they exist within the State, cannot nevertheless be absolutely, and as such prohibited by the State. For to enter into a 'Society' of this kind is the natural right of man ; and the State is bound to protect natural rights, not to destroy them ; and if it forbid its citizens to form associations, it contradicts the very principle of its own existence ; for both they and it exist in virtue of the like principle, namely, the natural tendency of man to dwell in society."

It is perfectly true of course, as the Pope points out, that "there are occasions when it is fitting that the law should intervene to prevent associations ; as when men join together for purposes which are evidently bad, unlawful, or dangerous to the State. In such cases, public authority may justly forbid the formation of associations, and may dissolve them if they already exist. But every precaution should be taken not to violate the rights of individuals and not to impose unreasonable regulations under pretence of public benefit. For laws only bind when they are in accordance with right reason, and hence with the eternal law of God."

The Church's viewpoint then stresses the safeguarding of men's natural desires. Life for men will be richer and the more varied, the more there are of lesser associations in the State. These societies allow for the expression of the different gifts and talents men possess ; they cater for the fuller development of personality, and because they are guided and directed by the members themselves they are a guarantee of freedom and initiative.

Totalitarianism and Lesser Associations.

We are not surprised to learn that totalitarian States fear these lesser associations, and that they always endeavour to suppress them or muzzle them. Trade unions in Russia, for example, are the lap-dog of the State. Aristotle, over 300 years before Christ, in his great work, *The Politics*, understood why all tyrannical Governments fear free associations of men. In discussing the way tyranny seeks to preserve itself, he says : "It includes the 'lopping off' of outstanding men, and the removal of men of spirit. But it also includes a number of other and additional measures. One of them is the forbidding of *common meals, clubs*, education and anything of a like character—or, in other words, a *defensive attitude against everything likely to produce the two qualities of mutual confidence and a high spirit. A second measure is to prohibit societies for cultural purposes*, and any gathering of a similar character : in a word, the adoption of every means for making every subject as much of a stranger as is possible to every other" (Barker's Translation, p. 244).

The nature of tyranny has not changed much since Aristotle's day. All totalitarian regimes are afraid of independent lesser associations ; they prefer that there be nothing between individuals and the State, for they can see that these associations make for "mutual confidence and a high spirit," qualities which are

detestable to the totalitarian despot. Rousseau, the so-called apostle of liberty, in his *Social Contract* writes: "it is therefore essential if the general will is to be able to express itself that there should be no partial society within the State and that each citizen should think only his own thoughts." He saw that these associations could be pockets of resistance to the general will, and after all "in order that the social compact may not be an empty formula, it tacitly includes the undertaking . . . that whoever refuses to obey the general will shall be compelled to do so by the whole body." Then comes the crowning sentence: "This means nothing less than that he will be forced to be free!"

The State and Society.

It seems clear then that the more associations there are in the State the better is the life of society. The State does not and never shall dominate the life of society. As Sir Ernest Barker points out in his *Reflections on Government* to confuse the State with society would be fatal. His words deserve quotation:

"A State is a juridically organised nation. A national State is a particular organisation of a national society, intended for a particular purpose. It is the national society organised as a political association and acting in terms of civil and constitutional law for the purpose of securing the value of civil and constitutional liberty and other political values. It is the legal expression of society—but not the only expression. *Society is not exhausted or comprehended in the State.* Society acts and exists for a number of purposes (economic, religious, educational, etc.) and through a number of contained unions, societies, associations, etc., which collectively constitute national society.

"The two must be kept distinct. Some would have the total State which is all and everything and includes all

and every purpose (this was the theory of the Greek city-State as it appeared to Plato; so with Burke 'A partnership in all science; a partnership in all art; a partnership in every virtue and in all perfection').

"*The State then is not the agent of all the purposes of man: and so it should respect the liberty of social groups* (provided they do not injuriously affect the State's achievement of its own purposes). The lesson of our times is that we need simultaneously both society and the State. *Man's personality with its many purposes needs more than one channel. Ultimately the only freedom is that of the individual.*"

Dr. Lindsay, Master of Balliol, in his *Modern Democratic State*, remarks: "The ordinary man if his personality is to have a chance must have his own small association of which he can be an effective member . . . : a community where all organisations are gathered into one great system cannot give its members equality whether it is theoretically authoritarian or democratic."

Mr. Langmead Casserly in his *Morals and Man in the Social Sciences* writes: "For a society, as in the totalitarian States, to subordinate personality and the richness of personal variety to the supposed administrative and governmental requirements of its own continued mass existence is as though a man were to cut off his head in order to make it easier for his feet to balance his body" (page 214).

Local Government.

A healthy spirit of local initiative is also very desirable if the State in general is to prosper. Bryce declares that "the best school of democracy and the best guarantee for its success is the practice of local self-government" (*Modern Democrats*, Vol. I, p. 150). In paragraph 689 of the Report on Vocational Organisation we read: "It is very much in the interests of a sound social life

that the State should help and encourage citizens to interest themselves in local government and to serve on local administrative bodies. Complete centralization of all local government in a department situated in Dublin would have serious disadvantages. It would prove to be costly and slow, and deprive people in the country of interest in local affairs, thus leading to a diminution of public spirit and voluntary public service. The tendency to replace voluntary unpaid public service by paid officials does not always make for economy or efficiency. It prepares the way for the undue extension of State interference at the expense of democratic and natural rights. A centrally controlled system breaks down in time of crisis or emergency and leaves the country in jeopardy."

The centralized administration of France and Germany broke down completely in emergency and took a long time to recover. After the last war Norway and Holland, countries accustomed to healthy local government, recovered rapidly—people set about doing things themselves, rather than wait for direction from the centre.

The dilemma, of course, is to reconcile local autonomy with national interests, but it may be taken as certain that live local government is essential for democracy. It must be regarded as a pity that the managerial system has developed so much in local administration. The reasons for its introduction were mainly the inefficiency and corruption of local bodies. These causes serve to impress upon us again and again the necessity for (a) moral character, (b) education, if the State and lesser associations are to function properly.

CHAPTER IX

VOCATIONAL ORGANIZATION

In *Quadragesimo Anno* Pius XI states: "As things are now, the wage-system divides men on what is called the labour-market into two sections, resembling armies, and the disputes between these sections transform this labour-market into an arena where the two armies are engaged in fierce combat. To this grave disorder which is leading society to ruin, a remedy must evidently be applied as speedily as possible. But there cannot be question of any perfect cure unless this opposition be done away with, and well-organised members of the social body be constituted: vocational groups, namely, claiming the allegiance of men, not according to the position they occupy in the labour-market, but according to the diverse functions which they exercise in society. For it is natural that just as those who dwell in close proximity constitute townships, so those who practise the same trade or profession, in the economic field or any other, form corporate groups. . . True and genuine social order demands that the various members of a society be joined together by some firm bond. Such a bond of union is provided both by the production of goods or the rendering of services in which employers and employees of one and the same vocational group collaborate; and by the common good which all such groups should unite to promote, each in its own sphere with friendly harmony. Now this union will become powerful and efficacious in proportion to the fidelity with which the individuals and the vocational groups strive to discharge their professional duties and to excel in them."

The Pope here points out that those working in any

industry or service are providing goods or services for the community. From this fact several conclusions follow :

1. That employer and employed should not be opposed to each other ; rather, their common purpose should help to keep them in harmony.

2. That in the activities of both employer and employed the common good must always be kept in view. Private or sectional interests should not be allowed to predominate.

3. That because employer and employed are working at a particular service or industry, their intimate knowledge should be utilized to the full in the operation of the service or industry. Political government has the task as the Encyclicals point out of "directing, watching, stimulating and restraining," and to help it in that task vocational groups will be of the utmost importance. Those charged with governmental responsibility will be all the better able to carry out their task if they have the advice and guidance of those who are best able to judge in their own affairs, whether it be industry, commerce, agriculture or the rest.

The choice at present seems to be between the bureaucratic civil servant who lives apart from the matters he decides upon and the counsel and direction of those "who know where the shoe pinches" in actual affairs. Vocational organisation aims at fulfilling this latter function.

The actual set-up of Vocationalism may vary from country to country, but the basic principles as outlined by the Popes should be the same. There is room for diversity, according to the social, cultural and industrial characteristics of nations.

The idea itself that people engaged in a particular occupation are best fitted to have expert knowledge

about its requirements and that therefore their special contribution to the direction of the affairs of the occupation should be utilized is not, of course, a discovery of the Popes. What they have done, however, is to emphasise clearly for all the importance of this principle, and they also have indicated that through Vocational Groupings the community and the diverse occupations can be revived and strengthened.

Wrong Notions of Vocationalism.

It is essential that a critical approach be shown towards systems which profess to be vocationally organised. A good deal of harm has been done to the whole idea by the various brands which have been put forward by some as true vocationalism.

For example, in England I believe a good deal of harm has been done to the vocational idea by the fact that the proposals of the Webbs are so unworkable. They proposed to draw a line between political government and industrial government ; to set over against the political parliament and the political executive a social parliament with separate executive organs. Clearly an independent or quasi-independent functional parliament is going to lead to political chaos. Control must be left in the hands of the political parliament ; the functional or vocational body must be subordinate.

Many, too, loosely identify vocational organisation with State-controlled corporative bodies. For example, a few years ago when Mr. Amery in his Chichele lectures advocated a House of Industry which would be a preparatory and advisory body to deal with social and industrial questions, the London *Times* commented as follows : "The idea of an economic "sub-parliament" is not new either in this country or on the Continent. On the Continent the notion of vocational representation flourished in the theory of the corporate State under

Italian Fascism and under National Socialism, and it was a prime instrument for breaking the power of the trade unions. . . The erection of a body parallel to parliament with legislative or semi-legislative powers, and not elected by the people, must be regarded as contrary to the sovereignty of the King-in-Parliament."

This is facile criticism. State-controlled vocationalism of dictators is not vocationalism at all in the proper sense of the term. Dictators have misused a good idea for their own ends, but to criticize vocationalism on that ground is like telling a man not to wear a tie because somebody might use it to choke him. Catholic social principles advocate that the organisation should really come from below, and the State's task is to encourage rather than impose such a system. Actually Pope Pius XI in *Quadragesimo Anno* in speaking of the Italian system as imposed by Mussolini, said (and we must not forget that Mussolini was in power when he wrote): "We feel bound to say that to Our knowledge there are some who fear that the State is substituting itself in the place of private initiative, instead of limiting itself to necessary and sufficient assistance. It is feared that the new syndical and corporative organisation tends to have an excessively bureaucratic and political character, and that, notwithstanding the general advantages referred to above, it ends in serving particular political aims rather than in contributing to the initiation and promotion of a better social order."

The Times further criticism that vocationalism would set up a body parallel to parliament and not elected by the people is also unjust. If vocational groups do elect a national council it would be subordinate and advisory to the legislature, and also it would be elected by the people in their occupational capacity. When these points are remembered much superficial criticism is effectively silenced.

Governments and Vocationalism.

The feeling in many countries is that parliaments could do with expert advice on social and economic questions. From a report of the International Labour Office we read: "There has been increasing dissatisfaction in recent years with existing government machinery for dealing with social questions essentially bound up with economic questions. Satisfactory adaptation of government institutions to changing economic requirements of government has not yet been achieved."

In Germany, under the Weimar Republic, an Economic Council was set up as an advisory body to Parliament, and it did important work in giving expert help to the Government. The idea was copied in France with the "Conseil National Economique"—a body of forty-seven members under the direct authority of the Prime Minister. It was consultative. In England the functional idea was adopted before the recent war on a small scale with the Economic Staff Advisory Council. Latterly, however, certain elements of vocationalism have been used on an increasing scale—Joint Production Committees, Works Councils, and particularly the Working Parties Reports on various industries, whereby men expert in their own industrial spheres have been used to draw up reports advising the Government.

Mr. Churchill in his Romanes Lecture of 1930 said that Parliament would be well advised to create a non-political body free altogether from party exigencies and composed of persons possessing special qualifications in economic matters. It should be subordinate to Parliament but should assist its deliberations. He thought that the political Parliament should choose in proportion to its party groupings a subordinate economic parliament of one-fifth of its members and composed of persons of high technical and business qualifications. As we have seen, Mr. Amery more recently advocated a special House of Industry.

That there is a need then for some non-political body to give expert guidance to Governments is generally recognised. The Popes assert that if society were organised according to Vocational Groups these voluntary and self-governing groups would be best fitted to look after the industry or service they represent. That is eminently in accordance with common sense.

The Powers of the Vocational Group.

The Most Rev. Dr. Lucey in a very stimulating article on *A Christian Alternative to Communism and Fascism* (C.T.S.) raises the question "What should be the powers of the Occupational Council?" He says: "The general principle is that the national occupational council of each industry and profession is to possess a large measure of autonomy in planning the economic life of its particular occupation. Its regulations are to be binding on everybody engaged in the calling, and are to be recognised as such by the State. This implies, therefore, that the occupational councils are to be public corporations. They are not to be mere organs of the political Government, but self-governing functional institutions for the various branches of social and economic life."

He continues: "The scope of the central council's regulatory power will vary in details. But in general, the council will codify the practices of the profession, standardize the products or services which the public are to expect from the profession, and determine what action on the part of members is to be thought unprofessional. Secondly, it will consider price-fixing, at least to this extent that it will go into the costs its members have to meet and show what would be a fair price in view of these costs. This, of course, will raise the question both of a fair rate of profit for share-holders and a fair wage-rate for workers. Thirdly, it will have power to impose the collective agreements made between

the labour unions and the employers' unions on all individual firms. And it will provide adjudication boards for all disputes about wages, working conditions and the like. Fourthly, it will lay down the conditions for membership of the occupation. Again it may be entrusted with responsibility for much of the social services now assumed by the State. In particular, Unemployment Relief, Old Age Pensions, Disability and Housing Benefits, should be undertaken by each union for its own members. What is more natural than that the out-of-work, the aged, the sick and the needy should continue to live directly from the occupation to which they have dedicated themselves as workers."

"But if the occupational council is to be semi-autonomous it is not to be autocratic. In the first place, it has to respect the rights and views of its own regional and local branches. Then, too, it must be careful not to encroach upon the functions of the trade union, the employers' federation or the individual business proprietor. And from above, its powers are limited by the State. *The State is superior to the occupational group just as it is superior to every other temporal society within the country. Hence it is the right and the duty of the State to supervise the activities of the group council.*" Dr. Lucey thinks that this function of the State would best be secured if all proposed legislation involving social and economic issues should be submitted to a National Vocational Chamber before submission to the State Legislature. That would ensure expert advice for the legislator.

The Vocational Commission.

The Irish Vocational Commission Report of 1943 is a document worthy of serious study. While one may not agree with details, the main principles as underlined and applied in the Report cannot be neglected by anybody

interested in the Social Question. Dr. McKeivitt in a foreword to a Synopsis of the Recommendations of the Report published by the Catholic Societies Vocational Organisation Conference declares: "We claim that vocational organisation is the only system that can preserve democratic liberties, secure the maximum collaboration between all classes of the community, and give workers a status commensurate with their contribution to social life."

Certain Objections to Vocationalism.

In saying all this, we must be aware of certain difficulties which must be faced. Some hold, for example, that Vocational organisation will lead to the creation of vested interests. We know from experience how certain associations, set up explicitly for providing "better services for the community," impose rigid restrictions on new entrants. Others form rings for the artificial control of prices. Against that criticism we reply: surely these things are rather an argument for vocational organisation than otherwise. In a vocational grouping (which these one-sided associations are not) employers and workers and consumers would have their voice. At present many can indulge with impunity in certain practices that would be impossible in the light of healthy criticism which would be a feature of vocational organisation.

Trade unions, too, need have no fear of vocationalism. Rather, I believe, their functions would be capable of immense development; they would be called upon to play a much bigger rôle than at present in the life of the community. Their practical experience of difficulties and everyday problems could be most useful in the formulation of policy in the services and industries of the country.

Vocationalism will not be a return to mediævalism. It is true that when the guild system flourished, society was, in general, organised vocationally. Pope Pius XI

in *Quadragesimo Anno* writes: "At one period there existed a social order which, though by no means perfect in every respect, corresponded nevertheless in a certain measure to right reasons according to the needs and conditions of the times." But the guild system did not accommodate itself to changes in economic and industrial life. Why? The Pope answers this question. "That this order has long since perished is not due to the fact that it was incapable of development and adaptation to changing needs and circumstances, but it is due to the fact that men were hardened in excessive self-love, and refused to extend that order, as was their duty, to the increasing numbers of the population; or else, deceived by the attractions of false liberty and other errors, they grew impatient of every authority and endeavoured to throw off all government." Here the Pope reminds us that men refused to extend the principles of guild life to changing circumstances because of selfishness, and they even objected to legitimate authority's general supervision. We need a return now to the principles of the mediæval guilds when they were flourishing; but we, of course, cannot return to the mediæval system of economy; we must apply these principles to modern conditions.

The Basis of Success.

For Vocational Organisation to succeed the members of the groups must be animated by the virtues of justice and charity. The Holy Father, in speaking of the breakdown of the mediæval guild system points the moral: "all that we have taught about reconstructing and perfecting the social order will be of no avail without a reform of conduct; of this, history affords the clearest evidence." Leo XIII has already said the same thing: "If society is to be healed now, in no way can it be healed save by a return to Christian life and Christian institutions."

Ireland and Vocationalism.

It should be possible for us in Ireland to do much more than we are doing at present for the attainment of Vocational Organisation. The process, of course, must not be hurried. With greater knowledge of social principles diffused throughout the community—and signs are not wanting that this diffusion is taking place on a very considerable scale—we may reasonably hope for better things. It is a pity that more Joint Industrial Councils are not set up—these are envisaged in our Industrial Relations Act, and the Labour Court in its reports laments that more is not being done on these lines. It finds that its services are all too frequently used for the settlement of disputes rather than in the inauguration and registration of Joint Industrial Councils whose presence in industrial life would make for peace and order on a more permanent basis.

Article 15 of the Irish Constitution has most interesting paragraphs on Vocational Organisation :

Section 2

1. The sole and exclusive power of making laws for the State is hereby vested in the Oireachtas ; no other legislative authority has power to make laws for the State.
2. Provision may however be made by law for the creation or recognition of subordinate legislatures and for the powers and functions of these legislatures.

Section 3

1. The Oireachtas may provide for the establishment or recognition of functional or vocational councils representing branches of the social and economic life of the people.
2. A law establishing or recognising any such council shall determine its rights, powers and duties, and its relation to the Oireachtas and to the Government.

CHAPTER X**TRADE UNIONISM****Early History.**

Many see in trade unions the lineal descendants of the old journeymen's guilds—these guilds were a breakaway from the old craft guilds which included masters, journeymen and apprentices. When the old craft guilds flourished the apprentice could become a journeyman, and later a master, but gradually it came about that in many crafts the masters opposed the journeymen in their efforts to become masters. So journeymen grouped themselves together to ensure that if they could not become masters they at least would get fair wages. These journeymen unions continued down to the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in some areas. We read, for example, that the master tailors of London and Westminster in 1720 complained to Parliament that "the Journeymen Tailors in and about the cities of London and Westminster to the number of 7,000 and upwards have lately entered into a combination to raise their wages and leave off working an hour sooner than they used to do." The hatters, woolstaplers, shipwrights, brushmakers, carpenters and others all had their unions in England and Ireland well before the factory system. It is important to note that these early unions were associations of skilled workers. Those in the ill-paid and ill-treated occupations were too weak to combine together.

The Industrial Revolution.

The factory system which developed with the Industrial Revolution gave an added incentive to the formation of trade unions. The workers realised that their only hope of betterment lay in combination. Cotton spinning was

the first big industry to be brought under the factory system, and it was with the spinners that trade unionism of a modern type begins. But these unions were weak and ineffectual. The laws were severe against combinations, and the methods used by the unions—particularly, violent strikes—only served to have the law enforced in all its rigour. Even with the repeal of the Combinations Act in 1824 the workers began to realise that their little unions were not strong enough to oppose the masters. The idea of a single union embracing all trades was born, and so in 1834 was founded the Grand National Consolidated Trades Union under the inspiration of the Irishman, John Doherty. This union fared badly; its organisation was weak and in a few short years the union died. This effort then at what might be called Revolutionary Trade Unionism—that is, a general movement as opposed to the isolated unions of the skilled workers, and with a “worker-versus-capitalist” philosophy—failed, and it was not until the closing years of the nineteenth century that the idea was again revived.

Revival of Trade Unionism.

After 1834 there was a lull in trade unionism for many years, but in 1851 a revival began. In that year the Amalgamated Society of Engineers was founded in England. This was to be the “new model” for trade unionism. It differed widely from its predecessors of the twenties and thirties. It had no interest in social revolution; it simply wanted a better standard of living for its members. Large subscriptions were paid and benefits were also big. Strikes were not favoured. Trade unionism had become “respectable.”

Again it is necessary to point out that these “new model” unions were of skilled men in large industries; along with them continued the old-fashioned small craft unions. But the great mass of workers was still outside

the movement. Unskilled workers, navvies and general labourers were not considered.

Trade Unions and Unskilled Workers.

It was not until the eighteen eighties that the movement spread to the unskilled workers. In 1886 Ben Tillet began what was to become the Transport & General Workers' Union, which won the big dock strike of 1889 with the assistance of the great Cardinal Manning, the convert son of a Bank of England governor. The other unions looked rather askance at this new development. These new unions were opposed to the safe friendly-society tactics of the other unions; they were more militant in their outlook. Gradually however they, too, took on the appearance of the “model unions” as they became more organised. But the spirit of these new unions reminds one of 1834—one hears more of the “worker-versus-capitalist” outlook. Industrialism has tended to be divided into two opposing camps, the masters on the one side and the workers on the other. The English movement was the inspiration behind the formation of the Transport & General Workers' Union of Ireland by Jim Larkin and James Connolly. Jim Larkin had come to Belfast in 1907 as the organiser of the National Union of Dock Labourers, with headquarters in Liverpool. After the Union executive had arranged a settlement of the 1907 Belfast Strike, leaving Larkin aside, he decided to form the [Irish Transport & General Workers' Union, which he founded on January 4th, 1909. James Connolly returned from the States in 1910, and in 1911 he was appointed Secretary and Ulster District Organiser of the Union.

The great strike or lock-out of 1913 was the effort of the masters to smash this union. The Federated Employers demanded of their workers that they sign a document drawn up in the following terms: “I hereby

undertake to carry out all instructions given to me by or on behalf of my employers, and further, I agree to immediately resign my membership of the Irish Transport & General Workers' Union (if a member), and I further undertake that I will not join or in any way support this union." This was 1913. Leo XIII in 1891 had written his great Encyclical *Rerum Novarum*, wherein he had laid down the right of the workers to organise in trade unions. I think it is true to say that the spirit of mutual suspicion and hostility then engendered in 1913 has never been wholly eradicated from Irish industrial life.

The Position To-day.

At the present time then we find that all the old crafts of carpenter, joiner, mason, baker, bricklayer and printer have maintained their ancient associations and new unions of skilled workers which modern science has produced—lithographers, stereotypers, plumbers, engineers and electricians—are all organised as craft unions.

There are other unions or associations catering for special services, *e.g.*, Irish National Teachers' Organisation, Bank Officials Association, and so on.

Then there are the general unions which will accept all types of workers. The big general unions in Ireland are (i) The Transport & General Workers' Union, (ii) The Workers' Union of Ireland, which was formed in 1924 by a secession of workers from the Transport & General Workers' Union, (iii) The Irish Women Workers' Union, founded in 1913 to meet the special needs of women, (iv) The Amalgamated Transport & General Workers' Union, formed in 1921, but whose membership in Ireland now is practically confined to Belfast.

There are at present two Congresses catering for Irish unions—the Congress of Irish Unions and the Irish Trade Union Congress. This is the result of a split which occurred in 1944.

Trade Union Information, which is issued by the Irish Trade Union Congress Research Department, in the March and April numbers, 1953, gives valuable and interesting details about trade unions in Ireland. We learn that to-day there are about 513,000 in the trade union movement, 319,000 of them in the Republic of Ireland, and 194,000 in Northern Ireland. These trade unionists are organised in 157 trade unions, of which 80 have members in the Republic of Ireland only, 42 have members in Northern Ireland only, and 35 have members both in the Republic of Ireland and in Northern Ireland. There are 298,000 trade unionists affiliated to the Irish Trade Union Congress, 172,000 to the Congress of Irish Unions, and 42,000 in unaffiliated unions.

Two general unions make up 43% of the total—the Irish Transport & General Workers' Union (130,000), and the Amalgamated Transport & General Workers' Union (90,000, mainly in Northern Ireland). The three next biggest unions are the Workers' Union of Ireland (25,000), Amalgamated Engineering Union (21,500), and the Amalgamated Society of Woodworkers (16,000). Of the five biggest unions listed above, three have their head offices in England, *viz.*, the Amalgamated Transport & General Workers' Union, the Amalgamated Engineering Union, and the Amalgamated Society of Woodworkers.

There are 57 unions with less than 250 members, and 16 have between 250 and 500 members. That means that half of the total number of trade unions in Ireland have an aggregate membership equal to only 2% of all trade unionists in the country. There are 46 craft unions with a total membership of 89,395. One out of two trade unionists in the country is in a general union.

And now after this synopsis of trade union history let us go on to deal with certain questions of principle.

The Right of the Workers to form Trade Unions.

No one disputes this principle nowadays, though in the past many attacked it. It is well to recall the words of Leo XIII in *Rerum Novarum*, written in 1891. "History attests what excellent results were brought about by the Artificers' Guilds of olden times. They were the means of affording not only many advantages to the workmen, but in no small degree of promoting the advancement of art as numerous monuments remain to bear witness. Such unions should be suited to the requirements of this our age—an age of wider education, of different habits, and of far more numerous requirements in daily life. It is gratifying to know that there are actually in existence not a few associations of this nature, consisting either of workmen alone, or of workmen and employers together; but *it were greatly to be desired that they should become more numerous and more efficient.*"

Pope Pius XI in *Quadragesimo Anno*, written in 1931, points out that the advocacy of trade unions by Pope Leo was well timed. "For at that period rulers of not a few nations were deeply infected with liberalism and regarded such unions of workmen with disfavour, indeed with open hostility. While readily recognising and patronising similar associations amongst other classes, with criminal injustice they denied the innate right of forming associations to those who needed them most for self-protection against oppression by the more powerful. There were even Catholics who viewed with suspicion the efforts of the workers to form such unions, as if they savoured of a sort of socialist or revolutionary spirit."

Trade Unions and Religion.

On the Continent much of trade unionism is dominated by Marxists. Leo XIII therefore urged that Catholics, where possible, should form their own trade unions. Indeed, the social encyclicals put forward the Catholic

trade union as the ideal for Catholic workers, and that wherever such unions are not possible then Catholics should have their own association to safeguard their moral and religious welfare. In England, Catholics have their Association of Catholic Trade Unionists (*Actu*, for short)—this organises lectures on social principles, and in general tries to see to it that Catholics use their influence as Catholics in their trade unions.

Our unions here are in the English secular non-denominational tradition. That is a fact of history. Our Bishops, however, consider them quite safe for Catholics, and I do not think it would be feasible or advisable to organise specifically Catholic trade unions. But Catholics (and the vast majority of our trade unionists are Catholics) should let their Catholicism influence their trade union activity in every possible way. The Church speaks with the voice of Christ; she has the healing salve for the wounds of humanity. Catholic trade unionists should learn correct social principles and be active trade unionists. There are too many sleeping partners in trade unions to-day with the result that sometimes a few officials, often remote from the conditions and circumstances of the members of the union, and often, ignorant of correct social principles, dictate the policy of the union.

Leo XIII says that the administration and government of these associations should be "*firm and wise.*" It cannot be firm if executives are afraid of intransigent members and if they fear to impose necessary discipline on some; it cannot be firm if expediency is the line of policy. It cannot be wise without wisdom, and wisdom follows from moral integrity and knowledge of principle. How pertinent then are the words of Pope Leo: "It is most important that office-bearers be appointed with due prudence and discretion and each one's charge carefully mapped out, in order that no members may suffer harm."

If trade unionists appear at a meeting only when a question of wages is being discussed, it is their own fault if abuses develop in the administration of their union.

Trade Unions and the Freedom of the Individual.

There is no doubt then that men have the right to form trade unions. But *must* an individual join a trade union? Has an individual a moral obligation to join a union? The encyclicals have, as we have seen, urged that men form trade unions but they do not touch explicitly on this question. In my opinion it would be wrong to insist that an obligation in conscience falls on each individual worker to join a trade union, except in certain circumstances where his not joining a union might be responsible for injustice being inflicted on his fellow-workers. Trade unions are voluntary societies, and we should try to keep the principle of liberty of the individual safeguarded. A certain union might not appeal to a worker—its executive may appear to him to be suspect; its methods of organisation may grate on him—for various reasons he does not like this union which is the only union catering for his job. It seems clear that he is at liberty to refuse to join.

But, it may be said, in actual fact one is compelled nowadays "to have a union card" or go without work. That is true, but we are discussing the moral justification of this practice. It is clear that craft unions are within their rights in insisting on a certain standard, arrived at by apprenticeship, for their members. But it is to be feared that certain trades are unjust in their restrictiveness regarding the admission of apprentices. They either allow too few in, although the trade could easily take more (this is one of the factors making for the high cost of living for workers) or they allow only sons or nephews of members. A man who has been at a certain trade naturally would like to see his son following

that trade, and other things being equal, the boy should have preference over another. "Other things being equal" is an important condition. I have known boys from poor homes in the new districts of Dublin, who have been very brilliant at school and who have a definite aptitude for a certain trade, but who were debarred from following their vocation in life. Clearly, of course, a flooding of a trade would be undesirable, but one must plead for a more liberal attitude on the part of some of our craft unions. The Church draws its priests from all classes of the community—a boy with the proper intention and the right moral and natural qualities will always be accepted and helped on to the goal of the priesthood by the Church. Restriction of new entrants to trades may be justified, but let these restrictions be enforced not simply from the point of view of the existing members alone but from the view of the common good. Let us lean on the side of liberty as far as possible.

The general unions, too, have to face this problem. At the outset, let it be said that the "one big union" idea should be quietly buried. It involves an appalling claim against individual liberty; political dictatorships are not more odious.

But may a union insist on 100% membership in a particular shop or factory or depot? Is it justified in seeking 100% membership of its own particular union? The argument used is that this is necessary for trade union solidarity. Again for obvious reasons managements prefer to negotiate with one union rather than with several. The custom is developing whereby certain firms make agreements with certain unions that these unions alone will cater for specific workmen, even though other unions may have workers of the same category. These arrangements may make for efficiency and uniformity, but they can also involve a serious invasion of individual rights—in effect they mean that

a man or woman might be bound irrevocably to a particular union without any hope of escape. This matter is discussed more fully in the chapter on strikes. The conclusion there is that it seems reasonable to grant exclusive negotiating rights to the union of the majority, but to insist on a person's remaining in a particular union is unjustified.

Some trade unionists will disagree with the above opinions, but I would remind them that trade unions have battled long and hard for many years for the right of free association, and it would be a very retrograde step for them to take away that same right to-day from their fellow trade unionists. The other argument that workers who benefit from a trade union's activity should be compelled to subscribe to its membership is hardly valid. Normally, workers who see the good done by a union will join, but there should be no compulsion.

Trade Unions and Politics.

Should trade unions attach themselves to any particular party? It seems to me that they should not. Trade unions have in their membership men and women of diverse political opinions, and it is unreasonable to demand their support of any particular political party because they happen to be trade unionists. In England Mr. Atlee's Government reversed the legislation of the Conservatives, who after the great strike of 1926, decreed in 1927 that trade unionists must contract explicitly to pay a political levy before such can be taken from them. That step, of course, has aided the Labour Party's finances considerably, but whether it is good as a long-term policy is extremely doubtful. For three reasons I consider that trade unionism should not ally itself to any political party—first, such a course seems to go against the objects of trade unionism; secondly, trade unionists will normally have different political opinions; and thirdly,

trade union funds which might be better employed, will be dissipated in electioneering.

Trade Unions and the Future.

One thing which may prevent trade unions from playing the rôle they should in society is a spirit of sectionalism. Each trade union tends to look at any problem solely from the point of view of its own members, and so the general good of the community may be forgotten. Barbara Wootton in her book, *Freedom Under Planning*, says: "It is in fact the business of a union to be anti-social; the members would have a just grievance if their officials and committees ceased to put sectional interests first." (It may be no harm to point out that she also says: "What is true of unions is, of course, no less true of employers.") Her judgment of trade unions may be harsh, but yet her words do point a certain lesson for the ordinary trade unionist, and that is that he must give his leaders and officials a fair chance. As Michael Fogarty, Catholic and Fellow of Nuffield College, Oxford, remarks in his brochure on *Full Employment and Freedom*: "No one who has worked with permanent trade union officials can fail to respect the breadth of their outlook. . . . Can anyone deny a certain narrowness and prejudice among many of the keener members of the rank and file?"

This sectionalism works in several ways. Consider, for instance, the question of increases in wages. If each union pushes its claim for increases there will be an ever-ascending spiral with the strong unions necessarily gaining at the expense of the weaker ones, and at the expense of those who are dependent on a fixed income. There is a necessity on this score for the Congresses of trade unions to formulate a coherent wages policy. The total effect at present is a competitive scramble when groups of organised labour unite to restore the old

margin between their rates and those of groups which have secured increases.

Another evidence of sectionalism is trade union rivalry. The public is sick of trade disputes caused by trade union inter-friction. The Congresses should settle these acrimonious matters within their own organisations or by mutual inter-Congress discussions. But surely the first essential in this country is that the Congress of Irish Unions and the Trade Union Congress should merge together in a spirit of good-will. The country cannot afford the luxury of Congress rivalry; and this strife, indeed, is doing little good to the cause of trade unionism itself.

In general it may be said that trade unions must re-adjust the compass. The "fighting" policy of the past is not good enough to-day, because trade unions have now definitely established themselves. A more positive approach is necessary. It is good to see trade union leaders travelling to the United States to examine their methods of productivity. If Irish industries are to prosper then suspicion and distrust of the employers will have to be abandoned. Vague nonsensical talk about "bloated capitalists" should be abandoned. If there are such—and I have no doubt there are a few with us still, but a very small minority—let them be shown up scientifically by the application of social and economic principles to their balance sheets. To do this, knowledge of these social and economic principles is essential. But it is much easier to use vague propagandist shibboleths than to give the time and patience necessary for the study of these principles. We need better educated trade unionists in these days; we need, too, men of moral and social integrity. The views of such men will not lightly be cast aside if raised against injustices, because they will be able to formulate a reasoned and sound judgment on the issue in question. That is not to

throw blame on the men who have led the trade union movement for so long, but rather to emphasise the necessity for new viewpoints.

The Irish Constitution, Article 40, Section 6, 1°, iii declares: "The State guarantees liberty for the exercise of the following rights, subject to public order and morality" (i and ii are not relevant to our subject) iii, "the right of the citizens to form associations and unions."

After stating this right it adds: "Laws, however, may be enacted for the regulation and control in the public interest of the exercise of the foregoing right."

CHAPTER XI

EDUCATION

This is a subject about which there is a great deal of discussion in modern times. It is not to our purpose in this text-book to enter into the details of this question, but rather to indicate for students of Sociology the main principles involved. At the outset it is clear that the earlier chapters on the Dignity of Man, the Family, and the State, should help us in determining the correct attitude to be adopted in the sphere of Education. Much of the confused thinking to-day about this matter is due to the fact that many who are responsible for educational policy ignore the fundamental truth that man is a child of God, whose final destiny is union with God after death, and that this life is a preparation for that ultimate goal. If the State assumes that man's needs are to be catered for by it alone, then we may expect that it will not give any great consideration to the claims of the Family or the Church in Education. The issue is obvious enough in Communist and Communist-dominated countries—there the battle for the schools is clearly seen as a battle for the souls of successive generations; but in other countries, wholly inimical to Communism, a State education is fostered which excludes God and religion from the class-room. As a result, materialistic ways of thought prevail and a hopeless inadequacy is felt in the domain of the things of the spirit. A piecemeal view of man must lead to erroneous practice concerning him, and nowhere is this more evident than in the field of Education.

Mr. Frank Sheed in his book, *Society and Sanity*, emphasises the absolute necessity of our facing up to the

question of the purpose of man's existence if modern society is to be sane. "Education provides an illustration perfect enough to be almost farcical. Throughout most of the Western World, the State is regarded as the normal educator. Schools not conducted by it are regarded as eccentric and in most countries they exist only precariously. This situation, I say, is taken as normal, whereas in fact it is grotesque. The State does not know what man is, and is taking more and more control of man's life." (Page 3).

The Teaching of the Church.

Let us listen, then, to what the Church, the voice of Christ, says on this matter. Pope Pius XI wrote the encyclical *Divini Illius Magistri* on Education. Therein, facing his numerous adversaries boldly, he unflinchingly declares: "Education is first and supereminently the function of the Church." That puts the whole subject immediately into its proper perspective. The Church is responsible for bringing the souls of men, for whom Christ died, to eternal happiness, and so logically, she must exercise her authority in Education, which plays so vital a rôle in man's formation.

"The first ground of the Church's right is that supreme teaching authority and office which the divine Founder of the Church delivered to her: 'All power is given to Me in heaven and on earth. Going therefore, teach ye all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost; teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you; and behold I am with you all days even to the consummation of the world.'" The Church, then, is commanded by God to teach all nations.

"The second ground of the Church's right consists in that supernatural office of motherhood whereby the Church, Christ's spotless Bride, bestows upon men the

life of divine grace and nurtures and fosters it by her sacraments and teaching. 'None can have God for his Father,' says St. Augustine, 'if he refuses to have the Church as his mother.' "

Here is stated succinctly the reason for the Church's stand on Education. The Church acts on the authority of Christ, the Son of God. As the Most Rev. Dr. McQuaid, Archbishop of Dublin, says in his brochure on *Catholic Education* (C.T.S.I.): "Catholic Education from first to last is based on Jesus Christ, True God and True Man, Redeemer of mankind. It firmly holds that 'other foundation no man can lay, but that which is laid; which is Jesus Christ.' "

All Branches of Learning Subject to the Church's Authority.

This authority of the Church extends not merely to specifically religious education but to all branches of learning. "Every branch of learning and training, like every human action, is necessarily dependant upon man's last end, and therefore of equal necessity subject to the commandments of God's law, of which the Church is the infallible guardian, interpreter and teacher. . . Even physical training is not to be regarded as outside the scope of her maternal function, for this, too, is a thing which may be either beneficial or harmful to Christian education" (Encyclical on Education).

Religious Instruction Alone Not Sufficient.

Some mistakenly think that if Catholic religious instruction is given in a school, then it does not matter who teaches secular subjects. Pius XI's words are very pertinent: "For the mere fact that religious teaching (often very meagre) is imparted in a school does not make it satisfy the rights of the Church and the family, nor render it fit to be attended by Catholic pupils. For this,

the whole of the training and teaching, the whole organization of the school—teachers, curriculum, school-books on all subjects—must be so impregnated with the Christian spirit under the guidance and motherly vigilance of the Church, that religion comes to provide the foundation and the culminating perfection of the whole training. And this applies not only to elementary schools but to secondary schools as well. 'It is not enough,' says Leo XIII, 'for the young to be taught religion at specified hours; all the rest of their training must be instinct with the spirit of piety. If this is lacking, if the minds of teachers and pupils are not pervaded and warmed by this sacred atmosphere, little benefit will be derived from any kind of learning and much harm will frequently result.' "

We are not surprised then to find that the Code of Canon Law forbids Catholic children to attend neutral or mixed schools, or that the ecclesiastical authorities in this country forbid attendance at Trinity College, except for the gravest reasons. Those who cavil at this viewpoint are insufficiently appreciative of the "pearl of great price," which is the Catholic Faith.

The Church's Campaign for Catholic Schools.

Hence the Church campaign for Catholic education for all Catholic children in Catholic schools is universal. It explains the struggle for Catholic schools at present being waged in England. It explains the policy of Catholics in Australia and United States—there Catholics by their voluntary contributions pay for their own Catholic schools and institutions without any aid from the State, and in addition to paying the State educational levy. They prefer to shoulder this tremendous burden rather than endanger the faith of their children. States err in distributive justice in not giving financial support to these schools and institutions. The State, indeed,

has certain rights in education, but these rights are subordinate to the prior claims of the Church and the family.

Trained Catholics are Excellent Citizens.

The true Catholic will have a strong love of country, for that is one of the virtues inculcated by the Church's teaching. The Holy Father declares: "Therefore let it be loudly proclaimed and generally understood that when the faithful demand Catholic schools for their children, they are not raising a question of party politics but simply performing a religious duty which their conscience rigidly imposes upon them. Nor have they any desire to divorce their children from the national spirit and way of life. On the contrary, they want to mould them in accordance with it, in the best sense and in the way most advantageous to the nation. For every true Catholic, trained in accordance with Catholic doctrine, is by that very fact found to be an excellent citizen, a sincere lover of his country, and a loyal and obedient subject under any legitimate form of government."

The Family and Education.

The rights of the Church derive from the supernatural order; the rights of the family from the natural order, but there is perfect harmony between them—the supernatural order elevates and strengthens the natural order. "Grace does not destroy nature but perfects it."

The family has its natural rights in education, and these family rights are tenaciously defended by the Church. The rights of the family are prior to those of the State, and it is the duty of the State to respect and uphold them. As Leo XIII says in *Rerum Novarum*: "Children are something of the father, a sort of extension of the father's personality; so that properly speaking,

they do not enter or become members of a civil society directly of themselves, but through the family in which they were born." Consequently, "parental authority is such that it cannot be eliminated or absorbed by the State, because it shares the same common origin with human life itself."

St. Thomas Aquinas said the same thing in the 13th century: "The son is by nature something of the father . . . and so the law of nature requires that until it reaches the use of reason the child shall be under the father's care. It would therefore be against natural justice if before reaching the use of reason the child were removed from the parents' charge or if any disposition were made concerning it against the parents' will" (2. 2. Q. x. a. 12).

Pope Pius XI points out that the Church "so scrupulously respects the sacred natural right of the family to educate its offspring, that she refuses, except under certain conditions and safeguards, to baptize the children of unbelievers or to make any arrangements for their education until such children are able to make up their minds for themselves and freely embrace the Faith."

The Irish Constitution, Article 42, is eminently in accordance with Natural Law. It declares:

1. The State acknowledges that the primary and natural educator of the child is the family, and guarantees to respect the inalienable right and duty of parents to provide, according to their means, for the religious and moral, intellectual, physical and social education of their children.
2. Parents shall be free to provide this education in their homes or in private schools or in schools recognised or established by the State.

The Duties of Parents.

The obligation of parents then regarding the education of their children is a serious one. The Code of Canon Law (c. 1113) declares: "Parents are bound by a very grave obligation to care for the religious, moral, physical and civic education of their children to the best of their power, and also to provide for their temporal welfare." That obligation is not satisfied by simply sending the children to a Catholic school; parents must interest themselves in their progress, particularly regarding Religious Knowledge and Practice. The best education for the child is the good example of parents: when much book-knowledge is lost, the shining example of good parents will be a sure guide and inspiration to the child all its days.

Pope Pius XI in his encyclical reminds us: "Evidently the first and natural environment for the child's proper education is his family, which is divinely instituted for that very purpose. Consequently we shall rightly regard as most enduring and reliable the training which is received in a well-regulated and virtuous family, and more effective and more enduring according as the household, and especially the parents, edify the children by their virtuous example." The Pope laments the unhappy decline in home training, at the present day and adds that "*the benefits which children might derive from home training are further reduced by the growing custom, now prevailing nearly everywhere, of separating them from their family at a very early age.*"

The State and Education.

The State's rôle in education is subordinate to that of the Church and the family; nevertheless, the State too has its rights in this domain because it exists for the common good. But in its promotion of the common good it must remember that the well-being of the State

depends upon the well-being of families and individuals, so its duty will be to protect and promote the interests of families and their members. "It is the right or more properly the duty of the State to protect the prior right which the parents possess to give their children a Christian education, and therefore also to respect the supernatural right of the Church over such Christian education" (Encyclical on Education).

The State's Responsibility.

"The State has the right to require and therefore to ensure that all citizens shall be instructed concerning their civic and national rights and duties, and be suitably equipped with such measure of scientific, moral and physical culture as the common good in these times really demands" (encyclical). The State then is justified in seeing that a certain minimum standard of education is received by its citizens.

As the Pope points out "the State possesses greater resources than any individual, and it is only right and just that the money which has been placed at its disposal for the common needs of all should be spent for the benefit of those who have contributed it." So the State then should foster the education of its citizens, and this in two ways: "First and directly, by promoting and assisting the work undertaken by the Church and family in this sphere. . . Secondly by supplementing that work where it is deficient; and also by building its own schools and institutions."

The State must observe Distributive Justice.

The Holy Father again adds the proviso: "It is obviously the duty of the State, in furthering public and private education in all these ways, not only to respect the inherent rights of Church and family in regard to Christian education, but also to observe distributive

justice. It is therefore unlawful for the State to claim such a monopoly of education and instruction that families are physically or morally constrained to send their children to State schools, against the dictates of a Christian conscience or against their legitimate preferences."

The Position in Ireland compared with Other Countries.

We in Ireland are singularly fortunate in that Church and family rights are safeguarded and fostered by the State. In many countries, however, the rights of Church and family are impugned, even in countries which loudly profess democratic principles. So far from promoting the rights of Church and family, justice itself is forgotten. Catholics are shouldering huge burdens in England, the United States and Australia, for example, in order to have their own schools. The Catholic Church, in fact, is the one institution which withstands the inroads of the Leviathan State on the elementary rights of the individual and family. As she almost alone upholds the sanctity of marriage and its indissolubility, so, too, almost alone, she defends the rights of the family in the domain of education.

The Irish Constitution might serve as a model for all States in its Article 42 on Education. We have already quoted Sections 1 and 2 of this Article in the paragraphs in "The Family and Education." The Article continues :

3. 1° The State shall not oblige parents in violation of their conscience and lawful preference to send their children to schools established by the State, or to any particular type of school designated by the State.

2° The State shall, however, as guardian of the common good, require in view of actual conditions

that the children receive a certain minimum education, moral, intellectual and social.

4. The State shall provide for free primary education, and shall endeavour to supplement and give reasonable aid to private and corporate educational initiative, and when the public good requires it, provide other educational facilities or institutions with due regard, however, for the rights of parents, especially in the matter of religious and moral formation.
5. In exceptional cases, where the parents for physical or moral reasons fail in their duty towards their children, the State as guardian of the common good, by appropriate means shall endeavour to supply the place of the parents, but always with due regard for the natural and imprescriptible rights of the child.

CHAPTER XII

PROPERTY

Among the natural rights of man listed by Pope Pius XI in his encyclical *Divini Redemptoris* are the right to obtain the necessary means of existence, and the right to possess and use property.

The Right to the Necessary Means of Existence.

The right to obtain the necessary means of existence need not long detain us, as it follows naturally and immediately from the right to life. Nobody would dispute this right. As Aquinas reminds us, if a person's need is manifest and urgent "it is lawful for a man to succour his own need by means of another's property, by taking it either openly or secretly; nor is this properly speaking theft or robbery" (*Summa Theologica*, II. II. Q. 66. 7); and again "all things are common property in a case of extreme necessity" (*Ibid.* II. II. Q. 32. 7 Ad 3).

The Meaning of the Term "Property."

First, let us see what is meant by the term "property." Material goods which are owned or are capable of being owned, and money, because it is capable of buying goods, are property. Air, then, for example, is not property. Property is divided into consumption goods and production or capital goods. Consumption goods are those which are quickly used up, for example, food and clothing. To produce consumer goods capital goods are necessary. These producer or capital goods are relatively stable; they are not used up except after a relatively long period and their purpose is to produce consumer goods. Such capital goods are land and machinery.

Except for a few eccentrics nobody would deny the right of the individual to own some consumer goods, such as the suit he wears, the food he eats, the toothbrush he uses. But the controversial question is whether the means of production, that is, capital goods such as land and factories should be owned by the State or by private persons. Many deny the right of private property in production goods.

Why the Right to Private Property is Denied

The main reason for this attitude derives from the abuse of private property in the past. The Industrial Revolution achieved maturity by sacrificing the well-being of the human element in industry. Too often industrial development was impelled by sheer rapaciousness. As Leo XIII said in *Rerum Novarum*: "By degrees it has come to pass that working-men have been surrendered, isolated and helpless, to the hard-heartedness of employers and the greed of unchecked competition . . . a small number of very rich men have been able to lay upon the teeming masses of the labouring poor a yoke little better than that of slavery itself." The industrial revolution began in England towards the end of the 18th century, and England was a country of which the words of Leo XIII were true, namely, that "public institutions and the laws set aside the ancient religion"—so the one sure safeguard of human dignity, the voice of religion, was unheard. *We must bear that in mind in our seeking for the correct social order; in the domain of modern industry Christianity has not been tried and found wanting, rather the truth is that, with some exceptions, Christianity has not been tried at all.*

The fact then is that there were horrible abuses of private property. The rights of property were stressed, and nothing was said about the duties attaching to it. Men like the philosopher John Locke emphasised the

sacredness of property, and even some branches of Protestantism regarded the acquisition of wealth as the sign of God's favour. The reaction to all this was the denial of the right to private property. "The earth and its fruits have been created for the benefit of man; the institution of private property has made for the aggrandisement of the few and the impoverishment of the many; the means of production are held by a small minority and the vast majority are left dependent upon them for livelihood"—that briefly is the kind of argument used, and the conclusion arrived at may be stated in the words of Bernard Shaw: "Abolish private property which has produced this ghastly poverty."

We may sympathize with this viewpoint, but a little reflection will show that it is not a rational argument. It is rather an appeal to the emotions. *The Communist Manifesto* of Engels and Marx was a skilful piece of propaganda because it did not attempt to reason; it played on the emotions. When Marx came to write a "rational" account of his theories they do not stand examination. Destructive criticism of property is all too easy; constructive criticism is not. Propagandists have concentrated on abuses which, of course, have been all too real, but the solution is not the destruction of property but its reform. We shall go on to show that private property is a fundamental right; that the proper solution for much of the social problem is the wider diffusion of property. Communists and Socialists in their proposed solution would have everybody propertyless; their remedy is much worse than the disease, for they will eliminate anything of value in the human personality to eradicate an abuse. They are like the person who on seeing a dirty, unkempt child would like to eliminate that dirt by not merely giving the child a good wash but by throwing out the child also along with the soap-suds. Clearly the dirtiness of the child will have been effectively

eliminated; that child will never need a wash again, for the simple reason that there will be no child left. So too with property. We agree that property could do with some reform, but the suggested cure, that when all property of individuals is eliminated there will be no abuses, is too absurd for consideration. Eradicate the misery of some by making everybody miserable; that is the Communist and Socialist solution. The proper solution is: everybody should have some property. "Every man has by nature the right to possess property as his own" (*Rerum Novarum*).

Hilaire Belloc writes: "The short cut to the relief of humanity from Industrial Capitalism is Socialism, that is, the denial of private property, especially in the means of production. So the short-cut out of the horrors of a false religion is materialism. So the short-cut out of an unhappy marriage is divorce. So the short cut out of any unhappy life is suicide. . . It is the experience of wise men that these short-cuts are much the longest way round, or rather that they do not get you home at all" (*The Catholic Church and The Principle of Private Property*).

Man's Right to Private Property.

That man has a right to private property in consumer and producer goods may be shown in three ways: first, from the fact that man is a person with intellect and will; secondly, from the fact of man as the head of a family; and thirdly, from the fact of man as a member of society.

1. Let us examine the first argument. Man, we say, is superior to the animals in that he has a spiritual soul which possesses the faculties of intellect and will. Animals, plants, inanimate creation are all under man's dominion

("the imperfect is made for the more perfect," as Aristotle says). Man does not look at the things of creation with the eyes of the animal. He sees, but he also foresees. He looks to the future. He sees the inner relations of things, their causes and effects. He can prepare for eventualities. It is natural then for him to want to possess property whereby he can prepare for the future. It would not be fitting that the State should dole out to him the things he needs, for he is a being with a unique personality; he has intelligence and will and it is his birthright to be able to make use of his own great powers. If you hold with Communists and many Socialists that man is just another animal, then it is easy to see why private property is denied to him. But man belongs to a higher order of being than the animals; granting that, then, the right to private property inevitably follows. Finally, the State itself exists for man and not man for the State—the State therefore cannot lawfully take from man a right which he possessed before the formation of any State.

Leo XIII in *Rerum Novarum* writes: "It is the mind or reason, which is the predominant element in us who are human creatures; it is this which renders a human being human, and distinguishes him essentially from the brute. And on this very account—that man alone among the animal creation is endowed with reason—it must be within his right to possess things not merely for temporary and momentary use, as other living things do, but to have and to hold them in stable and permanent possession."

Pope Pius XII in a Discourse on May 20th, 1948, declared: "Only those who deny to men the dignity of free persons can admit the possibility of substituting for the right of private property (and consequently the very institution of private property) some system of insurance or legal protection by public law."

2. The second argument for private property is based on man as the head of the family. The family, as we have seen, is prior to the State. Parents are bound to look after the rearing of their children. The State has no right to do this, except in exceptional circumstances. Now the father is the head of the family, and if he is to fulfil his task of providing for the members of his family, then he has a right to private property. He is entitled to possess resources, goods or money about which he can personally make decisions regarding the rearing of his children. The denial of this right would lower the dignity of the family, and make for interference by the State in a sphere in which it has no competence.

Leo XIII states in *Rerum Novarum*: "The family (is) the 'society' of a man's house—a society very small, one must admit, but none the less a true society, and one older than any State. Consequently, it has rights and duties peculiar to itself which are quite independent of the State. That right to property, therefore, which has been proved to belong naturally to individual persons, must in like wise belong to a man in his capacity of head of a family; . . . for it is a most sacred law of nature that a father should provide food and all necessaries for those whom he has begotten; and similarly it is natural that he should wish that his children, who carry on, so to speak, and continue his personality, should be by him provided with all that is needful to enable them to keep themselves decently from want and misery amid the uncertainties of this mortal life. . . . The Socialists, therefore, in setting aside the parent and setting up a State supervision, act against natural justice, and break into pieces the stability of all family life."

3. The third argument for private property follows from the fact of man as a member of society. For social life to be prosperous and happy the institution of private

property is essential. St. Thomas in the 13th century gave the arguments simply and concisely. In spite of the huge changes in the economic and industrial life of man, his arguments have lost none of their force, because they are based on the realities of human nature. In his *Summa Theologica* (II. II. Q.66 a.2) he writes :

“Private property is necessary to human life for three reasons : firstly, because every man is more careful to procure what is for himself alone than that which is common to all ; since each one would shirk the labour and leave to another that which concerns the community, as happens when there is a great multitude of servants.

“Secondly, because human affairs are conducted in more orderly fashion if each man is charged with taking care of some particular thing himself, whereas there would be confusion if everyone had to look after any one thing indeterminately.

“Thirdly, because a more peaceful state is ensured to man if each one is contented with his own. Hence it is to be observed that quarrels arise more frequently when there is no division of things possessed.”

Aquinas' first point then is that private property makes for incentive and efficiency. A person will pay much more attention to what is his own than to what is common. A communal bicycle or motor-car would not last very long, for example.

His second point is that private property makes for order in society. One can really mind one's own business if it is one's own business. “The distinction of ownership leads to a division of duties. The man who owns a farm will cultivate it. The proprietor of a store will order goods and sell them. If ownership were indeterminate, men would follow their impulses and instincts in a most haphazard fashion. In pleasant weather, there would be an inordinate number taking care of the fishing needs of the community. If snow

blocked the streets, most men would prefer to meet their indoor duties, rather than clear off the snow” (Cronin : *Catholic Social Principles*, p. 479). State direction of individuals as an alternative would involve denial of man's right to property both as an individual and as head of the family. It would necessarily involve also a denial of personal liberty—the few “planners” would regulate the placing of thousands and millions of citizens.

Aquinas' third point is that the institution of private property makes for peace in the community. In his commentary on the *Politics of Aristotle* (II, 4) he writes : “Aristotle says it is exceedingly difficult that many men lead their lives together, that they share in common in certain goods, especially in riches. For we see that those who have a common share in certain things have many dissensions with one another, as is evident in those who travel together. They frequently fall out with one another in regard to what they spend in food and drink, keeping an exact account and sometimes for trifling things they attack one another and give offence in word or deed.”

Leo XIII in *Rerum Novarum* sums up succinctly this third argument for the necessity of private property to man as a member of society. Socialism “would throw open the door to envy, to mutual invective and to discord ; the sources of wealth themselves would run dry, for no one would have any interest in exerting his talents or his industry ; and that ideal equality about which they entertain pleasant dreams would be in reality the levelling down of all to a like condition of misery and degradation. Hence it is clear that the main tenet of Socialism, community of goods, must be utterly rejected, since it only injures those whom it would seem to benefit, is directly contrary to the natural rights of mankind, and would introduce confusion and disorder into the commonweal.”

Property a Defence of Liberty.

Nowadays, because of the ever-increasing tendency of the State to trespass on the rights of families and individuals, Catholic sociologists emphasise the institution of private property as a bulwark of liberty. This involves no new argument; rather is it an application of the foregoing arguments to a modern problem. Hilaire Belloc writes:¹ "If you deny the human right to property, if you take this short-cut out of your present evils by transferring the control of land and machinery from the minority now holding it to so-called public servants, you are putting human life in its entirety into the hands of those public servants. . . There is sometimes an attempt to argue that the possession by men who might be called public servants, but who would certainly be politicians, of the means of production would be qualified and moderated. They would control industry; but the *products* of industry would be consumed as the individual chose. What guarantee have we of that? The wage-system does at least leave a certain modicum of liberty to the wage-earner; precious little, but a little. But it only does that because the wage-system asserts in theory a right to private property—not only in consumption, but in production. If you put into the hands of one centre the *whole* of that which controls human life, you would be not partly but completely at the mercy of that centre. You cannot distribute such power, and as for controlling it, it is amazing that men after their experience of even the highly limited power which politicians already exercise should imagine that any further control could be possible if those gentry were made a million-fold stronger than they already are. Freedom is a function of private property. The abolition of such property, means the abolition of freedom. The lack of freedom in our present society is precisely due

¹ *The Catholic Church and the Principle of Private Property.*

to the instability of property and to its not being possessed by the mass."

In the *Road to Serfdom* Professor Hayek writes: "What our generation has forgotten is that the system of private property is the most important guarantee of freedom, not only for those who own property, but scarcely less for those who do not."

Lacordaire on Socialism (*Political and Social Philosophy*: Kegan Paul), says: "I add that this universal helotism (*i.e.*, deprivation of property) would not be compensated for by a certain equality in the common degradation, but that in no other regime would the burden of inequality be greater and more odious. In fact, whatever distribution may be made of the land and of labour, the needs of society must still be provided for, and this entails the creation of a host of officials and functionaries to fill offices ranging from the highest and most pleasant to the lowest and most unenticing and repulsive. The progress of economic science will never efface the radical inequality of these offices. Now in the system which I am combating, no man being master of his own labour, the choice as to who should fill these offices would remain in the hands of the power representing society; we should become slaves not merely wholesale but in detail. One will make verses, another turn the grindstone, and in every case by the decision of those in authority—according to the will, that is, of two or three men pompously termed the State."

BELLOC: "Socialism means the control of the means of production by the political officers of the community, or to put it in ordinary language, by the politicians."

BERNARD HOLLAND: "The modern Socialist desires that all power should be concentrated in a central machine which he can hope to master and exploit."

G. K. CHESTERTON: "I have no enthusiasm for the present system of capitalism, but whatever may be good

or bad about capitalism, Bolshevism simply means a further concentration of wealth and power into even a smaller number of rulers, who would be officials instead of capitalists. . . Private property for a normal man is a necessity of human life and human dignity."

The Diffusion of Property.

The ideal then for which we must strive is that every man will have the opportunity of exercising his natural right to ownership. Let us indicate briefly the ways in which the ownership of property will be diffused :

1. By Thrift and Saving. Thrift is a virtue many ignore nowadays. A small sum put aside each week in the Savings Bank would accumulate over the years. The Church teaches that wages should be sufficient not only for a moderately comfortable life, but sufficient for saving as well. Leo XIII reminds us : " If a workman's wages be sufficient to enable him comfortably to support himself, his wife and his children, he will find it easy, if he be a sensible man, to practise thrift ; and he will not fail, by cutting down expenses, to put by some little savings and thus secure a modest source of income " (*Rerum Novarum*). Saving and thrift, unfortunately, are looked upon as old-fashioned nowadays. It is to be feared that in many cases a good deal of the family income is squandered aimlessly. Yet a small saving is extremely useful in times of emergency. It makes for more independence.

2. Another method is the extension of co-partnership and profit-sharing schemes. See Chapter XVII for a discussion on this.

3. Owning one's home would also help greatly. A family with its own house is a stronghold of liberty. Local Authorities should ensure that families will come

to own the houses they occupy rather than rent them. Colin Clark, the great Cambridge economist and adviser to the Australian Government, tells us that " in Queensland, Australia, 70% of the population now own their houses and over 50% in the other Australian States." ¹

4. Perhaps the most important way is by an increase in the number of working proprietors. We are so much overawed by the growth of large-scale undertakings in industry that we are inclined to underestimate the possibility of extending the number of working proprietors.

There are three points to be stressed in this connection—first, a " Back to the Land " Movement is rather illusory. We cannot hope to maintain more families on farms, at least to any appreciable extent. It is a fact that as a nation's standard of living increases the numbers occupied in agriculture become progressively less, and more and more go to " service " industries. This happens because when a person's income increases, more of it is not spent on food, but rather on other things, particularly services.

The second point is that although large-scale undertakings are a big feature of modern States, yet the number of small concerns is still enormous. In Great Britain, for example, of which Colin Clark says that " there is probably no country so deeply sunk in Capitalism as England," nevertheless there according to Compton and Bott in their work *British Industry*, " it would be incorrect to leave the impression that each and every industry is organized as a monopoly or a cartel. Of some 120,000 registered companies probably nine-tenths are private firms of the type which are still in the main organized

¹ *Property and Economic Progress.*

along individualist lines and are not associated with other businesses. The small man still holds a primary place, if not by economic power; then by remaining relatively numerous, in the industrial, commercial and agricultural structure of the country."

The third point is that we can look to the extension of the number of working proprietors in small-scale manufacture and in the service industries. Colin Clark has demonstrated (cf. *The Conditions of Economic Progress* and *Property and Economic Progress*) that as a people's standard of living increases there is a decline in the number engaged in agriculture and in manufacture and more are occupied in the service industries, e.g., trade, building, transport, garages, hotels, professions, etc. "In most of these service industries large-scale organization is the exception rather than the rule, and the working proprietor again comes into his own." Colin Clark says further: "Even within the sphere of manufacturing itself, conditions are changing. Increasing efficiency, even in manufacturing industry, by no means always involves larger units and a diminished proportion of working proprietors. . . The most interesting paradox is provided by the motor trade and is a warning not to take things at face value. The eye and the imagination are dazzled by the gigantic factories erected by some of the larger motor companies. But there is only room for a limited number of these, while with the number of motor cars on the road continually increasing, there is a steadily increasing amount of repair and maintenance work to be done; which must be done in local garages rather than in large factories." In trades like tailoring and furniture, too, he points out that the beautiful and durable hand-made article is being preferred.

Colin Clark's conclusion is that "if we know how to make use of it, the whole trend of the times is now working in favour of a restoration of individual ownership

of the means of production." These are heartening words coming as they do from an economist and statistician of international standing.

The Holy Father on the Diffusion of Property

The present Holy Father, Pius XII, is very insistent on the necessity of people owning property. In an address to Catholic Action men on September 7th, 1947, he said: "What you can and ought to strive for is a more just distribution of wealth. This is, and this remains, a central point in Catholic Social doctrine. The natural course of affairs, no doubt, brings with it—this is neither economically nor socially abnormal—an unequal distribution, within certain limits of the goods of the earth. But the Church is opposed to the accumulation of these goods in the hands of a relatively small and exceedingly rich group, while vast masses of people are condemned to a pauperism and an economic condition unworthy of human beings."

In September, 1944, in a Radio Address, he said: "Small and medium holdings in agriculture, in the arts and trades, in commerce and industry should be guaranteed and promoted; co-operative unions should ensure for them the advantages of big business; where big business even to-day shows itself more productive, there should be given the possibility of tempering the labour contract with a contract of co-ownership."

The American Hierarchy in 1940 declared: "If the majority of our citizens possess insufficient private property to be independent of a wage income for even a short period of time, then there is grave danger to the entire social fabric. Social stability rests upon this basis of individual ownership of property. There should be more of it and not less of it, if our existing economic system is to remain secure."

The Duties of Property Owners.

Aquinas having discussed the right to own property goes on to say: "The second thing that is competent to man with regard to external things is their use. In this respect man ought to possess external things not as his own but as common, so that, to wit, he is ready to communicate them to others in their need" (*Summa Theologica*, II. 11. 66. 2). Leo XIII explains what are the obligations of those with possessions: "No one, certainly, is obliged to assist others out of what is required for his own necessary use or for that of his family, or even to give to others what he himself needs to maintain his station in life becomingly and decently: 'No one is obliged to live unbecomingly.' But when the demands of necessity and propriety have been sufficiently met, it is a duty to give to the poor out of that which remains. 'Give that which remains as alms.' These are duties not of justice, except in cases of extreme need, but of Christian Charity, which obviously cannot be enforced by legal action. But the laws and judgments of men yield precedence to the law and judgment of Christ the Lord, who in many ways urges the practice of almsgiving: 'It is more blessed to give than to receive,' and who will judge a kindness done or denied to the poor as done or denied to Himself."

Surplus possessions—those remaining after one has sufficiently provided for one's state in life—are due in charity to the poor. It is no harm to point out that to live according to one's station does not justify us in living luxuriously, because others do the same. The Christian virtues of Prudence and Temperance must be observed.

It is held by many that nowadays State taxation removes all obligation in legal justice of distributing superfluous goods. This is, I believe, a valid argument. But the incidence of State taxation is often unfair; there may still be a personal obligation on some to distribute

their surplus possessions to the poor. And it would be a great pity if the State by excessive taxation should destroy the virtue of liberality.

It is worth remembering as Pius XI points out in *Quadragesimo Anno*, that "the employment of a large income in increasing the opportunities for remunerative work, provided the work is devoted to the production of really useful goods, is to be considered according to the teaching of the Angelic Doctor,¹ an excellent act of liberality, particularly appropriate to the needs of our time."

A quotation from Pope Pius XI in *Divini Redemptoris* is most apt: "To be sure of eternal life, therefore, and to be able to help the poor effectively, it is imperative to return to a more moderate way of life. to renounce the joys, often sinful, which the world to-day holds out in such abundance; to forget self for the love of the neighbour."

The State and Property.

Property owners, then, let it be repeated, have rights but they also have duties. Ownership has its individual and social characteristics. The State as guardian of the common good has its part to play in the regulation of property. Pius XI in *Quadragesimo Anno* declares: "Men must consider in this matter not only their own advantage but also the common good. To define these duties in detail when necessity requires and the natural law has not done so, is the function of those in charge of the State. Therefore, public authority, under the guiding light always of the natural and divine law, can determine more accurately upon consideration of the true requirements of the common good, what is permitted and what is not permitted to owners in the use of their property. Moreover, Leo XIII wisely taught 'that God

¹ *Summa Theologica* 2. 2. q. 134.

has left the limits of private possessions to be fixed by the industry of men and institutions of peoples.' ”

Pope Pius XII in a radio broadcast, September 1st, 1944, said: “The social and economic policy of the future, the controlling power of the State, of local bodies, of professional institutions cannot permanently secure their end, which is the genuine productivity of social life and the normal returns on national economy, except by respecting and safeguarding the vital function of private property in its personal and social values. *When the distribution of property is an obstacle to this end—which is not necessarily nor always an outcome of the extension of private inheritance—the State may in the public interest intervene by regulating its use or even, if it cannot equitably meet the situation in any other way, by decreeing the expropriation of property, giving a suitable indemnity.*”

The Irish Constitution in Article 43 on Private Property is admirable in its exposition :

1. 1° The State acknowledges that man, in virtue of his rational being (the Irish text reads: “toisc buaidh an reasuin do bheith ag an duine”= because man has the gift of reason) has the natural right, antecedent to positive law, to the private ownership of external goods.

2° The State accordingly guarantees to pass no law attempting to abolish the right of private ownership or the general right to transfer, bequeath and inherit property.

2. 1° The State recognises, however, that the exercise of the rights mentioned in the foregoing provisions of this Article, ought in civil society, to be regulated by the principles of social justice.

2° The State, accordingly, may as occasion requires, delimit by law the exercise of the said rights with a view to reconciling their exercise with the exigencies of the common good.

CHAPTER XIII

CAPITALISM

Description of Capitalism.

It is extremely difficult to define precisely what is meant by Capitalism. We can give a rough description of what the term brings to our mind. It is an organization of the economy with certain characteristics :

1. Production by power-driven machinery in large factories.
2. Ownership of the means of production in the hands of a few.
3. The direction of industry in the hands of entrepreneurs. (An “entrepreneur” may be defined as the man who makes business decisions. Very often to-day such a one is not an owner, but a manager).

The above description raises difficulties. There is and has been Capitalism in land. Also there have been instances of individual Capitalists, long before the 19th and 20th centuries. Fanfani in his *Catholicism, Protestantism and Capitalism*, reminds us of one Jacques Cœur who lived from 1393 to 1456. “A merchant, he builds the ships he uses. He sets up warehouses in various trading centres. He manufactures the goods in which he trades, he establishes relations with the court of Charles VII of France, becoming its treasurer and obtaining from the king special facilities for engaging his crews and ordinances which, by abolishing tolls and promoting an improvement of roads and waterways, help the development of his immense trade.” But the

point is that men such as Jacques Cœur were isolated individuals. Their spirit did not inform the period in which they lived.

To understand Capitalism it is necessary for us to examine its inner dynamism, its attitude to men and things, its spirit or motive-power, the operation of which on Society has led to the present structure of Capitalism with its characteristic features of large-scale factory production, ownership in the hands of a few, and direction of industry by entrepreneurs. The present-day structure is, as it were, the flowering of the Capitalist seed which was sown after the breakdown of the mediæval economy, germinated in the 17th and 18th centuries, and attained mature growth in the 19th and 20th centuries.

I think we must agree with Tawney in his *Religion and the Rise of Capitalism* that Capitalism was conceived after the breakdown of the mediæval economy, when economics was divorced from morals. He writes: "When the age of the Reformation begins economics is still a branch of ethics, and ethics of theology; all human activities are treated as falling within a single scheme, whose character is determined by the spiritual destiny of mankind; the appeal of theorists is to Natural Law not to utility; the legitimacy of economic transactions is tried by reference, less to the movements of the market, than to moral standards derived from the traditional teaching of the Christian Church; the Church itself is regarded as a society wielding theoretical, and sometimes practical, authority in social affairs." Again he writes: "The most obvious facts are the most easily forgotten. Both the existing economic order, and too many of the projects advanced for reconstructing it, break down through their neglect of the truism that, since even quite common men have souls, no increase in material wealth will compensate them for arrangements which insult their self-respect and impair their freedom."

Tawney asserts that "Compromise is as impossible between the Church of Christ and the *idolatry of wealth, which is the practical religion of capitalist societies*, as it was between the Church and the State idolatry of the Roman Empire." We are not surprised to see the late Lord Keynes declare that "Modern Capitalism is absolutely irreligious, without internal union, without much public spirit, often, though not always, a mere congeries of possessors and pursuers."

Before the Capitalist regime, then, economics was regarded as being subordinate to morals. There were, of course, abuses in mediæval times, but men when they erred against social justice knew and felt they were sinning. The spirit of the age was against the accumulation of riches. Material things were not looked upon as the be-all and end-all of existence. With the growth of Capitalism, to be rich is to be respected, to be poor is to be despised. In pre-Capitalism the moralist had a big part to play; the engineer and the economist have the important rôles in Capitalism.

The Pope and Capitalism.

Pope Pius XI is strong in his denunciation of Capitalism. Nobody who has ever read the encyclicals can say that the Church favours the unequal distribution of property that prevails. Hear him in *Quadragesimo Anno*: "Each one therefore must receive his due share, and the distribution of created goods must be brought into conformity with the demands of the common good or social justice. For every sincere observer is conscious that, on account of the vast difference between the few who hold excessive wealth and the many who live in destitution, the distribution of wealth is to-day gravely defective. This is the aim which Our predecessor urged as the necessary object of our efforts: the emancipation of the proletariat. It calls for more emphatic assertion

and more insistent repetition, because these salutary injunctions of the Pontiff have not infrequently been forgotten, deliberately ignored or deemed impracticable, though they were both feasible and imperative. They have lost none of their force or wisdom for our own age, even though the horrible pauperism of Leo's time is less prevalent to-day. The condition of the working-man has indeed been improved and rendered more equitable, particularly in the larger and more civilized States, where the workers can no longer be said to be universally in misery and want. But when the use of machinery and the expansion of industry progressed with astonishing speed and overran and took possession of many countries in the new world, no less than of the ancient civilizations of the East, the number of needy proletarians, whose groans rise from earth to heaven, increased beyond all measure."

Again he says: "It is patent that in our days not wealth alone is accumulated, but immense power and despotic economic domination are concentrated in the hands of a few, who for the most part are not the owners, but only the trustees and directors of invested funds, which they administer at their own good pleasure."

Many more passages could be quoted in the same view. No Communist has ever put the case so well against the excesses of Capitalism as the Holy Father, but the Communist's remedy is even worse than the disease—he merely adds to the proletarian's neck the yoke of slavery.

Capital and Labour are Both Necessary.

It must not be forgotten that in this discussion of modern Capitalism, we are dealing with many abuses and excesses which have resulted from the violation and neglect of the Moral Law. But we must not go to the other extreme of condemning capital as such. As Leo XIII reminds us: "Capital cannot do without labour,

nor labour without capital." And Pope Pius XI in *Quadragesimo Anno* says: "To adjust this economic regime to the standards of right order was the entire preoccupation of Leo XIII; and hence it follows that it is in itself not to be condemned. And certainly it is not vicious of its very nature; but it violates right order whenever capital employs the workers or the proletariat with a view, and on such terms as, to direct business and economic activity entirely at its own arbitrary will and to its own advantage, without any regard to the human dignity of the worker, the social character of the economic regime, social justice and the common 'good.'"

The Remedies Required.

The Holy Father recalls briefly in *Quadragesimo Anno* the remedies for the economic and social order. "In the first place, due consideration must be had for the double characters, individual and social, of capital and labour, in order that the danger of individualism and collectivism be avoided." Individuals, owners of capital and workers have their rights which cannot be absorbed by a collectivist or totalitarian regime, but they also have strict social obligations which cannot be ignored.

The Pope continues: "The mutual relations between capital and labour must be determined according to the laws of the strictest justice, called commutative justice, supported however by Christian charity." The employer is bound to pay a living wage, enabling a man to support himself and family in frugal comfort, and this binds in strict justice. The worker too is bound in strict justice to do an honest day's work. Employers and workers should try to live as members of Christ's Mystical Body. They are all brothers and sisters of Jesus Christ. If that thought prevailed in the minds of all, how easily would the problem of industrial relations be solved. Employers would remember that their treatment of workers is a

grave responsibility for which they would have to answer before the judgment seat of Christ, and workers, too, would be filled with the notion of the dignity of work, and the knowledge that their vocation to work and the way in which they answered that call would determine their place in the next life.

The Pope goes on: "Free competition, kept within just and definite limits, and still more economic power, must be brought under the effective control of the public authority, in matters appertaining to the latter's competence. The public institutions of the nations must be such as to make the whole of human society conform to the needs of the common good, that is, to the standards of social justice." In other words, the State as guardian of the common good, has an obligation to curb the abuses of Capitalism and to see to it that the rules of social justice are observed.

We all must agree that if the Pope's words are observed, then, as he says, "the economic regime, that most important branch of social life, will necessarily be restored to right and healthy order."

CHAPTER XIV

COMMUNISM

Karl Marx lived from 1818 to 1883. He was born at Trier in Germany, of Jewish parents. When he was six years of age, his family converted to Protestantism. He was educated at the Universities of Bonn and Berlin, where he read law, philosophy and history, and achieved his Doctor's degree in 1841. He married a Prussian aristocrat, and there is no doubt that the marriage was a happy one. Marx was a very truculent man, who fell out with everybody with whom he came in contact—the two exceptions were his wife and Engels. Marx became a journalist, but his paper was suppressed, so he left for Paris where he wrote for a publication to which Engels contributed, and from that time began his friendship with Engels.

Frederick Engels (1820-1895) came from the German manufacturing class. He was sent to England to learn the English industrial technique. While there he became interested in social conditions, and in 1845 he published a book on the condition of the working class. He himself became head of a firm of cotton spinners, and he kept both himself and Marx on the money which he made—apparently without being too upset at the contradiction between theory and practice.

In 1845 Marx was expelled from France and went to Brussels. Here he and Engels joined forces to found a Workingmen's Club. In 1847 appeared *The Communist Manifesto*, the joint production of Marx and Engels, and in many ways the most successful work they ever wrote. It was a revolutionary pamphlet which appealed to the

emotions. "Workers of the world unite"; "Workers have nothing to lose but their chains"; "The fall of Capitalism and the victory of the Proletariat are equally inevitable"—these are a few of its phrases. Many believe that Engels was primarily responsible for the *Manifesto*, for when Marx years later set out to explain the philosophy of Communism in a regular treatise, he produced *Das Kapital*, which few Communists have ever read, simply because it is so indigestible as to make one lose one's appetite for Communism.

Marx returned to Germany in 1848, but was banished in 1849. He came to Paris, and was driven from there, and so finally this much-banished man came to London in 1849, and there he made his home until he died in 1883. In London for some time he and his family were in great poverty, for Marx was never interested in work in the ordinary sense of the term. Indeed he never mixed with the working-men at any time of his life; this champion of the proletariat really despised the proletariat—they were to be the instruments of the revolution, but not its directors. Shortly after 1860 he received an allowance of £300 per year from Engels, and so he was relieved from financial straits.

While in London Marx spent each day in the British Museum working at Government "blue books." In this exhilarating atmosphere he cogitated on "Dialectical Materialism."

Dialectical Materialism

I remember as a young priest being brought to see a man who would have nothing to do with religion. He told me he was a "dialectical materialist." I told him I was a "psychophysical phenomenon," and he grew pale. It was quite obvious he did not know the meaning of dialectical materialism at all, but it is a high-sounding phrase, and its repeated use along with other expressions

like the "dictatorship of the proletariat" and "economic relativity," etc., do give one a feeling of importance. Every French writer at some time or other will demand a "mystique" of some kind to settle any problem; Communists, too, have used the "mystique" of verbal incomprehension to get a number of disciples. However, all Communists are not so simple; certain key-men—the directors of the party and often the least voluble—do know what "Dialectical Materialism" etc., mean, and so it is necessary to study the philosophy of Communism to appreciate its message.

To understand the adjective "dialectical" it is necessary to say a few words about Hegel.

Hegel lived from 1770 to 1831. When Marx was studying in Germany, Hegel's system of philosophy was predominant. Hegel's works are not easy to read or understand. Indeed it is said of him that when he lay dying he remarked sorrowfully that "only one man ever understood him and even he did not." Hegel's system is usually referred to as "Dialectical Idealism." It is not to our purpose to discuss this, but to note that on the "Dialectic" Marx fastened, for he rejected the "Idealism" of Hegel. Briefly, Hegel taught that ideas developed by the principle of the dialectic. An idea (thesis) begets its opposite (anti-thesis), and the resulting conflict results in a third idea (synthesis). This synthesis itself becomes the thesis begetting its contradictory, antithesis, and so on. In the "crystal clear" words of Marx: "The struggle of these two antagonistic elements, comprised in the antithesis, constitutes the dialectical movement. The yes becoming no, the no becoming yes, the yes becoming at once yes and no, the no becoming at once no and yes, the contraries balance themselves, neutralize themselves, paralyse themselves"¹ ("Paralyse" is rather good!)

¹ K. Marx: *The Poverty of Philosophy*.

According to Hegel, nature is but the external manifestation of an absolute and eternal Idea which expresses itself through the dialectical process. The progressive actualization of the world-leading Idea entails the submission of individuals to the unity of the State. In Hegel's interpretation of history it is the State, rather than the individual, which is the significant unit. "The State is the march of God through the world." Each State by the dialectic must have an opposition, and so war is inevitable. "The military class is the class of universality." "War is not an accident" but an element "whereby the ideal character of the particular receives its right and reality."

Hegel believed that the dialectical process had reached fulfilment in his own life-time in the Prussian monarchy of Frederick William the Third. That this should be so seems rather strange. (Marx later was to hold that the dialectical process ended with the dictatorship of the proletariat).

The philosophy of totalitarianism can look to Hegel for its inspiration. He exalted the State to a mystical height. He also believed that the State escaped from any moral restrictions. Bosanquet, the English philosopher, who was greatly influenced by Hegel, held that "the State is the guardian of our whole moral world and not a factor in our organised moral world," so the State cannot be bound or limited by the system of social ethics it makes binding on its members. Gentile, the philosopher of Fascism, owes a great deal also to Hegel.

The point then is that Hegel has been the inspiration of many thinkers who would submerge the individual completely in the collectivity. Karl Marx was another such thinker. While abandoning the Idealism of Hegel he accepted the notion of the dialectic. Progress is achieved through opposition, through strife, through conflict, not of ideas but of economic forces. Marx

wedded Materialism to the Dialectic. He held that matter, not idea, was the only reality. Matter had in itself the dialectical principle, and this was expressed in the economic sphere. Production and the methods of production determine the course of history.

Marx wrote in 1852: "Middle-class historians long ago described the evolution of class-struggle, and political economists explained the economic physiology of classes. My contribution has been to add the following theses: (1) that the existing classes are bound up with certain phases of material production; (2) that the class-struggle necessarily leads to the dictatorship of the proletariat; (3) that this dictatorship is merely the transition to the abolition of all classes and the creation of a free and equal society."

The Marxist View of History.

A quotation from *Anti-Dühring* of Engels tells us: "The materialist conception of history starts from the principle that production, and with production the exchange of its products, is the basis of every social order; that in every society which has appeared in history the distribution of the products, and with it the division of society into classes or estates, is determined by what is produced and how it is produced, and how the product is exchanged. According to this conception, the ultimate causes of all social changes and political revolutions are to be sought, not in the minds of men, in their increasing insight into eternal truth and justice, but in changes in the mode of production and exchange; they are to be sought not in the philosophy but in the economics of the period concerned."

From Marx in his *Critique of Political Economy*: "The mode of production of the material means of existence conditions the whole process of social, political and intellectual life. It is not the consciousness of men that

determines their existence, but on the contrary, it is their social existence that determines their consciousness."

The Marxist view of history, then, is that the economic factor is the overwhelming determinant of the course of history. Religion, laws, literature, art, music, and so on are all fashioned by the manner in which men produce material goods.

Everybody, of course, admits that man's economic condition is an important factor. Aquinas reminds us that: "A man in hunger is to be fed rather than instructed, and as the Philosopher observes, for a needy man, money is better than philosophy, although the latter is better simply" (II. II. Q. 32. 3). Our thoughts can definitely be coloured by our economic situation, but to suggest that the economic factor determines the course of history and the structure of society with its religion, laws and social relations is really an insult to our intelligence. It involves, first of all, a denial of free-will in man, and a denial that he possesses an intellect superior to matter. Having swallowed that, then we must accept that all the aspirations of men spring from the way they live: the martyrs of Christendom, masters and slaves, in the early centuries, old and young from all classes of society, in later centuries, went and go to their death, by a conviction of the truth of Christianity which was determined for them by the way they lived, though on the Marxist thesis some were oppressors and some oppressed! The Irish during the Penal days suffered persecution, the loss of their lands and all they possessed, and even death to keep true to their religion. Irish patriots from all walks of life have endured prison, transportation and death for an ideal. Really, of course, the non-material and spiritual ideals of the Irish race emerged from the way they produced their material goods! There is no need to pursue the Marxist view into the realms of art, poetry and literature or history

generally, except to remark that the classical shape of Cleopatra's nose has more right to be considered the determinant factor in the course of history than the economic conditions of the time.

The Class-war and the Dictatorship of the Proletariat.

This is the next stage in the Marxist thesis. It may be stated briefly: at every stage of society a particular class gets control and exploits the rest for its own advantage; this develops its opposite class, and strife between the two classes leads to another dominating class; the class-war reaches its simplest and final phase when the capitalist is face to face with the proletariat. The proletariat will conquer and then will be inaugurated the Dictatorship of the Proletariat. This is not real Communism yet. The Dictatorship phase is a transitional one, during which all capitalist elements will be liquidated. When that phase is ended "the State will wither away," and Communism will be ushered in. There will be no more class-war after the proletariat conquers, because no other class will be allowed to exist. The dialectic will have run its course, and presumably will have retired to a suitable dressing-room after its long marathon across the centuries of history.

Trade Unions and the Class-War.

With Marx, trade unions which sought for reforms and the mitigation of the workers' lot were only a brake on the progress of the dialectic. Their real purpose should be to intensify the class-struggle.

It is worth noting that on the Continent the majority of trade unionists followed this Marxist line. In France, for example, the Confédération Général de Travail (C.G.T.) has always been Communist-dominated. Their methods have been the lightning strike and disruption of the nation's economy. In Great Britain, on the other hand, trade unions did not follow the Marxist line. They

used their associations to promote the good of the worker, and later with the formation of the Labour Party, they sought by political methods to advance their cause. Such action is regarded by Communists as treason to Marxism: because the unions were working in and through the machinery of the State instead of seeking its overthrow in accordance with true "working-class ideology."

The Progress of the Class-war.

Marx predicted that the war would come first in the most advanced industrial countries. The workers' lot under industrialism would get worse and worse, so that in the end a revolution would become inevitable. Actually, of course, the revolution came in Russia, the least advanced in industrialism, and the condition of the workers in the "capitalist" countries has improved enormously since the time Marx wrote. He based his prophesy mainly on his economic theory which we will examine later.

Marx believed that the Dictatorship of the Proletariat would grow out of a revolution in which a democracy of social reformers would come into power. The duty of the Communists was then plain—having moved in with the "social reformers," they must break up this new regime by fighting it at every turn "in the interest of the masses," so as to facilitate their own seizure of power. Lenin acted thus in the first Russian revolution. When the Russian army revolted, the Tsar abdicated in February, 1917. Kerensky took over the government in July, but in October, 1917, the Bolsheviks on the urging of Lenin and Trotsky (against the opinion of Kamenev, Zinoviev and Stalin) took the reins of power themselves. The more recent history of the Russian "satellite" States follows the same pattern—the Communists moved in with the Social Reformers, got

a couple of key ministries like that of the Ministry of the Interior, consolidated their own position, and then ousted their former colleagues to set up a Red regime.

How long will the Dictatorship of the Proletariat last.

As we have seen, the Dictatorship of the Proletariat is only a transitional phase during which all reactionary elements will be liquidated. Communism in the full sense will be ushered in after this period. Communist theorists are rather vague as to the length of time this phase will take. Lenin was convinced that the more thorough-going and ruthless that dictatorship, the quicker will be the transition to full Communism. When the classless society is arrived at, there will be no more need for violence. Millions now may suffer transportation and death, but let them not worry—there's a good time coming! The Bolshevik Revolution occurred in 1917, and still there is not the slightest sign that the "Dictatorship of the Proletariat" is on its way out.

The Meaning of "Dictatorship of the Proletariat."

This high-sounding phrase is typical of the opium of Communism. The poor proletariat have as much say in the running of things as they had under the Tsars. In fact, the dictatorship of the proletariat means the dictatorship of the Communist Party. It enforces discipline and organisation upon the masses. The Communist Party, though a very small minority, expresses the real will of the people; they know what is good for the people, and they will force the people to accept the necessary remedies. Like the totalitarian philosopher Rousseau, they feel that the "general will" is in the safe keeping of a section of the people. With Robespierre the Communists can say: "Our will is the general will," and "the Government of the Revolution is the despotism of liberty against tyranny."

The Communist Party, then, is the Dictatorship of the Proletariat. Lenin says: "Without a party of iron . . . such a conflict as ours cannot be conducted." Stalin: "Communists cannot permit themselves the luxury of sectionalism since their object is power." The Communist Party will ruthlessly suppress all opposition; Lenin tells us: "If you exploiters attempt to offer resistance to our proletarian revolution we shall ruthlessly suppress you; we shall deprive you of your rights; more than that, we shall not give you any bread, for in our proletarian republic the exploiters will have no rights, they will be deprived of fire and water."¹

The Nature of Society when full Communism arrives.

We have seen that the Dictatorship of the Proletariat is only a stepping-stone to Communism. We have not seen Communism yet, according to the theorists—the way is only being prepared. No one can tell us how long we are to wait. But we are to believe that the process is being advanced by the Dictatorship. What kind of society shall we eventually have? Communist theorists are rather vague about this, but Engels does attempt the answer.

He tells us that the first act of the proletariat will be to socialize the means of production. "By this very act it ends itself as a proletariat, destroying at the same time all class-difference and class-antagonisms, and with this also the State. . . . The interference of the authority of the State with social relations will then become superfluous in one field after another, and will finally cease of itself. *The authority of the Government over persons will be replaced by the administration of things and the direction of the processes of production. The State will not be abolished; it will wither away.*"² This statement is

¹ *The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky.*

² *Anti-Dühring.*

really naïve. How can things be administered and processes of production be directed without administering and directing persons? Things and processes do not exist in a vacuum.

Lenin also gives his version of the Communist paradise: "The new society will come when people have become accustomed to observe the fundamental principles of social life, and their labour is so productive that they will voluntarily work according to their abilities. . . . There will then be no need for any exact calculation by society of the quantity of products to be distributed to each of its members, each will take freely according to his needs." Engels' words deserve to go along with those of Lenin: "Productive labour will become a pleasure instead of a burden . . . by giving each individual the opportunity to develop and exercise all his faculties, physical and mental, *in all directions.*" Finally, the picture may be rounded off by Marx himself: "In Communist society, where nobody has one exclusive sphere of activity, but each can become accomplished in any branch he wishes, society regulates the general production, and this makes it possible for me to do one thing to-day and another to-morrow, to hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, criticize after dinner, just as I have a mind, without ever becoming hunter, fisherman, shepherd or critic."¹

The reader now should have a fairly adequate picture of what society will be like when full Communism is ushered in, according to the main theorists. There may be tribulation and terror under the Dictatorship of the Proletariat, but do not worry—wait till real Communism comes. We can't tell you when it will come, but come it will "in the long run." (We cannot refrain from quoting Lord Keynes who criticizing "long-run" economists said that in the long-run we are all dead!)

¹ *The German Ideology.*

No opium addict has ever dreamed dreams like this of Marx, Engels and Lenin about Communist society. Man's nature will have changed completely. Everybody will be rushing voluntarily to work in all directions. Everybody can choose to be somebody one day and somebody else the next day. However, as Professor Gray says in his work, *The Socialist Tradition* (p. 328): "Even the inhabitant of Engel's future fairyland will have to decide sooner or later whether he wishes to be Archbishop of Canterbury or First Sea Lord, whether he should seek to excel as a violinist or as a pugilist. . . A short week-end on a farm might have convinced Marx that the cattle themselves might have some objection to being reared in this casual manner in the evening."

Conditions under the Dictatorship of the Proletariat.

While we wait for the promised Paradise of full Communism, the proletarian State is consolidating the position and preparing for the future—mainly, by suppressing "reactionary elements" and "re-educating the masses." Reactionary elements are liquidated—as Trotsky reminds us: "The Red Terror is a weapon utilized against a class, doomed to destruction, which does not wish to perish." What other methods are to be used?

1. EDUCATION: This will be nothing else but an instrument of Communist propaganda. Communists believe that if they can educate the Youth to their ideas, it will take many generations to undo the work. That, of course, explains why Communism in Russia and the Satellite States, in China and elsewhere, has deprived the Catholic Church of its schools. It also explains why the Church fights tenaciously everywhere for the right of her children to be educated in the doctrine of Christ.

Godless schools make for a Godless people, of whom materialist Communism can make an easy prey.

2. RELIGION: Religion and Communism are incompatible. Religion is "a bourgeois superstition." In Communist materialism there is no such thing as the supernatural. So Religion must go.

Russia has found that it is impossible to eradicate religion from the hearts of a people. So for security purposes it has in recent years come to terms with the Russian Orthodox Church—the Patriarch is degradingly submissive to the political power, but there is a certain amount of toleration for religious practices. The Communists feel that as the result of their indoctrination of the young in a few years they can more easily dispose of the Orthodox Church. The Catholic Church, of course, is chief enemy.

3. THE POSITION OF THE WORKER: The elementary rule is that he that will not work, shall not eat. The worker cannot choose what he will do; he must labour as the proletarian State decides. However, he is "safeguarded" by labour organizations, which function under the aegis of the Communist Party!

Communists insist that the productivity of the proletarian State *must* be greater than that of the capitalist State. "The problem before the social organization," says Trotsky, "is just to bring laziness within a definite framework, to discipline it." To this end a variety of means are to be used—propaganda, payment by results, demands for "volunteers," surrender of the normal standard conditions, compulsion, and militarization of labour.

The worker, in effect, is in complete slavery. Lenin in *State and Revolution* had held the principle of the maximum income—that no State official should get more than a qualified worker. Stalin (Jan., 1931)

declared that equality in wages was "alien and detrimental to socialist production." Eastman showed in 1937 (*The End of Socialism in Russia*) that the gulf between the pay of the lowest paid labour and that of the highest paid executives was far greater in Russia than in U.S.A. Even the very food allotted to a worker is based on production—by an elaborate system of rationing, a worker must give his very life-blood to obtain the means of subsistence. "He that will not work shall not eat!" And how much a worker should be able to do depends on the opinion of his overseer, a State official.

Another alternative to starvation is transportation to Siberia. Siberia, of course, was used by the Tsars but compared to conditions under Communism, the Siberia of the Tsars was comparatively tolerable. Siberia was, in truth, the University of the Bolsheviks. There, in exile, they lectured and wrote and trained for the future. Lenin married Krupskaya, who was also in exile, in Siberia. Moreover it was comparatively easy to escape from Siberia. But present-day Communists know better. They have seen to it that Siberia is a vast slave concentration camp.

The Communist Theory of the State.

So far we have dealt with the Marxist view of history—the dialectic showing itself in the class-war, which leads to the Dictatorship of the Proletariat, and then finally to Communism. Now it is necessary to treat briefly of the Communist theory of the State.

The State according to Marx is simply a capitalist organisation. It is the means by which the capitalist dominates the worker. Note carefully that he does not say that the State has been captured by the capitalists, rather the State *in itself* is a capitalist weapon against the workers. "The capitalist State," says Bukharin, "is a union of the master-class formed to safeguard

exploitation. The interests of capital and nothing but the interests of capital—here we have the guiding star towards which are directed all the activities of this robber band." Engels wrote: "The State is nothing more than a machine for the oppression of one class by another."

By the dialectic, it is only by the negation of the State that the working-class can be free. It is useless to try to reconcile the working-class to the organization which is the State. Laski in his work on *Communism*¹ tells us that in 1920 the Independent Labour Party in England inquired from the Third International whether Communism could be introduced only by armed force, and the Executive replied: "The workers should prepare not for an easy parliamentary victory, but for victory by a heavy civil war; should the workers have succeeded in gaining power without this civil war, that would only signify that the necessity of civil war would confront the working-class so soon as it set out to realise its will to defend itself from capitalist exploitation and speculation."

The Dictatorship of the Proletariat will liquidate opposing classes, and then "the State will wither away," as there will be no classes left.

The Economics of Marx.

For many years after the publication of the *Communist Manifesto* Marx was pressed by Engels and other adherents to produce the "scientific" work he had promised, to show why the revolution of the proletariat was inevitable. So Marx took up the study of economics, mainly in the works of Ricardo. He incorporated his theories in the *Critique of Political Economy*, published in 1859, and later in *Das Kapital*. Due to the influence of Ricardo, Marx propounded a theory of value based on labour. Value is

¹ Page 130.

determined by the number of labour-hours that go into the making of something. If it takes a carpenter two hours to make a table and one hour to make a chair, then the table is twice the value of the chair. So that if you could know the number of "congealed" labour hours in an article you could know its value.

That is all very simple and reasonable at first glance, until we ask ourselves a few questions. What about the various skills of different people?—some are quicker than others, some are more expert and so on. Marx replies that we can measure the amount of "labour-power" in each man's effort by taking the commodity to the market and finding there its exchange value. This, of course, undermines the Marxian thesis completely—for now supply and demand are taken to be factors of great importance: the simple "labour" theory falls down.

Marx also means exclusively manual labour. He takes no account of intellectual labour. The man who designs an object built by workers is not considered—the workers' labour-time gives the object its value.

It must be admitted that labour-time is an element in the creation of value, but to erect a theory on the basis of manual labour alone is asking too much.

Marx developed his theory of surplus-value from his theory of value, and it is on this surplus-value that he can predict the doom of capitalism, and the revolution of the proletariat. His theory of surplus-value is the heart of his economic system. It is as follows—the capitalist buys labour-power and sets it to work on the instruments of production. The labourer is paid the cost of his labour-power, which is equal to what is necessary for his subsistence. But the labourer produces far more than his cost, and this "surplus value" is taken by the capitalist. For example, if a labourer works an eight-hour day, four hours work may pay for his subsistence, and the other four hours work then are

unpaid work hours which represent profit for the capitalist.

Now Marx continues—since value is created by labour, the introduction by the capitalist of more machines means that the capitalist's profit will diminish, so in order to keep his profits, the capitalist exploits more and more the labourers he hires. He must make them work longer and harder to keep up profits. Eventually the workers will be so victimized that they will have to revolt and bring in the Dictatorship of the Proletariat.

The reader at this stage may scratch his head in wonder. Is this a fairy-tale? Why, he will ask, does not the capitalist employ more and more labour rather than machines, if surplus-value is the outcome of labour? Certainly, there seems to be something wrong with Marx's analysis.

Many therefore of his admirers have written books to explain what he really meant, e.g., G. D. H. Cole: *What Marx Really Meant*. I think the simplest explanation, and the most charitable, is that Marx was no economist. Lenin, later, paid little attention to this aspect of Marx's writings. Max Beer, a friendly critic, in his *Life and Teaching of Karl Marx* says that "Marx's theory of value and surplus-value has rather the significance of a political and social slogan than of an economic truth."

The opinion of the late Lord Keynes, the greatest economist of our day, will conclude this section. In his *Essays in Persuasion*, he describes *Das Kapital* as "an obsolete economic text-book . . . not only scientifically erroneous, but without interest or application for the modern world." And in his *The End of Laissez-Faire* he writes: "Marxian Socialism must always remain a portent to the historians of opinion—how a doctrine so illogical and so dull can have exercised so powerful and enduring an influence over the minds of men, and through them the events of history."

Lenin's Role in Communism.

Lenin, whose real name was Vladimir Ilyich Ulianov, was born in 1870 in Russia—his father being an inspector of schools, and his mother the daughter of a doctor. In 1887 Lenin's brother Alexander was executed for plotting against the Tsar—this made Lenin a revolutionary for ever. Lenin went to the University of Kazan in 1887, but was expelled for revolutionary activity. So he went to the country and read Marx's *Kapital*. In 1893 he moved to St. Petersburg and practised at the bar. In 1895 he went to Austria, Switzerland, France and Germany. In Switzerland he met Plekhanov and other revolutionary theorists. Lenin returned to Russia, and distributed secretly literature from the Swiss exiles. He was arrested, and after spending fourteen months in prison in St. Petersburg (1896-97), he was sent to Siberia. Here he married another revolutionary, Krupskaya, also in exile. In exile Lenin read and wrote revolutionary articles. He was released in 1900.

He decided to leave Russia in order to publish a revolutionary paper and have it smuggled into Russia. So he founded *Iskra* in 1900.

The "All Russian Congress of Social Democrats" was held in Brussels in 1903 and was transferred to London. Here a split occurred, from which the name "Bolsheviks" derives. The dispute arose between Lenin and Martov about the qualifications for membership of the Party. Martov wished to include sympathisers and fellow-travellers; Lenin was for strict centralization. Lenin was defeated on this issue by twenty-eight votes to twenty-three. But in the elections for the Central Committee Lenin's men received nineteen seats to the others' seventeen. The minority (the Mensheviks) objected to this, as they held the majority (the Bolsheviks) had acted illegitimately. So the followers of Lenin were known as the Bolsheviks afterwards, though the word

in Russian simply refers to a numerical quantity—the majority.

In the years up to 1914 Lenin's days were spent in reading and writing, and quarrelling with the Mensheviks.

In 1917 the army revolted, and the Tsar abdicated in February. Lenin was in Zürich at the time, while Trotsky was in America. Lenin was sent by the Germans in a sealed train into Russia, where he arrived in April. Lenin knew the army and people were tired of war, and so he demanded peace in his speeches. Kerensky took over the Government in July, and he decided to continue the war. He also decided to suppress the Bolsheviks, so Lenin escaped to Finland, and Trotsky was arrested (he also had returned to Russia). The Russian army collapsed. In October, 1917, the Bolsheviks, on the urging of Lenin and Trotsky, took over the Government. The army was with them because they promised peace.

The Government of the October Revolution delegated important and urgent business to an inner Cabinet which consisted of five commissars—three Bolsheviks and two Social Revolutionaries. The three Bolsheviks were Lenin, Trotsky and Stalin. From the beginning Trotsky and Stalin detested each other. Trotsky had been a Menshevik, who joined the Bolsheviks in July 1917. As Minister for War in the Government he achieved great publicity and popular acclaim. The fires of envy were later to be fanned by disputes on policy. Lenin tried always to keep the peace between the two. Trotsky underestimated Stalin, and looked upon him always as a "dull mediocrity." But Lenin regarded Trotsky and Stalin as the two most able men of the revolutionaries. Before he came to die in January, 1924, he saw the inevitable clash which would occur between these two personalities, but towards the end he sided against Stalin's taking over the leadership of the party. In a postscript to his will he wrote: "Stalin is too rude, and this fault . . .

becomes unbearable in the office of General Secretary. Therefore, I propose to the comrades to find a way to remove Stalin from that position and appoint to it another man . . . more patient, more loyal, more polite and more attentive to comrades, less capricious, etc.”¹

Lenin's Special Contribution to the Theory of Communism.

Lenin is the master of tactics for Communists. In the words of Stalin: “Leninism is the theory and tactics of the proletarian revolution in general, the theory and tactics of the dictatorship of the proletariat in particular.”² Lenin gives Marxism its driving force; he was the engineer of revolution. To him, rather than to Marx, Communists look for guidance in the attainment of their ends.

Lenin insisted that the Communist Party should have an iron discipline. He pointed out that they should know when to retreat as well as when to advance. He also taught them to make use of organizations like trade unions, clubs and associations in order to further their cause. Communists according to Lenin should be prepared to enter into compromises “even with the devil and his grandmother.” They, too, should make use of parliamentary elections to get inside Parliament and work there. Lenin in the apostle of the “fifth column.”

The Role of Stalin.

Joseph Djughashvili, later to be known as Stalin (which means “man of steel”) was born in 1879 at Gori in Georgia. His parents were poor, and had lately been liberated from serfdom. His father was a shoemaker. Stalin studied at the Orthodox Theological Seminary at Tiflis from 1894 to 1899. He was expelled, as he said himself, for “propagating Marxism.”

¹ The reader is referred to Deutscher's *Stalin* (Oxford University Press), easily the best book on the Russian Revolution.

² Stalin: *Foundations of Leninism*.

He became an active revolutionary Socialist, helping to distribute *Iskra*, Lenin's paper edited abroad. He went to Batum and carried on propaganda with the factory workers. He was arrested in 1902 and transported to Siberia in 1903. He escaped and returned to Tiflis in 1904. Here he organised fighting squads who carried out acts of terrorism, raiding banks to obtain party funds and so on.

Between 1907 and 1917 Stalin spent nearly seven years in prison or Siberia (he frequently escaped). Lenin in 1912 appointed Stalin as one of four members of a Russian Bureau which was to direct the Party's activities inside Russia. On the strength of this, in the beginning of 1917, Stalin hurried back from Siberia to St. Petersburg to lead the Bolsheviks, before Lenin's return from Switzerland.

Stalin became General Secretary of the Central Committee in 1922. This gave him immense power, as he held all the threads of control in his hands. So that even while Lenin was alive, and Trotsky still surrounded with glory, “Russian society already lived under Stalin's virtual rule, without being aware of the ruler's name.”¹

After Lenin's death Stalin joined with Kamenev and Zinoviev in the Politbureau against Trotsky. Zinoviev proposed that there was no need to read Lenin's will (which opposed Stalin) as they all knew of Stalin's loyalty to Lenin, especially shown at Lenin's funeral.

Stalin advanced the policy of “Socialism in one country” which was adopted at the Fourteenth Party Conference in 1925. This was a change from the Marxist-Leninist line, which had always held that the success of Bolshevism demanded world Communism. Trotsky, too, insisted on the doctrine of “Permanent Revolution”—and this was another source of quarrel with Stalin. Not that Stalin did not believe in

¹ Deutscher: *Stalin*.

international revolution, but he sensed the psychology of the situation—the tide of revolution in the West had ebbed and the likelihood of its return seemed remote; it seemed better for the sake of the revolution in Russia to concentrate on the home front.

In 1925 the Politbureau consisted of Stalin, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Trotsky, Bukharin, Rykov and Tomsky. The latter three accepted Stalin's "Socialism in one country," the others opposed it. Bukharin was the intellectual on Stalin's side. His *ABC of Communism* was the standard book of communist propaganda until the early thirties.

By the end of 1926 Trotsky, Zinoviev and Kamenev had been expelled from the Politbureau by Stalin. In December, 1927, Trotsky was deported to Alma Ata; Zinoviev and Kamenev capitulated to Stalin by renouncing their "deviationist" views in public. In January, 1929, Trotsky was expelled from Russia. Then Stalin turned on the others. Bukharin, Rykov and Tomsky were dismissed from their positions, and allowed to continue in the Party only by repudiating their own views. By the end of 1929, when Stalin was fifty years old, there was nobody left to challenge his supremacy. The Stalinist cult began—the walls of Moscow were covered with large portraits of Stalin, his statues and busts filled the public squares and buildings. His fiftieth birthday brought tributes in praise of his virtues from all parts of Russia.

In 1929 Stalin embarked on Collectivization of Farms and the liquidation of the Kulaks (the bigger farmers). In the preceding years he had opposed this policy as tending to alienate the countryside; now because of the failure of the peasants to deliver sufficient grain to the towns, he changed completely. The overwhelming majority of the peasantry confronted the Government with desperate opposition. So collectivization went

ahead through machine-guns. Then as large-scale farming demanded tractors, Stalin embarked on the industrialization of Russia, no matter what the cost in blood and tears. Terror stalked the land. In 1932 Stalin's wife reproved him for his brutality, and then committed suicide.

Stalin insisted on differences in pay and reward to encourage efficiency. The Leninist doctrine of equality was abandoned. Lenin in *State and Revolution* had held the principle of the maximum income—that no State official should get more than a qualified worker. At the seventeenth Congress in 1934 Stalin described the equalization of wages and salaries as a "reactionary, petty-bourgeois absurdity worthy of a primitive sect of ascetics but not of a Socialist society organized on Marxian lines." As Deutscher points out: "The highly paid and privileged managerial groups came to be the props of Stalin's régime. They had a vested interest in it. Stalin himself felt that his personal rule was the more secure the more solidly it rested on a rigid hierarchy of interest and influence."

From 1935 on Stalin immersed himself in a blood-bath. Zinoviev and Kamenev were tried and executed in August, 1936; the highest generals of the Red Army in June, 1937; Bukharin, Rykov and others in March, 1938. All the members of Lenin's Politbureau except Stalin and Trotsky, who was in exile, were "purged." The "Old Guard" of Bolshevism was completely liquidated. Naturally, they all "confessed" to their crimes! Hundreds of thousands of party administrators went with them. From 1938 a new class of administrators, technicians and economists, graduates of the soviet schools, took over the offices of the country. These had imbibed the Stalinist cult and threw themselves with enthusiasm into their work. One of the last acts of the purge was the execution of Yezhov, the chief of the

political police, the organiser of the "purge trials"—he had succeeded Yagoda, who organised the earlier "purges" and had been executed. Such was the irony of fate under Stalin!

During the 1939-45 War Stalin's power continued to increase. When the German Army advanced to the gates of Moscow, Stalin did not leave the city. But he appealed to the nationality of the Russians; he spoke of the Fatherland being threatened, the enemy was on their own sacred soil—all this, of course, in complete contradiction of the Communist theory which seeks to make the worker an "internationalist." However, the Russians responded to Stalin's call, and with the help of the fierce Russian winter, they sent the German Army reeling back from Moscow. Later came the great victory of Stalingrad. With the final victory of the Allies in 1945 Stalin proceeded to encircle Russia with Communist States—there was no effort to give the appearance even of the "proletariat" in revolt; the Communist Party, backed by Russia, simply steam-rolled all opposition.

So up to 1953 the "Dictatorship of the Proletariat" in Russia was very definitely the dictatorship of one man—Joseph Stalin. He stood like a great Colossus across the eastern world. Stalin died on 6th March, 1953, and was succeeded by Malenkov.

The Communist International.

Communism has for its objective World Communism. only a simpleton will think otherwise. It is the essence of Marx-Leninism, and Stalin, of course, subscribes to the same view (his "Socialism in one country" policy was but marking time). So we are not surprised to find that the Communist International has been in existence from the start, and that all Communists are fifth-columnists in any country outside Russia, because they owe their allegiance to Moscow. Bitter experience

has brought this home to many countries, but a good deal of blame attaches to the leaders of these lands, because they should have known that Communism means treason to one's own nation.

Let us look briefly at the history of the International.

The First International was set up in 1864. It was a meeting of British, French, German, Italian, Swiss and Polish workers in London, to consider a British proposal for co-operation against the practice of importing cheap foreign labour. They decided to form an "International Federation of Working Men," which was dominated by Marx and his adherents. The Paris Commune Revolt of 1871 (March 17th—May 28th), during which the Archbishop of Paris was shot dead, was the first Communist revolution, and the leaders of the International were involved.

The dissolution of the First International was due to Marx's dispute with Michael Bakunin (1818-1876). Rather than let Bakunin get control, Marx at the Hague Congress of 1872 carried a resolution transferring the headquarters to the U.S.A., where it frittered out in 1867.

The Second International was founded in Paris in 1876. Liebknecht and Vaillant were the main leaders. They adopted Marx's basic principles. This International was a loosely-knit assembly of workers' organizations. It was not as revolutionary as the First International. In fact, some of its members began to go against Marxist principles—Bernstein, the German Social Democrat, was rather Fabian in his outlook, and he also held that the worker owed a duty to his own country; and Millerand in France accepted ministerial office in 1897.

So in 1904 the International condemned the views of the reformist Bernstein and Millerand.

However during the War of 1914-18 every Socialist Party in the war had supported its own Government, so Lenin decided it was time to replace the Second International by a "genuinely revolutionary" body—the Third International.

The Third International (or Comintern) was founded in March, 1919. This directed Communism in all countries outside Russia. To it alone Communists gave allegiance. However, in April 1943, Stalin disbanded the Comintern—because of his alliance with England and France. He wished to allay the fears of his allies. What simply happened, of course, was that the Communists went underground. However, even the "official" banning of the International did not last very long. In September, 1947, the *Cominform* was set up at a Nine-Power Conference in Warsaw. Communism is again once more openly and blatantly on the march!

Why Communism has appealed.

The Holy Father, Pope Pius XI, in his encyclical, *Divini Redemptoris*, briefly gives us the answer.

First, too few have really realised the aims and purposes of Communism. People oppressed by the evils of Capitalism clutched at this new remedy—a remedy worse however than the disease. As P. G. Wodehouse remarks, the best remedy for dandruff is the guillotine, and the Communist remedy is akin to that—it may shatter Capitalism, but along with it, it crushes out the human spirit.

Secondly, the Holy Father tells us that Communism advanced because of the religious and moral destitution of many. The Freemason and Liberal ideas have brought a terrible retribution. On the Continent particularly, where religion was cast out from the schools, generations have grown up easy victims of the Communist poison.

Thirdly, the Pope reminds us of the shrewd and wide-spread propaganda machine of Communism. Grievances, true and false, are exploited by Communists for their own ends. They will use any and every means to attain their ends. They are ruthless and cunning, while the majority of men have slept. Many countries have wakened to find themselves in the grip of a few Communists.

Conclusion.

Communism has definitely passed its peak. Its methods and aims have been exposed in too many countries. Only a simpleton or a knave will now accept Communism. But every country must be on the watch. Communists are highly trained; they are unscrupulous; their object is world-domination. "He that hath ears to hear, let him hear."

CHAPTER XV

STRIKES

The evil effects of industrial disputes are too well known to every citizen to need any elaboration. The general public is very often the worst sufferer through the dislocation of normal life. But the contestants themselves suffer greatly also—owners, because business is often irrevocably lost, while rents and rates and interest charges must be met, although financial resources dwindle; workers, because normally they have families dependent on them, and for many weeks they are endeavouring to exist on strike pay, which is hopelessly inadequate. It can be said that the workers will require many years to recover from any long-drawn-out strike, even though victory may be theirs. Their savings will have been exhausted, their goods sent to the pawn, and their families undernourished. The National Income suffers, too, because the loss of the productive work of many means that there is less of the National cake for distribution.

Compulsory Arbitration.

Because of the obvious evil results, many quite reasonable thinkers believe that there should be compulsory arbitration. Why expose the community to such wasteful struggles, they ask? While one must have a certain sympathy with this viewpoint, it would be unwise to advocate compulsory arbitration. In the last analysis it must be maintained that a man has a fundamental right to withdraw his labour (provided, of course, as we shall see later, certain moral conditions are fulfilled). Those who advocate compulsory arbitration

point to the example of democratic Australia and New Zealand, but it is more significant that the totalitarian States—Stalin's Russia, Hitler's Germany, and Mussolini's Italy—all have prohibited strikes, and it is only in such totalitarian States that the prohibition of strikes is effective. Australia and New Zealand have found that compulsory arbitration does not abolish strikes—in fact, they have found it more expedient not to invoke the law against strikers. (From 1920 to 1942 in New Zealand there have been 1,134 strikes, but only in 55 cases were proceedings taken against the strikers—52 of these before 1929—a confirmatory testimony to the growing experience of New Zealand of the inefficacy or inexpediency of invoking the law in these matters).

Prohibition of Strikes in Certain Cases.

While then one would be against compulsory arbitration on the two grounds of (1) its infringement of a fundamental right, and (2) its inefficiency, it is clear there are certain cases where the State is entitled, in the interests of the common good, to forbid strikes. Such categories, for example, are the police, the army, the civil service, certain public utilities such as the water supply workers. One hesitates to enlarge this number of services, although modern life is so highly organised that other services, for example, gas and electricity, teaching, banking and transport, must nowadays be considered border line cases. In spite of their importance to the life of a nation, it would be wrong to prohibit strikes in these services. The danger of State autocracy would be too great. A real problem, however, is created for a Socialist State like that under a Labour Government in England. The more services and industries are nationalized, the more citizens are made State employees—striking in these industries and services will easily be regarded by the Government as an attempt to overthrow the State.

The logic of nationalization would seem to make for State authoritarianism. So again, we see that the right to strike may be a bulwark of freedom if used properly.

It is necessary to state that these services—army, police and civil service—which are forbidden to strike should be justly paid, and there seems no justification for the State's depriving them of an independent arbitration tribunal, with proper governmental safeguards.

Conditions for a Lawful Strike.

We now consider the conditions under which a strike is lawful :

1. There must be a just cause for the strike.
2. There must be a proper proportion between the evil caused by the strike and the good which is aimed at.
3. All other means—negotiation, conciliation, arbitration—must have been tried.
4. The means used in carrying on the strike must be lawful.
5. There must be a reasonable hope of success.

Because strikes cause such great evil they must be embarked upon only as a last resort. Only when other means such as negotiation, conciliation or arbitration have failed can a strike be started. Industries and services should have established their own arbitration machinery in which both sides may have confidence. It is no harm to state again, what must be said so often, that a good deal of industrial trouble is due to bad employer-employee relations, the fault of which very often lies with the Victorian ideas of the employer, though occasionally, also, one meets with the trade union official who considers himself the Napoleon of industrialism.

There must be a just cause for the strike. By the use of the word "just" here we are not speaking of "strict justice"; "fair" or "reasonable" is the meaning implied. Theologians are agreed that it is lawful to strike for some good which is not due in strict justice (cf. Prümmer, *Theologia Moralis*, Vol. II, par. 309). Decent pay, proper working conditions, reasonable hours of work—these may constitute just causes for striking. It is to be feared that many workers have not sufficient courage to resist a call for a strike when urged by their leaders. The secret ballot vote, of course, is a definite safeguard in these matters and should be an absolute rule before strike action is taken. But in the preliminary discussion before balloting, workers should have the moral courage to express their views conscientiously, without fear of human respect.

As a number of strikes arise out of union questions, it is no harm to touch upon these matters.

Workers are not justified in striking because some of their fellows refuse to join a *particular* union. A man is free to join any union he wishes; if that principle is denied, the way is left open for official dictators of trade unions to do as they please. It may be objected that trade union solidarity will be affected; the answer to that is that if a union cannot cater for its members properly, then they are entitled to leave; if they do cater properly for the majority, the minority who break away cannot do it any great harm. And even if the minority may cause difficulty, the solution to that difficulty lies elsewhere than in the denial of the right of free association. There are only three associations to which a man must belong—the family, the State, and the Church. Some trade union leaders would want to add *their particular union* as another essential society. Trade unions have fought through the last century for the right of free association; it would be a sad thing if they

themselves were to deny that same right to-day to their fellows. For a further discussion on trade unionism, see Chapter X.

A quotation from a very interesting article by Dr. Lucey (who has since become the Bishop of Cork) in *Christus Rex* of October, 1950, is very much to our way of thinking. He writes: "As I see it, workers have the right to choose the union most to their liking, no matter what the shop they are working in. Consequently, to force them by strike action, threat of dismissal, or any other form of intimidation, into a particular union or out of a particular workshop is wrong. But I would not go so far as to concede equal bargaining rights to all unions on a job. Trade unions are like political Parties. Just as the citizen has the right to belong to any of the Parties in the field—or save in exceptional circumstances, to none—so the worker has the right to belong to any of the trade unions in the field. But not every political Party has the right to a say in running the country; the Party with an absolute majority usually forms the Government and the legislation it enacts is binding on everybody—even on the members and followers of the opposition Party or Parties. In the same way, the majority union in a shop may fairly claim the exclusive right to negotiate agreements binding even the members of the other unions—provided, of course, the terms of the agreement are such as to involve no discrimination against these other members. The 'single union' shop has as little to be said for it as the 'single Party' State; majority-union bargaining has the same to be said for it as majority-Party Government, *i.e.*, all that can be said for individual freedom of choice and majority rule."

A grave cause implies that there must be a proper proportion between the good which is sought and the evil that will be caused by the strike. The dismissal of one man unjustly which causes a strike of thousands is

justified, because of the principle involved for every workman. The reprimanding of a man or a few men, even unjustly, would not be a sufficient reason for a strike. When a strike involves the serious disruption of a nation's commercial life, as for example, a Bank strike, clearly the cause must be exceptionally grave.

The means used in carrying on the strike must be lawful. If the strike is just, the means must also be just. The end does not justify the means. The strikers have no right to injure the person of the employer nor his property. Attempts, for example, to derail a train during a railway strike are criminal. Picketing of workers' homes is also a development that cannot be approved. No industrial dispute can justify this invasion of man's family life. In this connection the report that strikers in a railway dispute picketed the public-house which served non-striking workers with drinks seems not only unjustifiable but ridiculous. Workers are free to picket the works and to dissuade others from working there—not by violence but by moral persuasion (provided, of course, that the strike originally is just). Violence may not be used against a "scab," even though the scab is morally wrong in seeking to break a just strike. It is necessary also to point out that propaganda used during a strike must be truthful.

The last condition for a strike to be lawful is that there must be a reasonable hope of success. Obviously, it would be wrong to embark on a strike which was doomed to failure. In weighing up this, of course, the possibility of a moral success in drawing the public attention to an obvious injustice is not to be discounted.

Various Kinds of Strike.

Having discussed strikes in general we go on to distinguish several classes of strikes.

First, there is the *simple strike*. Here a body of men

cease work for their own sake; they suffer from the same grievance. The *sympathetic* strike is begun by one body of men for the removal of the grievance of another body of men—they themselves are not directly involved; they strike in “sympathy” with the other group. The *general* strike is started by the whole body of workmen or by such a large section of them as to bring the general industry of a country to a standstill. The *lightning strike* is caused when workers cease work without any notice being given.

The morality of the simple strike is governed by the conditions already discussed. The other forms of strike need a further treatment. Regarding the *sympathetic strike*, it may be said that in our day a great many strikes are of this nature. With the growth of large-scale organization in services and industries, and also with the development of nation-wide unions, a strike which some years ago might have involved a relatively few workers, now is often regarded as a strike involving all the members of a service or industry or union. Such a state of things necessitates very clear thinking on the morality of strikes.

If the original strike is justified and the sympathetic strikers have the same employer then their striking may be justified, provided there is a reasonable proportion between the greater evil effects which will be caused and the good which is being sought.

If different employers are involved, the issue is more complicated. If the second employer is innocent, it would be wrong for his workers to strike because of the notion that workers must stand together against the employers as a class. That would be unjust. But supposing the second employer is using all his power to assist the first employer to break the strike, then, in that case, sympathetic action of his workers would be justified. What of the case where the second employer has no sympathy at all with the employer whose men are on

strike, but is a supplier of essential goods to that employer by long-standing contract? May his workers look upon these goods as “tainted” and refuse to handle them? If they handle them they will in effect be helping to make the strike of the other workers ineffectual. Presuming that the original strike is justified the workers of the second employer are also justified in sympathetic action. The trouble is that many workers refuse to consider the rightness or wrongness of the original strike and often embark quite recklessly on sympathetic action.

The *general strike* involves such excessive hardship to the community that only an exceedingly grave reason could ever justify it. It nearly always involves an attack on the legal Government of the country, and so in practice it cannot be justified.

The *lightning strike* normally is reprehensible. Apart from very special circumstances it is morally wrong. Nowadays with union organizations in almost every sphere of work, it harms both society and trade unionism if unofficial lightning strikes take place. Machinery is normally available for settling causes of disputes. If workers are unorganised and an employer presents them with an unjustifiable demand, *e.g.*, reduced wages or longer working hours, the lightning strike may be the only weapon of redress.

Conclusion.

This chapter on strikes may fittingly be closed by a quotation from the Most Rev. Dr. Browne of Galway. “In industrial or labour disputes it was a very grave offence against social peace to refuse to avail of arbitration machinery, especially where that procedure had been established by solemn agreement. It was, also, most reprehensible to ignore the Labour Court, established by legitimate authority for, in an orderly community, no individual or section could claim to be judge of his own

case or to prefer violence to reason. *It was not lawful to inflict widespread and severe injury on many in order to obtain some small advantage for a few.* There were some services that were so necessary to individual citizens and to the whole body politic that a strike in them was lawful only for very extreme reasons, such as the preservation of life itself. Members of a fire brigade, of the police, of medical and hospital services, of water, electricity, transport and banking services may not withdraw their labour to enforce any demand for improved conditions or higher standards until they submit to impartial investigation, and prove their case to be just and reasonable, and in the meantime fulfil their duties to the public."

CHAPTER XVI

WAGES

Leo XIII in *Rerum Novarum* reminds us that "a man's labour necessarily bears two notes or characters"—it is *personal*, that is, it is man's exclusive property, and it is *necessary*, that is, without the result of labour a man cannot live. "Now, were we to consider labour merely in so far as it is personal, doubtless it would be within the workman's right to accept any rate of wages whatsoever . . . but our conclusion must be very different if together with the personal element in a man's work we consider the fact that work is also necessary for him to live. . . It necessarily follows that each one has a natural right to procure what is required in order to live; and the poor can procure that in no other way than by what they can earn through their work." The Pope continues: "Let the working man and the employer make free agreements, and in particular let them agree freely as to the wages; nevertheless, there underlies a dictate of natural justice more imperious and ancient than any bargain between man and man, namely, that wages ought not to be insufficient to support a frugal and well-behaved wage-earner. If through necessity or fear of a worse evil the workman accept harder conditions because an employer or contractor will afford him no better, he is made the victim of force and injustice."

The Just Wage.

That the just wage is the family wage seems evident from the fact that Leo XIII a few sentences later says: "If a workman's wages be sufficient to enable him

comfortably to support himself, his wife and his children, he will find it easy, if he be a sensible man, to practise thrift." However, any doubt on this matter has been cleared up by Pius XI in his encyclicals *Christian Marriage* and *Quadragesimo Anno*. In *Christian Marriage* we read: "Every effort must be made to bring about that which our predecessor, Leo XIII of happy memory, has already insisted upon, namely, that in the State such economic and social methods should be adopted as will enable every head of a family to earn as much as, according to his station in life, is necessary for himself, his wife, and for the rearing of his children, for 'the labourer is worthy of his hire.' To deny this or to make light of what is equitable is a grave injustice, and is placed among the greatest sins by Holy Writ, nor is it lawful to fix such a scanty wage as will be insufficient for the upkeep of the family in the circumstances in which it is placed." Again, in *Quadragesimo Anno* the Pope repeats: "The wage paid to the working man must be sufficient for the support of himself and of his family. . . Every effort must therefore be made, that fathers of families receive a wage sufficient to meet adequately normal domestic needs."

If a Business cannot pay a Family Wage ?

The assertion of the principle of the family wage does not solve several difficulties of which the Pope is well aware. What if a business cannot pay a family wage ? In *Quadragesimo Anno* we read: "In settling the amount of wages one must also take into account the business and those in charge of it: for it would be unjust to demand excessive wages which a business cannot pay without ruin, and without consequent distress amongst the working people themselves; though if the business make smaller profit on account of want of energy and enterprise, or from neglect of technical and

economic progress, this is not a just reason for reducing the workers' wages. If, however, the business does not make enough money to pay the workman a just wage, either because it is overwhelmed with unjust burdens, or because it is compelled to sell its products at an unjustly low price, those who thus injure it are guilty of grievous wrong; for it is they who deprive the workers of a just wage, and force them to accept terms which are unjust. Let employers, therefore, and employed join in plans and efforts to overcome all difficulties and obstacles, and let them be aided in this wholesome endeavour by the wise measures of the public authority. *In the last extreme*, counsel must be taken whether the business can continue, or whether some other provision should be made for the workers. The guiding spirit in this crucial decision should be one of mutual understanding and Christian harmony between employers and workers."

It follows then that a business, which is able to do so, is bound to pay a family wage to its workers. A business which cannot do so, through no fault of its own, may require assistance from the State in preventing unjust competition, or in removing certain obstacles—for example, dumping by a foreign firm. If, however, all things considered, it is better that the firm should close down, that may be in the best interests of the workers in the long run, though such a course will only be followed as a last resource.

The Size of the Family.

The question also arises of the size of the family. Is an employer to pay a man sufficient to keep himself, his wife and ten children, or two children, or six children ? It seems clear that a normal sized family is considered. That may vary as between one country and another. However, as a guide we may accept the figure of population statisticians who regard an average of 2.4

children per family as necessary to maintain a country's population, and on that figure we should say a family of three children should be regarded as being the determinant of the family wage. In Catholic families, of course, this figure will normally be higher, and to enable the family of more than three to exist in frugal comfort it will be necessary for industry to devise an extra payment for larger families. In France, for example, industrialists created a pool or common fund for such cases. In the absence of this, the public authority will be obliged to undertake this task. This is clearly one of the legitimate enterprises of the State. It exists for the common good, and it is a mistake to err by excess in dismissing intervention of the lawful public authority as "State interference." Pius XI in *Christian Marriage* says quite plainly: "Those who have the care of the State and of the public good, cannot neglect the needs of married people and their families, without bringing great harm upon the State and on the common welfare. Hence, in making the laws and in disposing of public funds, they must do their utmost to relieve the needs of the poor, considering such a task as one of the most important of their administrative duties." Nowadays, the normal method by which the State helps larger families is by a system of family allowances and tax reliefs.

In Ireland, 2/6 per week was granted for each child after the second up to age sixteen. Under the new Social Security Bill of Dr. Ryan these allowances are increased: 2/6 for the second child and 4/- for others under sixteen. It would appear that here is an obvious channel for State schemes of social security. More generosity here would be amply rewarded. It is interesting to note that Australia grants 5/- per week for the first child, and 10/- for every other child. However, it is no harm to remember always that "Family allowances do not

supersede the family wage, they merely supplement it in the case of large families" (O'Rahilly: *Social Principles*, p. 22).

The Age of the Worker.

Again, the question of the age of the worker in relation to the payment of the family wage calls for discussion. Clearly, one serving an apprenticeship will not qualify until the period of apprenticeship is over. So also, normally in the case of young entrants some years should be spent with a firm before the family wage is due.

But it is outside the competence of a firm to require of their employees that they should not marry until they reach a certain age. It may be imprudent of a man to marry in such circumstances, but the "paternalism" of a firm is not the remedy. The right to marry, of course, carries responsibilities, and it is a pity that more preparing for marriage do not pay more heed to the Holy Father in *Christian Marriage*: "Care however must be taken that the parties themselves before entering upon married life should strive to dispose of, or at least to diminish, the material obstacles in their way. The manner in which this may be done effectively and honestly must be pointed out by those who are experienced."

Wages and the Common Good.

In *Quadragesimo Anno* the Pope touches on another aspect of wages. "Wage-rates must be regulated with a view to the economic welfare of the whole people. . . All are aware that a rate of wages too low or too high causes unemployment. . . To lower or raise wages unduly, with a view to private advantage, and with no consideration for the common good, is therefore contrary to social justice." Too many in this matter refuse to consider the common good but only their own private advantage. There is no need to emphasise the danger

of inflation if wages proceed to chase each other upwards in an ascending spiral. The trouble is, however, that certain highly-organised groups are able by pressure tactics to win for themselves wage advances, while those on fixed incomes—especially pensioners of all kinds—suffer greatly.

A common misconception is that of some sections who seek rises in wages on the ground that their position in relation to other workers has deteriorated. In essence, this means that if a poorer section of the community gets a well-merited increase, others demand that they keep their relative distance. Such a viewpoint is contrary to the good of the community, and as a principle by itself must be reprehended. Leo XIII in *Rerum Novarum* hopes for a diffusion of ownership, one of the results of which will be that "the respective classes will be brought nearer to one another."

These misconceptions are indicative of a selfishness which is affecting the community. During the war there were restrictions on entry into certain trades because the members did not wish to allow others to encroach upon their particular gold-mine, while the community in general was the unhappy sufferer.

The Wage-Contract is not Unjust.

It is well to bear in mind that the wage-contract in itself is not unbecoming or degrading to man. Many nowadays err by a certain excess in demanding that workers *should* be co-partners in an industry or service. Pope Pius XI says, it is true: "We deem it advisable that the wage-contract should, when possible, be modified somewhat by a contract of partnership . . . in this way wage-earners and other employees participate in the ownership or the management or in some way share in the profits," but he is careful to point out that "those who hold that the wage-contract is essentially

unjust and that therefore in its place *must* be introduced the contract of partnership, are certainly in error. They do a grave injury to Our Predecessor, whose encyclical not only admits the legitimacy of the wage-system, but devotes much space to bringing it into accordance with justice." For a fuller discussion on the point, the reader is referred to Chapter XVII on "Profit Sharing and Co-Partnership."

The Wage-Earner and Industry.

Dr. McKevitt in his *Plan of Society* says that "the payment of the workers' just share is a first obligation on industry," and Dr. O'Rahilly in his *Social Principles* declares that "as he is completely dependent on his income even for his minimum requirements, the wage-earner is the chief claimant upon industry; his right takes precedence over all less vital claims, whether of higher paid officials or of shareholders." We cannot push these ideas too far, for as we have seen the owner has his rights too, and in certain circumstances he may be unable to fulfil these obligations adequately, and presumably he is not to render himself bankrupt in attending to them. The main point, however, is that the employer must have a prime interest in his workers; they are more important than the machinery of his enterprise. A firm which would try to recoup its capital outlay quickly by scamping the workers' share would act unjustly. It is to be feared that some of our new industrial enterprises in this country have tried to recoup their outlay in a short number of years—that policy inevitably involves doing injustice to the employees and to the community. The human element surely must be the chief object of the employer's consideration.

Justice: What it is.

So much has been said in this discussion about justice and strict justice that a few words about justice and its divisions are called for.

Justice is a moral virtue which moves us to give others what is due to them.

Commutative Justice is that which concerns the obligation of one individual to another individual, or one community with another community. This is the strictest kind of justice. Its violation begets the obligation of restitution. This, for example, regulates the moral duty of an employer to pay a just wage to the worker.

Distributive Justice is that which regulates the dealings of the ruler or rulers of a community with the members thereof—rewards and positions and honours and burdens and punishments should be meted out with impartiality, with no exception of persons.

Social Justice is explained by Pope Pius XI in the encyclical *Divini Redemptoris*: "Besides commutative justice, there is also social justice with its own set obligations, from which neither employers nor working men can escape. Now it is of the very essence of social justice to demand from each individual all that is necessary for the common good." Social justice then regulates the obligations a man has to the community. It is often called legal justice or general justice.

Women's Wages.

The question of wages for women calls for special consideration. Should women receive the same pay as men for equal work? Many are prepared to argue against women on this matter. It is pointed out that in most firms where men and women are employed women have a worse record for absenteeism than men. Again it is held that most will leave anyway as soon as they are married, and as they are not normally the family bread-winners, why should they receive equal pay with men? Finally, it is argued that in some trades at least, lower wages for women are women's strongest recommendation in seeking employment—if the general

wage were raised and there was equality of pay, there would be a decline in the number of women employees.

His Holiness Pope Pius XII in an address to Catholic women workers discusses this matter. His words are clear and to the point. "Woman," said the Pope, "was the heart of the family, the queen of her home. But while industrial inventions had saved the housewife much of her old work, industrial development has, on the other hand, forced large numbers of women to leave the domestic circle and to work in factories and offices. Many regretted this, but it is to-day impossible to turn back. Under these conditions it is now more than ever the woman's duty to make the family the sanctuary of her life. For the unmarried girl, this may mean sacrificing the more independent life and pleasures which many of her companions enjoy freely. It is a case of swimming against the stream, but it is the conduct necessary for the girl who wishes to remain true to her Christian duty. For those who are wives and mothers it is especially difficult to obey the Law of God when they have at once the duties of work in some business and of their domestic cares. Many fail to stand the dual strain and give in.

"The Church's efforts for the payment of a wage sufficient to maintain the worker and his family have always had the purpose of returning the mother and the wife to her true vocation, that of the home. But if the woman has to work in factory or business then she should with double intensity give husband and children her constant care and love.

"The Church has always held that women should receive the same pay as men for equal work and output. To exploit female labour as cheaper would injure not only the women, but also the working man, who would thus risk being out of work."

Where there is a question then of equal work, women

should receive the same pay as men. This is in the interests of society itself—otherwise the head of the family might be left unemployed while women worked for cheaper pay. Where there is no question of equal work, in specifically women's work for example, there could hardly be any case made for a family wage for a woman—in that case women should be entitled to a personal living wage. Rowntree in his book, *The Human Factory in Industry*, in discussing the question of wages, makes an interesting comparison between men's and women's wages. For a man, he says, his wage should be sufficient to allow him to marry, to live in a decent house and to maintain a family of normal size in physical efficiency, and with a margin for contingencies and recreation. (Rowntree is not a Catholic, but this idea of men's wages is very much in line with the teaching of the Popes). Regarding women, he says that a woman's pay should be sufficient to enable her to live comfortably in respectable surroundings. As we have just seen from Pope Pius XII if equal work is involved, this pay would not be considered sufficient, but apart from that the notion seems reasonable.

CHAPTER XVII

PROFIT-SHARING AND CO-PARTNERSHIP

Pope Pius XI in *Quadragesimo Anno* says: "In the present state of human society, however, we deem it advisable that the wage contract should, when possible, be modified somewhat by a contract of partnership, as is already being tried in various ways to the no small gain both of the wage-earners and of the employers. In this way wage-earners are made sharers in some sort in the ownership or the management or the profits." Clearly, then, it is our duty to be deeply interested in those schemes which would seek to make wage-earners sharers in ownership or management or profits, and not only must we be deeply interested, but we are, too, to be alert and critical, so that we may be alive to the defects and shortcomings of some of the proposals which are put forward. The Pope says that "*when possible*, the wage contract should be *modified* by a contract of partnership."

Profit-Sharing.

We may define profit-sharing as an arrangement whereby employees receive an addition to their *regular wage*, from profits, in a proportion *fixed in advance*. The wage contract itself then is primary—there can be no justification for any system which would tend to depress regular wages because of the share in profits. The fixing of the proportion in which capital and labour shall share in profits is not easy. Among many profit-sharing schemes there seems to be no uniformity of practice. It is clear that a fair return must be given to capital in the form of dividends, and a certain amount

must be set aside for reserves and depreciation. But straight away we are up against the problem of what is a fair return to capital? J. L. Garvin wrote in the *Observer*: "The origin of our whole social trouble lies in the rooted belief that labour is not getting its just share. The rewards for the utmost exertion of flesh and blood are limited. The earnings of money alone, even of sleeping capital, may be unlimited. Labour feels about this just as the Middle Ages felt about usury. There must always be an encouraging interest on capital for capital proper. There must always be large and even dazzling rewards for organising and directing ability, for that creative business-building, employment-giving, profit-making power which labour by itself could never supply. But that after wages and salaries are fixed, capital should not be simply free to 'scoop the pool' of profit, however big it may be, which results from the common effort—this whether we like it or not, is the spreading conviction of the majority of the people." The point then is that if the general body of workers considers that the dividend allocation to capital is excessive they will have no great enthusiasm for any scheme of sharing profits. In Ireland, where so many new firms have gone into industry since the founding of the national State, there is no reasonable doubt that some of them have tried to recoup their capital outlay in a very short period of years. Sir Charles Bartlett, Managing Director of Vauxhall, a firm of 20,000 employees, in a lecture in 1946 declared: "I think we are heading steadily towards the definition and limitation of rewards to capital as such."

The Division of Profits.

As regards the methods of division of profits to employees—the most common is that based on the employee's wage or salary, and generally an eligibility

clause of a year or more's connection with the firm is laid down. Profits are generally distributed in one of three ways, or sometimes by a combination of all three, *viz.*, (i) in shares of stock, (ii) in cash, (iii) by allocation to a benefit fund. Trade unions normally are not too keen on profits being distributed in the form of shares or in their allocation to a benefit fund, for they fear it may embarrass the union in regard to action which they desire should be taken in common by all the workers. Some with more shares than others may feel unable to support the action of their fellows, and all may fear a reaction against their benefits, though if the profit-sharing scheme has been mutually agreed to and is drawn up by contract, these fears should be minimized.

Sharing the Losses.

An obvious question arises at this stage: if the workers are to share in profits, should they not also share the losses? For there is no doubt that quite a number of firms crash financially—a fact which pink-hued propagandists conveniently forget. It should be obvious, however, that the workers cannot be asked to bear the losses. That would be to impose an impossible financial burden on them.

Co-Partnership.

Co-Partnership schemes are an extension of profit-sharing schemes. Profit-sharing is one element of co-partnership, but not necessarily the most important. There are three main features of co-partnership:

1. The sharing with the employees of a pre-determined portion of the net profits of business.
2. The enabling of employees to acquire capital in the undertaking.

3. The granting of a share in the management to employees by co-partnership committees, works councils, etc.

This, of course, does not mean that the workers should take over the running of a concern, but rather that they should feel that they are in a real sense partners with the owners or the management. As Mr. Ramage, a former secretary of the Industrial Co-Partnership Association, puts it: "Co-partnership is an effort to translate into industry, so far as its peculiar conditions will allow, the idea of government based on the consent of the governed. The first requirement, therefore, is a leadership capable of inspiring those who have to obey orders, and of earning their confidence that the working arrangements of the business are so organized that the workers can earn as much as industry can afford, that they, too, as well as the owners of capital or the management have a sense of proprietorship in the concern, and that their abilities are properly utilized for the common benefit."

Co-partnership then aims at a sharing of responsibility with the workers, not merely a sharing of profits. Many feel that co-partnership is more in keeping with the innate dignity of every individual. It gives him a sense of status, a feeling that he is something in the firm where he is employed.

G. S. Walpole in his *Management and Men* says: "What will be sought . . . is a relationship which satisfies the deepest-rooted of all human desires—recognition of the dignity of man as man . . . it is not a matter of a man being accorded the privilege, *although an employee*, of stating a complaint or offering a suggestion; but of his having a recognised responsibility for doing so *because he is an employee*, and therefore a joint partner in the enterprise, in which he is investing not his money, but his life."

Recent Developments.

The last war and the direct necessities which it imposed upon industry saw the birth and growth of joint production committees in Great Britain, the United States, Canada and Australia. At the end of 1944 it was estimated that in Great Britain 3,500,000 workers were covered by joint production committees. These committees were normally composed of an equal number of representatives of management and staff; it was their business to study how to increase the productivity of the undertaking. They were purely advisory in character.

After the war the number of such committees declined in the United States and Great Britain. According to the *International Labour Review* of February, 1949, there were, however, in existence in U.S.A., in 1948, 287 committees in undertakings ranging in size from 15 to over 40,000 workers. In Great Britain the National Advisory Council, which is composed of an equal number of employers and Trades Union Congress men, in 1947 recommended to employers' organizations and trade unions the setting up of joint consultative machinery, where it did not already exist, for the regular exchange of views between employers and workers on production questions, provided it was clearly understood that such machinery would be purely voluntary and advisory in character.

In Canada joint production committees have increased in number since the war. From 250 at the end of 1944 the figure rose to 615 by March, 1949 (*International Labour Review* of June, 1949). According to the same *Review*, committees have been set up in all undertakings employing at least twenty workers in Norway, and twenty-five in Denmark and Sweden. Their functions are purely advisory, but their competence is wider than the dealing with production questions "since they also

have important functions in regard to other economic questions and to social questions. In the last named respect, it may be said, generally speaking, that they are required to promote the best possible conditions of labour in the undertaking, to improve the general welfare of the workers and to contribute to the development of vocational training." These committees were set up in Scandinavia as the result of agreements between the central organizations of employers and workers. The Norwegian agreement was concluded in December, 1945, the Swedish in August, 1946, and the Danish in September, 1947.

Under French and Belgian legislation works councils are compulsory in all undertakings permanently employing at least fifty persons.

Trade Unions and Works Councils.

Two quotations from the *International Labour Review* of June, 1949, just quoted, are of interest. First, "through the works councils, the trade unions have assumed very much wider functions. Besides continuing to defend the occupational interests of the workers, they are now directly interested in the life of the undertakings. And aware of the increased responsibilities which fall upon them, they are seeing to it that their members have the preparation they need for the proper discharge of their new duties." And secondly, "the establishment of a works council does not necessarily mean an immediate improvement in the workers' material circumstances, but their right to play an active part in the organization of production has been recognised. From being mere "hands" they are becoming true collaborators in the undertakings to which they belong, and they may well come to exert a profound influence on the economic life of their country."

Happy Industrial Relations the First Essential.

Progress in human relationships in industry must come before profit-sharing schemes can be entertained. In the immediate future co-partnership ideals without profit-sharing should be the objective. No profit-sharing scheme can function successfully where there is mutual suspicion, and this suspicion and distrust must first be broken down. In a Review of Profit-Sharing published in the *International Labour Review* of December, 1950, we read: "The history of profit-sharing in all countries where it has been left to voluntary enterprise, as in the United Kingdom and the United States, is full of examples of plans started with high hopes and ended in failure, sometimes after many years of operation. In a few rather exceptional cases it has been a spectacular success, but judging from the long list of abandoned plans, and the comparatively small number that have endured for more than a few years, the contribution that profit-sharing can make to the promotion of healthy and happy industrial relations and to more efficient production seems to be rather problematical." An important conclusion is: "In fact, profit-sharing can hardly be introduced as the first item in a sound industrial relations programme; it should be among the last."

The Views of Statesmen.

In England the Liberals and Conservatives place profit-sharing and co-partnership as one of the main planks in their political platforms. In our own country responsible opinion is becoming increasingly interested in these schemes. Mr. Costello in a speech to the Master Builders' Association in January, 1951, declared: "All industry is a partnership of capital and labour. Only by the fullest use of the resources of both can the highest levels of production and efficiency be obtained. In the workshops and factories the partnership of capital and

labour at present finds its expression. Is it not permissible to hope that the representatives of capital can make a significant contribution, with a betterment of relations between employers and workers, by an extension of the partnership which has already been established in the factory and workshop, if not immediately to the director's table, at least working towards the creation of a system which would give the workers an opportunity of having a voice in matters pertaining to the rôle of the workers in industry?"

Mr. Lemass in November, 1950, speaking to a resolution at the Ard-Fheis of Fianna Fáil regarding partnership and profit-sharing said "The Ard-Fheis should go on record as having approved of the idea and instructing the National Executive to examine it." He spoke encouragingly of the resolution, but added some salutary words of warning: "It was necessary that the workers should know that any plan for giving effect to the idea of partnership and sharing profits conferred on them not merely advantages but also responsibilities." He pointed out: "We had got in many industries grounds for the establishment of industrial councils relating to matters of great interest to both workers and management." He made a most important observation when he declared that "any plan for the workers' participation in the management of industry must not interfere with the authority or discipline of management." That proviso is sometimes overlooked, but the present Holy Father, as we shall see, has emphasised it in two of his allocutions.

Addresses of Pope Pius XII.

On May 7th, 1949, Pope Pius XII addressed the International Union of Catholic Employers' Associations. He pointed out that "managers and workmen are not irreconcilable antagonists. They are partners in a common work." He deplored the growing tendency of

socialization and nationalization, rather than the growth of vocational organization in which workers would be given an equitable share in the formation and development of the national economy. On the level of the vocational or occupational group he asserted with Pius XI the common responsibility of all the partners in industry. But as regards the individual business he declared: "The owner of the means of production, whoever that may be—an individual proprietor, a workers' co-operative or a public company—must remain master of his economic decisions."

On June 3rd, 1950, in an address to the International Congress of Social Studies and the International Christian Social Union, the Holy Father warned against the danger of shifting economic authority from persons to anonymous groups. He went on to say that "a similar danger is likewise present when it is claimed that the wage-earners in a given industry have the right to economic joint-management, notably when the exercise of this right rests in reality, directly or indirectly, with organizations managed from outside the establishment." He added that "neither the nature of the labour contract nor the nature of the business enterprise in themselves admits necessarily of a right of this sort."

The Holy Father seems to have had in mind certain extravagant claims made by some in Western Germany regarding the question of sharing management. He emphasises for us what Pope Pius XI had taken pains to point out, namely, that the wage-contract in itself is not unbecoming or degrading to man. Strict justice is fulfilled if a man receives a family wage. To demand co-management and profit-sharing as due in strict justice would imply that the wage-contract is unjust. Pope Pius XI spoke of the *advisability*, when possible, of modifying the wage-contract by a contract of partnership—that is not to say that the worker has a strict right in justice to it.

The furtherance, then, of co-partnership ideals is not hindered in any way by the words of the Holy Father; rather is he warning against an uncritical and extravagant advocacy of labour participation in management.

That this is the view of the Holy Father is clearly shown in a letter written by Monsignor Montini on behalf of Pope Pius XII to the 25th Italian Catholic Social Week held at Turin in September, 1952. In that we read: "Our Holy Father Pius XII has many times referred to the juridico-social position of the workers in enterprise, distinguishing that which belongs within the sphere of natural right and that which forms part of the aspirations of the working classes and which, therefore, can be pursued by legitimate means as an ideal. . . In the main, therefore, there is actually no true right of a worker to co-management; but this does not prevent employers from granting participation in some form and measure to the workman, just as it does not impede the State from conferring upon labour the means of making its voice heard in the management of certain industries and in certain cases, where the overwhelming power of anonymous capital, left to itself, manifestly harms the community." Monsignor Montini went on to refer to the discourse of His Holiness of March 11th, 1945, wherein he declared: "The time has now come to abandon empty phrases and to think with *Quadragesimo Anno* about a new organization of the productive powers of the people. Over and above the distinction between employers and workers, let men know how to see and recognize that higher unity which mutually binds all who collaborate in production, which means to say the unity and solidarity in their joint duty of providing firmly for the common good and the needs of the entire community. Would that this solidarity extended itself to every branch of production, that it became the foundation of a better economic order, of a

healthy and just autonomy, and that it opened the way for the working classes toward gaining honestly their share of responsibility in the conduct of the national economy. In such a way, thanks to this harmonious co-ordination and co-operation, and to this more intimate union of his labour with the other factors of economic life, the worker will come to find in his work a reasonable return which is sufficient to sustain himself and his family, a true satisfaction of the spirit and a powerful stimulus toward his own perfection" (N.C.W.C. Service).

Conclusion.

It is on a new spirit prevailing that one must rely for the future. Until a spirit of mutual trust and partnership prevails, the wage-contract will be the chief safeguard of society. It indeed will always be fundamental, even should profit-sharing and co-partnership help to modify it in some cases. But because so many of us are borne along on the waves of avarice, suspicion and power, the wage-contract will be for most men their sheet anchor. Profit-sharing and co-partnership involve an appeal to the things of the spirit, and the more the Gospel of Our Lord influences men and women, the more will industry welcome such schemes.

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